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Governor Claiborne Jackson of Missouri and his fellow pro-Secessionists tried to 
nudge the ostensibly neutral state of Missouri into the Confederacy. Taking advantage of 
controversial Federal actions, they were able to mobilize thousands of Missourians into 
the Missouri State Guard under commanding General Sterling Price. The Missouri State 
Guard had to win victories in order to raise popular support against the Federal 
government while fostering an alliance with the Confederate Army. It largely 
accomplished this task throughout 1861. By early 1862, however, the possibility of a 
Confederate Missouri was still lost. Despite a string of victories, Price and many within 
the State Guard hamstrung coordinated efforts with the Confederate army through poor 
discipline, short-sighted strategies, and the overbearing and ill-advised politicking and 
personal attacks conducted by Price and his supporters. 
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CHAPTER I 
Who Lost Missouri? 
Throughout 1861 and early 1862, the state of Missouri was a major battleground of the 
Civil War. It was a slaveholding state both above the Mason-Dixon Line and on the 
western frontier. In Confederate hands it would not only block Union invasion routes to 
the Trans-Mississippi and Mississippi River theatres, but strangle the North’s Midwestern 
river trade while providing a potential launching point for incursions into states such as 
Illinois. Despite its strategic position, Confederate support for the state’s military force, 
the Missouri State Guard under General Sterling Price, appeared half-hearted and 
lukewarm. A lack of Confederate military support resulted in several aborted campaigns. 
In the later war over memory, former State Guardsmen blamed Confederate General Ben 
McCulloch and other Confederate leaders, up to President Jefferson Davis, for the loss of 
Missouri. They claimed that if not for the prejudice and over-cautiousness of Confederate 
generals the state could have been won for the Confederacy. The Confederates should 
have acted more decisively in supporting them and been more on the offensive, and their 
reasons for failing to do so was linked towards their perception of Missourian soldiers as 
mere militia1 The counter-argument, somewhat lining up with Guardsmen’s accusation of 
prejudice, was that the Missouri State Guard was too poorly managed and ill-disciplined 
to ever secure the state and that Confederate assistance would have been pointless.2 There 
is truth to both arguments. This thesis argues that the poor coordination between the State 
Guard and the Confederacy was not because of any disinterest, strategic blindness, or 
 
1 Thomas L. Snead, The Fight for Missouri from the Election of Lincoln to the Death of Lyon, 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), 1886, 254-255. 




   
refusal to work with Missouri’s state troops. It was because of legitimate Confederate 
concerns based on Missouri’s seeming non-committal waffling between neutrality, 
Unionism, and secessionism. While the state’s governor, Claiborne Jackson, was all for 
the Confederacy, he had to be careful in how he guided Missourians towards that cause, 
as the majority of them wished to stay in the Union despite their support for slavery. 
When Missouri was finally recognized as a Confederate state, there were still unresolved 
issues that plagued efforts to get the state out of Union hands. One such issue revolved 
around Sterling Price, who was arrogant and insubordinate when dealing with his 
superiors and with men of equal rank. Price constantly hatched over-ambitious strategies 
instead of adopting a moderate approach, and lambasted those who refused to support his 
grand strategies. These issues resulted in the loss of Missouri to the Confederacy, which 
in turn hastened the loss of proper Confederate territory in 1862. 
The Confederacy was fully aware that Missouri held strategic importance. It was 
ranked third in corn production and was no slouch in horses, mules, lead, and iron. It had 
major river and rail networks that allowed for military flexibility. Its most importance 
resource, however, were thousands of potential recruits, and it in fact had the largest 
military-age white male population of any of the slave states.3 If the Confederates got its 
hands on the state, they could further constrain Union trade and transport along the 
Mississippi. They would have a potential launching point for invasions deep into the 
Midwest while obstructing invasions of its own territory. Even if it, along with Kentucky, 
were to somehow remain neutral, it would contribute to a 600 mile long secure border for 
 
3 Joseph W. McCoskrie, The War for Missouri: 1861-1862, (Chicago: Arcadia Publishing Inc., 
2020). 18; Floyd C. Shoemaker, “The Story of the Civil War in Northeast Missouri,” Missouri Historical 
Review, Vol. VII No. 2 (January, 1913), 65. 
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the seceding states.4 To many veterans of the State Guard, the lackluster Confederate 
support appeared to show great prejudice or ignorance. One believed the Confederate 
government had been blind to the situation in Missouri and too adherent to laws which 
were rendered useless by the war. They “lost to the Confederate cause the field service of 
thousands in north and central Missouri, the material for the best soldiers in the world.”5 
A contributor to Confederate Veteran went so far as to claim that “President Davis didn’t 
want Missouri in the Confederacy. To have it in would only increase his difficulties by 
adding some six hundred miles of defensive border to those now threatened with 
invasion.”6 
What these veterans failed to account for were two aspects of President Davis’ 
defensive policy. In trying to present the Confederacy as a legitimate nation seeking to 
defend itself, he was wary of approving military operations in a neutral state. After all, 
one of the justifications for the Rebellion was the right of states to choose their own 
association free of Federal interference, or what was more widely termed “coercion.” 
Davis applied the same tactic towards the other prominent western neutral state of 
Kentucky. Missouri’s government had many pro-Secessionists, Governor Claiborne 
Jackson among them, yet it declared an armed neutrality and conditional Unionism.7 The 
second aspect of Davis’ policy was the protection of all Confederate territory. This was 
calculated to maintain the support of various governors and other state leaders who would 
 
4 Louis S. Gerteis, The Civil War in Missouri: A Military History, (University of Missouri Press. 
July 6, 2012), 4. 
5 Joseph Mudd, “What I Saw at Wilson’s Creek,” Missouri Historical Review 8, (January 1914), 
89. 
6 James E. Payne, “Early Days of War in Missouri,” Confederate Veteran 39 (February 1931), 60. 
7 William Garrett Piston & Richard W. Hatcher III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil 
War and the Men Who Fought It, (University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 101; Snead, 11-16. 
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not want parts of their states sacrificed for strategic purposes, as well as prove that the 
Confederacy was a nation that could protect its borders. This early war strategy proved to 
be a blunder, stretching military resources thin. The Secessionist presence in Missouri 
was just one voice clamoring for aid in the early days of the war. This enabled the Union 
to destroy scattered pockets of defenses such as Fort Donelson.8 As far as Missouri was 
concerned, this meant that various Confederate generals across the borders were unable 
or hesitant to provide much aid when it would mean exposing their assigned departments 
to invasion. On this count the Confederate government can be assigned some, but not all 
blame for the loss of Missouri. Nonetheless, the Confederacy did indeed have interests in 
Missouri and there was real aid sent in the form of weapons and later actual soldiers. 
The State Guard, like the American Continentals with France in the Revolutionary 
War, had the task of showing its allies that it was possible to win Missouri, and that it 
was worth the cost. Thanks to several notable successes it succeeded in garneting 
support, but not enough to achieve its ultimate aim. Its commander, General Sterling 
Price, proved difficult to work with. He not only quarreled with Confederate officers, 
primarily General Ben McCulloch, but he was terrible at maintaining discipline. Some of 
his subordinate commanders proved entirely unsuited to military command. Elements of 
the rank-and-file themselves could prove unreliable or downright treacherous. Many 
would come for a battle and then leave to work at home, while others were as likely to 
loot from their Confederate allies and civilians as they would from defeated Federals. 
This gave them the appearance of a rowdy and unreliable militia force. 
 




   
These factors created grave tensions, but they do not adequately explain 
McCulloch’s stubborn refusal to launch further operations in Missouri. The problem is 
that the passage of time silenced many of the key decision-makers’ voices. General Price 
died only a couple years after the war, and his collection of papers and documents 
perished in an 1885 fire. Most of what is known about his views can only be pieced 
together by the observations of other persons, many of them biased veterans who revered 
him and others by bitter political and military rivals.9 Governor Claiborne Jackson did not 
even make it past the second year of the war, succumbing to stomach cancer in December 
1862. General McCulloch was killed at the Battle of Pea Ridge on March 7, 1862. His 
right-hand man, Colonel James McIntosh, would have had some valuable insights, but he 
perished in the same fight. Thus the major decision-makers were never able to look back 
on this period with the benefit of hindsight and to provide narratives that might be 
coalesced into a more clarified central one. Whatever the issues between the State Guard 
and the Confederacy, they precluded any possibility of securing Missouri for the South in 
1861 (though there would be one final, tangible opportunity in the early spring of 1862). 
While there were few papers and almost no post-war writings that survived from 
many of the major participants, there is still a wide array of primary sources available. 
The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion was of course valuable. In addition to 
providing a chronology of orders and details of the battles, several of its volumes provide 
insights into some of the tensions between the Confederacy and the Missouri State Guard. 
The absence of some commonly accepted information in contemporary reports disputes 
some of the traditional narrative. While I focus more on the Confederate correspondence, 
 
9 Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West, (LSU Press, 1993), vii. 
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I do look at Union sources at points to ensure that dead Missourians and Confederates are 
not steering my perspective. Some additional information was found from the Journal of 
the Confederate Congress. 
While Price, McCulloch, and others died during the war or did not live long past 
it, there is still an abundance of memoirs and recollections from other individuals. 
Thomas Reynolds, the lieutenant-governor of Missouri, left an unfinished draft of a book, 
published by the University of Missouri Press as General Sterling Price and the 
Confederacy (2009), that details his dealings with Price and Jackson.10 More fervently 
secessionist than Price, Reynolds is naturally more inclined to criticize his political and 
military decisions. However, he does counter-balance the gushing reminiscences of 
former Guardsmen. Thomas Snead’s War for Missouri (1886) is considered one of the 
essential sources for this episode of the Civil War. While of course biased towards the 
State Guard, Snead is comparatively more honest and humble in listing some mistakes. 
Snead served as Price’s adjutant-general and thus had both private insights into the 
command squabbles with McCulloch and the improvisational nature of the State Guard. 
He also served in Missouri’s legislature and provides further information on the events 
leading to war. 
Only two other major officers left their memoirs for posterity (many did not 
survive the war). Of the divisional commanders in the State Guard, only Jeff Thompson 
wrote down full memoirs. He waged a separate guerilla-style war in southeast Missouri, 
so there is far less on the main force under Price, but he did have his own imperfect 
 
10 Reynolds stopped writing his book when he learned of Price’s death. There are two 
interpretations of this action. The more heartwarming one is that stopped out of respect for the former 
general’s death. The more cynical take is that with Price dead, there was no antagonist to fight in a post-war 
battle of memoirs. 
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relations with the Confederacy. Quarter-master General James Harding delivered a 
speech that has been edited and published by James McGhee as Service with the Missouri 
State Guard (2000). In charge of procuring and distributing supplies, Harding was aware 
of the many supply deficiencies of the State Guard and the improvisational solutions. 
Some of the lower-ranking officers and privates also left behind their recollections, with 
Ephraim Anderson providing one of the longer ones: Memoirs: Historical and Personal; 
including the Campaigns of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade (1868). Anderson’s 
memoirs provide a good ground-level look. Veterans, and a few civilians as well, were 
eager to record their memories for posterity, and many of my sources include their 
articles from Confederate Veteran, the Missouri Historical Review, and the Missouri 
Republican, many of the last of these compiled in a series of books edited by Michael 
Banasik. Robert Bevier, a colonel in the State Guard, wrote a history of the First and 
Second Missouri brigades, which were created out of the State Guard at the start of 1862. 
The first half of this book is a general overview and the second contains some of Bevier’s 
personal stories. 
I also have looked at archived material, mainly from the Missouri Historical 
Society. These include various diaries, written-down speeches, and letters which flesh out 
the lives of the State Guard and the perspective of men still living in the historical 
moment. Also available are the journals of the Missouri state legislature that voted 
against secession and a more pro-Confederate convention later in the year. 
Two Trails Publishing in Missouri has done much work to reprint primary sources 
as well as provide organizational data for research. Carolyn Bartels has created a roster of 
all known Guardsmen as well as a simple chronological overview of the war in The Civil 
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War in Missouri Day by Day: 1861 to 1865 (1992). Richard Peterson’s Sterling Price’s 
Lieutenants (1995) is very valuable for keeping track of the various units and officers, 
with footnotes adding pieces of biographical information on the main officers. Ezra 
Werner’s Generals in Gray (1959) and a later sequel, More Generals in Gray (1995), 
have brief but helpful biographies of the generals who served in the Guard’s ranks. There 
are several biographies of Price. The one I have used is Albert Castel’s balanced General 
Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West (1993). Biographies have also been written 
on Thompson (though heavily reliant on his memoirs) and Jo Shelby, a famed cavalry 
officer who started with the State Guard. 
Many secondary sources were valuable in filling in other details, as well as 
putting the memoirs and writings of the participants in their proper context. The Missouri 
Historical Company published county histories, published within living historical 
memory of the war. Joseph McCoskrie Louis Gerteis have written general military 
histories, the former covering the specific timeframe of this thesis. A much earlier 
military history is John McElroy’s Struggle for Missouri (1909). This was written by a 
Union veteran so it provides a balance to the various pro-Confederate writings I utilize. 
And of course I used various battle histories on Wilson’s Creek, the Siege of Lexington, 








   
CHAPTER II 
The Half-Way State 
Missouri had long held a special place in the nation’s struggle with slavery. In fact, the 
solution to one of the great sectional crises was named after the state. In 1820 Missouri 
Territory was approaching statehood. It would be the first state admitted west of the 
Mississippi. The majority of the early settlers had their roots in Virginia or Kentucky 
(which itself was founded primarily by migrant Virginians). Because of this the new state 
was likely going to allow slavery. The slave states would have a two-seat lead in the 
Senate, upsetting the near fifty-year balance of free and slave states. Furthermore, 
abolitionists and others hostile to slavery believed it was unjust and even un-American to 
extend slavery to the new territories. Pro-slavery advocates countered that every state had 
a right to choose whether to be slave or free. The U.S. Government finally hit upon a 
solution. It would allow Missouri to be admitted as a slave state, but northern 
Massachusetts would become a whole new free state: Maine. Furthermore, the Missouri 
Compromise established a boundary between free and slave territory. Aside from 
Missouri, slave states would only be permitted below the latitude, 36 degrees 30 minutes, 
which included the new state’s southern border. This same territory had to have been part 
of the Louisiana Purchase (The annexation of former Mexican territory decades later 
allowed Texas to be admitted as a slave state as well). This restored the balance of free 
and slave states and hopefully headed off any violent conflicts over the boundaries of 
slavery.11 
 
11 Michael F. Holt, The Fate of the Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the Coming of the 
Civil War, (New York: Hill and Wing, 2004), 5-6; Christopher Phillips, Missouri’s Confederate: Claiborne 
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 Despite its admittance as a slave state, Missouri’s practice of the peculiar 
institution somewhat differed from its southern neighbors. While there were a 
considerable number of slaves, they were distributed across smaller landholdings rather 
than massive plantations. If a rural Missourian owned between 20 and 30 he was 
considered a large slaveholder. White immigrants valued slaves more as tools for 
hastening the taming of the western wilderness than for manning large fields. This did not 
necessarily mean easier working conditions, at least in the state’s initial stages of 
development. Most slaves came with their masters from the more temperate climates of 
Virginia and Kentucky and had a shock when dealing with Missouri’s harsh winters and 
steaming summers.12 
Missouri’s proximity to free states also ensured that by 1860 there was a sizeable 
minority of interstate migrants disinterested in or opposed to the institution. Its two, later 
three borders with free states provided various avenues for slave escapes. In 1837, a pro-
slavery mob forced out David Nelson, a Missourian minister and Evangelical missionary 
who publicly expressed abolitionism and handed antislavery literature to both free and 
enslaved blacks. He continued to contest slavery from his Marion College in Quincy, 
Illinois. From this Evangelical college he recruited his students to help slaves in northeast 
Missouri. The slaves would escape to Illinois and then north to Canada. White 
Missourians did not take kindly to these intrusions upon slavery. Over the next couple 
decades they arrested and imprisoned several men for trying to guide slaves to freedom. 
Bands of Missourians, the Anti-Abolition Society, would sometimes cross over into 
 
Fox Jackson and the Creation of Southern Identity in the Border West, (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1959), 27-28. 
12 George Lee, “Slavery and Emancipation in Lewis County, Missouri, Missouri Historical 
Review 65:3 (April 1971), 295-296. 
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Northern states to capture suspected Underground Railroad conductors and in one case 
burned an abolitionist preacher’s chapel down. This ended Marion College’s war on 
slavery, but by the mid-1850s slave runaways were still on a marked increase. The added 
free soil presence in Kansas provided another escape route and the events of Bleeding 
Kansas provided further cover for abolitionist activities. John Brown himself was 
reported to have liberated 68 slaves in a border raid and then sent them to final freedom 
in Canada. In the east the growing link between Illinois and the city of St. Louis provided 
more routes and allies for runaways.13 
Slavery in Missouri was more benign than it was in most other slaveholding 
states, but only in comparison. Smaller landholdings meant less need for bullying 
overseers. Through an 1824 law, Slaves who were carried by their masters into free states 
were allowed to make a case for their freedom. In fact the Dred Scott case was brought 
about when Scott, a slave, was taken to and from Illinois by his master. Scott used the 
1824 law to sue for his freedom and it looked like the Missouri justice system would back 
him up. The Supreme Court, however, denied his freedom, now affirming that blacks in 
America, free or slave, had no rights to citizenship. This further solidified the existence 
and racial justification for slavery and also increased anti-slavery fervor in the North. 
Once again Missouri played a major role in the slavery-driven division in America.14 
While Missouri lacked the staple crops associated with slaveholding, such as 
cotton, it nevertheless saw a major growth in slaves in the decades leading to the Civil 
 
13 Benjamin Merkel, “The Underground Railroad and the Missouri Borders,” Missouri Historical 
Review 37 (April 1943), 271-281; Lee, 308; Oleta Prinsloo, “‘The Abolitionist Factory:’ Northeastern 
Religion, David Nelson, and the Mission Institute near Quincy, Illinois, 1836-1844, Journal of the Illinois 
State Historical Society, Vol. 105, No. 1 (Spring 2012), 40-41, 59-60. 
14 Silvana S. Siddali, Missouri’s War: The Civil War in Documents, (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2009), 12-14, 21-23; Phillips 124-127;  Lee, 303. 
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War. The number of human property tripled to over 114,000 between 1830 and 1860, 
although in terms of percentage of the overall population it did shrink. Much of the cheap 
land available in the western part of the state was gobbled up by poor farmers unable to 
afford slaves, though the populace still affirmed slaveholding as a protected right. As in 
the South, slaveholding conferred a special status among its practitioners. One faction, 
the Boonslick Democrats, believed in an agricultural society guided by wealthy planters 
and merchants, with slave labor as an important component.15 They and other prominent 
Missourians shared the Southern fear that emancipation would lead to a violent race 
war.16 Most of these same Missourians, which included Sterling Price, Claiborne 
Jackson, Jeff Thompson, and others, would find their sympathies naturally inclined 
towards the Confederacy when the secession crisis arrived. 
 Missouri once again found itself at the center of the slavery issue with the 
admittance of Kansas and Nebraska as territories. The South realized at this point that the 
Missouri Compromise had put a severe limit on the extension of slavery, leaving most of 
the West as future free-soil states. Thus Southern Democrats opposed any further 
organization of the West into territories and states until slavery would be allowed. This 
put pressure on Northern Democrats to circumvent or flat-out nullify any compromises 
regarding westward expansion and slavery. Democrats in Missouri were themselves split 
into two factions, one sharing the southern Democrats’ views and the other opposing the 
expansion of slavery into the territories in the hope that slavery would be gradually 
eliminated and the threat of sectional war thus removed. Spearheaded by Illinois senator 
 
15 James E. Muench, Five Stars: Missouri’s Most Famous Generals, (University of Missouri 
Press. 2006), 33-34; Phillips, 124-127. 
16 Doris Land Mueller, M. Jeff Thompson: Missouri’s Swamp Fox of the Confederacy, (Missouri 
University Press, 2007), 18. 
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Stephen Douglas, a coalition of Democrats across the nation devised the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. In this Act Kansas and Nebraska were to be officially organized into 
territories and later states “with or without slavery as their constitution may prescribe at 
the time of their admission.” The inhabitants of the territories would thus vote to decide 
whether they would be slave or free. Controversially, this overturned the Missouri 
Compromise, which established that aside from Missouri no western territories above the 
36 30 parallel could hold slavery. Naturally free-soilers did not appreciate how slavery’s 
limits had been dissolved and Southerners were actually worried that the territories would 
be voted into the free soil camp. Despite strong opposition and dire warnings, President 
Franklin Pierce and both houses approved the Act and passed it in 1854.17 
 The Kansas-Nebraska Act unleashed a wave of violence across the frontier. Much 
of the fault lay with pro-slavery advocates in Missouri. The majority of the prospective 
inhabitants of Kansas were free-soilers, but pro-slavery Missourians feared a free Kansas. 
This would mean that the state’s eastern, northern, and western borders would be ringed 
with free-soil states. There would be stronger economic and political anti-slavery 
pressure, not to mention slaves would have a new avenue of escape.18 They also believed 
the inability to grow slavery would end up destroying it. The lack of assumed necessary 
black labor to cultivate the South and the West “would convert this vast region, into a 
howling wilderness.”19 
 
17 Cong. Globe, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess, 221-222 (1854; Holt, 93-101; H.C. McDougal, “A Decade of 
Missouri Politics – 1860 to 1870. From a Republican Viewpoint,” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. III No. 
2 (January, 1909), 127-128; Brooksher, 7-8. 
18 Larry Wood, Civil War Springfield, History Press, (November, 2011. Kindle Edition, 2011), 11. 
19 Siddali, 27. 
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Hundreds of Missourians crossed westward into Kansas. A good number of them 
had no intention of settling in Kansas, but thanks to a failure on the part of the local 
Federal authority to institute verified residency requirements, they were able to vote 
Kansas into a slave territory with pro-Southern leadership. In some parts of Kansas less 
than ten percent of the votes cast came from actual residents. Irate at this blatant voting 
fraud, free-soilers created their own legislature. A civil war before the Civil War erupted. 
For years pro and anti-slavery factions fought in what was labeled Bleeding Kansas. This 
ensured that by 1861 Missourians both Union and Confederate would have had actual 
combat experience. Bleeding Kansas ended with a free-soiler victory, but it had warned 
the nation that the growing sectional tensions could bring the whole nation into an orgy 
of violence.20 
 The 1860 election hammered home Missouri’s unique position. It was the only 
state in the Electoral College to go over to the moderate Democrat Stephen Douglas 
while the southern states went for the more sectionalist John C. Breckinridge. The 
inhabitants did not care for the new Republican Party, yet were uneasy with the 
secessionist strain emerging in the South. They tended to have cultural and familial ties 
with the South, with a slave culture transplanted by Kentuckians and Virginians. But over 
time it developed stronger economic links with the Northern states. While the Mississippi 
River fostered trade with the South, the emergent railroad system made it much more 
profitable to sell resources to the east in Northern factories. The state found itself in an 
uncertain position after the election of Lincoln and the announced secession of several 
slave states. Should Missouri stay with the Union or join the fledgling Confederacy in 
 
20 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, (Oxford University Press, 1988), 
146-147; Brooksher, 11-12. 
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seceding? In general Missourians wanted to stay with the Union and were hostile or at 
least hesitant towards talk of secession. An editorial in the Western Journal of 
Commerce, which had pulled for Stephen Douglas, stated that anybody who sought to 
initiate disunion or worse a war over the election of Lincoln when the Constitution was 
not visibly threatened was a “traitor.” Another pro-Douglas paper, the St. Louis 
Republican, expressed disappointment with the results of the election, but proudly stated 
that Missouri was the only one that “stood by the regular nominees of the Democratic 
Party” instead of chasing after the pro-Southern Breckinridge. It further pointed out that 
even if Lincoln were to attack protections for slavery, the House of Representatives 
would still be able to check his moves.21 
Missourians were more divided on the issue of helping the North subdue the 
rebellious states through military force should war indeed break out. To those of pro-
slavery or more specifically pro-Southern inclinations it was unethical for the Federal 
government to force them into a war against the South. Missourians began to see 
themselves as a neutral entity. Even more, they began to see their state as the great 
mediator, preventing the anticipated war from breaking out. They argued that Missouri 
was more a state of the West than North or South, and thus not as bound to the sectional 
divisions.22 This feeling was expressed in one local speech by the lawyer Robert S. 
Bevier, a future officer in the State Guard: 
 
21 Siddali, 43-45; Brooksher, 30; Virgil C. Blum, “The Political and Military Actions of the 
German Element in St. Louis, 1859-1861,” Missouri Historical Review 42, (January 1948), 106. 
22 Missouri Convention, Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri State convention held at 
Jefferson City, March, 1861, (St. Louis: George Knapp & Co. Printers and Binders, 1861), 83; The 
“Crittenden compromise” was a possible political solution to head off war. See page 16 for further details. 
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Hence if Missouri with the other border slave States should take her hand 
calmly, considerately, and firmly demand a redress for the aggressions of 
sectional parties - the passage of the Crittenden compromise or similar 
measures, and if that redress is not granted go out of the Union only after a 
full understanding with the other border States, and when they go with us. 
And these border States, or rather the central states, by assuming such a 
position, would command the respect of the extremists of both sections, 
and do more to save the Union and cement together its discordant 
elements than all the politicians of. Coercion is not for a moment to be 
thought of.23 
 These feelings of neutrality and peace were not exactly shared by the winners of 
the 1860 state elections. The seat of governor had previously been occupied by Robert M. 
Stewart, a Democrat who agreed that the South had the right to take their slaves into the 
western territories, but was adamantly opposed to the idea of secession. His successor 
was of course another Democrat, Claiborne Fox Jackson.24 Jackson had been born in 
another state currently advocating for neutrality, Kentucky. He had worked in the 
mercantile business for a while, but transitioned into politics. He associated with the 
Boonslick Democrats, upholding such values as slaveholding and hard currency.25 He 
won the governorship by stressing a moderate stance, supporting Douglas in the national 
election, yet at the same time presenting himself as strongly pro-slavery. He did not 
advocate any secessionism in case of a Republican presidential victory, yet claimed to 
 
23 Robert S. Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri Confederate Brigades: Annotated 
and Illustrated, (Saint Louis: Bryan, Brand, & Co., 1879), 286-289. 
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uphold a state’s right to pursue its own agenda above the nation’s. This strategy won him 
the moderate Democrat vote as well as the support of rural pro-slavery Missourians. 
Jackson’s civilian aide and secretary, former newspaperman Thomas Snead, described 
him as “tall, erect, and dignified; a vigorous thinker, and a fluent and forcible speaker, 
always interesting, and often eloquent a well-informed man, thoroughly conversant with 
the politics of Missouri and of the Union with positive opinions on all public questions.” 
Snead insisted that Jackson “loved the Union, but not with the love with which he loved 
Missouri, which had been his home for forty years, nor as he loved the South, where he 
was born, and where his kindred lived.”26 Jackson publicly professed armed neutrality, 
yet his sympathies were indeed pro-Confederate. As a Boonslick Democrat he believed 
that slavery was an essential to a healthy westward-growing democracy. 
As he would throughout his two years of governorship, he publicly displayed a 
desire for moderation, yet his true sympathies were heavily slanted in favor of the South. 
He could gain the support of many Missourians, yet only through obscuring his pro-
Confederate leanings.27 He had to walk a political tightrope, acting the part of neutral 
conciliator while searching for a way to bring Missouri into the Confederacy. 
Unfortunately this resulted in a mismatch between his words to the Missouri populace, 
his words to the Confederate government, and his actions. To one close observer he 
“changed his opinion… every hour of the day.”28 
In his farewell address, exiting governor Stewart urged a moderate stance of 
neutrality. He proclaimed that Missouri was “able to take care of herself, and will be 
 
26 Snead, 17-18. 
27 Phillips, 227. 
28 Thompson, 59. 
18 
 
   
neither forced nor flattered, driven or coaxed, into a course of action that must end in her 
destruction.” It would not let slavery within her borders be threatened by “unfriendly 
legislation of the North, nor be dragooned into secession by the extreme South.” 
Following up with his own address, Claiborne Jackson quickly set about stirring up pro-
Southern sentiment. He claimed the Republican Party was a sectional power that would 
impose its agenda on the whole nation. He further lamented that Missouri was treating 
the danger to the South with “philosophical equanimity” and would unexpectedly find 
itself in the coercive grip of the North. He admitted that South Carolina had been hasty in 
pursuing secession, but that the North’s response was “more fatal” in its widespread 
attempt at suppression. He tellingly used the favored Southern term “coercion” in 
referring to the Federal government’s actions. Any support he expressed for the Union 
was conditional, matching the mood of Missourians in general. “So far as Missouri is 
concerned, her citizens have ever been devoted to the Union, and she will remain in it so 
long as there is any hope that it will maintain the spirit and guarantees of the 
Constitution.” Naturally any act of war against the South could be seen as “coercion,” 
thereby ensuring that Missouri’s government would not fight with the North.29 At the end 
of his address he called for a “thorough organization of our militia” to ensure Missouri’s 
“honor and safety,” in other words armed neutrality.30 This was the origin point of the 
Missouri State Guard, a consolidated force made up of pre-existing and future militia 
units. 
The commander of the militia was senator and now Colonel Daniel Frost. Frost, a 
veteran of border skirmishes with Kansas Jayhawkers, was sent to the St. Louis Arsenal 
 
29 Snead, 18-22. 
30 Snead, 25. 
19 
 
   
in late January to ensure that it would supply Missouri’s military, not the U.S. 
Government’s. It was indeed an impressive arsenal, with 60,000 muskets, plenty of 
ammunition for those muskets, 50 pieces of artillery, and machinery which could produce 
more arms and ammunition. If the arsenal’s contents were to end up in the militia’s 
hands, the Missouri State Guard would have no lack of equipment for armed neutrality, 
or even a war against the Federal government. While Frost set on his mission, Jackson 
was already writing to Confederate officials with requests for arms and ammunition. He 
even wrote the chief of ordnance in Washington D.C. for guns and a gun carriage to serve 
as a model.31 
Jackson’s lieutenant-governor was Thomas Reynolds, an avid pro-Southerner. On 
January 17, he delivered a speech to the state senate in which he argued for separation 
from the North, or preferably the deposing of Lincoln and his Republicans from power. 
He argued that one nation could not exist because the states did not share the same 
“domestic institutions.” Half the states outlawed slavery while half practiced it, and even 
then slavery’s perpetual existence was not guaranteed. Because the Union had not 
universally accepted and practiced slavery, it could not stand. He echoed the secessionist 
argument that if slavery could not expand west, than the society built on it would stagnate 
and die.32 As a slave state on the western frontier, Missouri had every right to sever ties 
with a government which would limit the expansion of slavery while proposing a policy 
(that would come to life in the Homestead Act) which would allow free-soilers to grab all 
the remaining land in the West. He further argued that the southern Confederacy would in 
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fact be the legitimate United States of America, as so many of the prominent founding 
fathers were southern slaveholders and slavery originally existed in all the colonies.33 
With powerful voices advocating resistance to the Federal government or support 
for the Confederacy, Missouri had to clarify its position. In February Jackson’s 
government called for a convention to “consider the then existing relations between the 
Government of the United States, the people and Governments of the different States, and 
the Government and people of the State of Missouri; and to adopt such measures for 
vindicating the sovereignty of the State and the protections of its institutions.” In other 
words would Missouri side with the North, South, or try to stay out of the emerging 
conflict?34 Tellingly, commissioners from already seceded states such as Georgia and 
Mississippi sat in on parts of the convention, sometimes joining in to make the case for 
secession and influence th delegates.35 There was a hope among some Missourians that 
the convention would result in Confederate membership. First they would have to 
convince the Unionists. There were the Unconditional Unionists who were adamantly 
against any support for the Rebellion and the Conditional Unionists who might be 
persuaded. 
Former governor Sterling Price was a major advocate of Conditional Unionism at 
the convention. Price and his family had originally lived in Virginia, moving to Missouri 
in 1830. Using his family’s prominence, he pursued a career in politics. As a Boonslick 
Democrat he served in the state House of Representative for two terms and in one of 
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those terms as its speaker. He raised and led a regiment of volunteers in the Mexican 
War, in which he put down an uprising in New Mexico Territory. During his military 
tenure he proved to be stubborn and insubordinate. At one point he disobeyed orders to 
hold back in light of the war-ending Guadalupe-Hidalgo Treaty. He started a battle in 
which surrendering Mexicans were killed. Despite his blatant disobedience and the 
following unnecessary violence, he was regarded as a hero in his home state and won a 
term as governor in the mid-1850s. Now, in the Secession Crisis, he found himself once 
again deeply involved in politics.36 
In post-war writings Price was often portrayed as a noble conditional Unionist, 
but he could come off as a political opportunist, hitching himself to whatever the majority 
view was. Lieutenant-Governor Reynolds, a post-war critic, recalled how he briefly set 
aside his Conditional Unionism to ingratiate himself with Jackson’s pro-secessionist 
administration. This got him an appointment as bank commissioner. However, having 
gotten when he wanted, he suddenly became a strong Unionist again, drawing others to 
his point of view through his considerable personality and influence.37 Reynolds may 
well have blamed Price for the results of the convention, which would not affirm 
secessionism. If Price had come out more strongly in support of secession, then Missouri 
may have likewise come out more strongly on the Confederate side, resulting in more 
solid military and economic support from the South’s emerging nation. 
The Conditional Unionists held on to the unrealistic expectation of national peace. 
They pushed for the Crittenden Plan, a “compromise” that was being touted at the time as 
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the way to avert war. Aside from affirming the geographic boundaries of the Missouri 
Compromise, the Crittenden Plan was by no means compromising, promising to 
decisively uphold slavery in the Constitution and to quell anti-slavery activism. Missouri 
hoped to work with delegates from the other unseceeded slave states (which at the time of 
the convention still included future Confederate states such as Virginia and Tennessee) to 
promote such guarantees of continued slavery. The Daily Republican (not a pro-
Republican party paper though the editorials and reporting showed a Unionist slant. In 
fact it was founded years before the party’s formation) optimistically reported in January 
that the Crittenden Compromise would be accepted by Republicans and Democrats, as 
the majority of both factions earnestly desired the union’s preservation. Only extremists 
centered in Massachusetts and South Carolina were calling for disunion with their 
obstinate, uncompromising attitudes. Neutral Conditional Unionism itself was too 
strongly inclined towards the South to survive as an idea. Price and other adherents 
pledged to stand with the South if the North resorted to force.38 More realistic voices 
pointed out that even if the Southern states were let off in peace, Missouri would still be 
attacked. It was too far north and had too much control over major waterways to be 
allowed as an independent state, much less part of the Confederacy.39 Unconditional 
Unionists further argued that Conditional Unionism was too confrontational, making 
demands for compromise or else. This would provoke heavier Federal interference in the 
state.40 
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The delegates were in favor of slavery, and argued that it was a right passed down 
from America’s founding generation, but some provided criticisms that attacked the 
foundations of the emergent Confederacy. One, Alexander Doniphan, a particularly 
respected Missourian, shared the Confederacy’s belief that the Northern states had 
unconstitutionally assaulted slavery through improper legislation, and also had allowed 
mobs to hide fugitive slaves and “abduct” others traveling north with their masters. At the 
same time he found the secessionists to be foolishly misguided in their venture. The 
Confederacy was bound to fail because its platform was caught up on one single point: 
expansion of slavery. Eventually divisions along other interests would fracture it. There 
was no reason for Missouri to get involved in a single-issue dispute. He re-conjured the 
image of Missouri as the great conciliator state, that is was her “glorious mission…to aid 
in arresting the progress of revolution and in restoring peace and prosperity to the 
country.”41 A few days later another delegate responded to a Georgian’s insistence that 
Missouri should secede. He pointed out that all previous legislation regarding slavery had 
been bi-partisan and there was yet no approved legislation challenging to the existence of 
slavery or the inequality between whites and blacks. Therefore, rushing to secession and 
likely war over fearful speculation was a grave mistake. There was great hesitance in 
joining a war for slavery when slavery was not necessarily threatened by the Federal 
government.42 
The final verdict came up overwhelmingly against secession. About 110,000 of 
the 140,000 delegates cast their votes against it. In fact the bulk of the convention was 
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spent justifying this decision as well as figuring out a way to peacefully reassemble the 
Union. The delegates’ final resolution noted that Missouri could not last against the 
North, as it was bordered by too many pro-Union states. It would be wiser to seek 
neutrality and avoid possible destruction. Though its sympathies still lay with the South, 
“there exists no adequate cause why Missouri should secede from the Union, and…she 
will do all that she can to restore peace to the same by satisfactory compromises.” It 
instead should try to bring back the seceding states by showing how peaceful measures 
within the government and Constitution could work in lieu of violence.43 The results of 
the convention were a serious blow to Jackson’s hopes. There was pro-Southern 
sentiment throughout the state, but it was not strong enough to drive it into the arms of 
the Confederacy. Also his military bill, which sought to strengthen and organize the 
militia into a large defensive force, was put in limbo. He did have some reason to cling to 
his hope. The majority of delegates resolved that they would not support any “coercive” 
measures and would indeed “resist and oppose any attempt” to involve Missouri in these 
measures. Many of the delegates likely meant peaceful resistance, but even that might 
bring about rougher Federal measures and thus more incentive towards armed resistance. 
There was also a call at the convention for Federal soldiers to “withdraw” from their forts 
in the state, in the hopes that this would de-escalate tensions. This was a serious 
challenge to Federal authority and in fact raised the suspicions of Unconditional 
Unionists such as prominent house representative Francis Blair, Jr., the brother of 
President Lincoln’s postmaster general Montgomery Blair.44 
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Secessionism looked more within Jackson’s grasp on April 12. Secessionist forces 
in Charleston, South Carolina bombarded a Federal garrison in Fort Sumter. The Civil 
War had begun. Many continued to hope for Missouri’s neutrality, but the incident 
spurred radical secessionists and fervent Unionists to action. Under the direction of Blair, 
who had a direct link to Lincoln through his brother, the Federal army reinforced the 
garrison at St. Louis Arsenal, while on the others side of the state Secessionists plotted to 
seize the weapons depot in Liberty. Jackson did not publicly support secession, but 
refused to raise any troops to suppress the Confederacy. The question remained that, if 
forced, which side would most Missourians take? A tragic occurrence in St. Louis would 
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CHAPTER III 
Missouri Swings South 
Unionists and Federal officers in Missouri had good reason to believe the state might 
pitch in with the South. In St. Louis, the most important city in the state, pro-
Secessionists formed the Minutemen, a militia group in opposition to similar pro-Union 
German organizations. These German groups, originating as the Wide Awakes, were the 
first of the Home Guards, a militia force created with the oversight of representative 
Francis Blair, Jr. Missouri’s German immigrant population, which made up about half of 
St. Louis’ inhabitants, was its most reliable Unionist element. They had fled their 
European homelands after the failed 1848 revolutions, seeking democracy and 
republicanism in America. They gave Missouri the sixth largest German-American 
population in the country. Of the over 88,000 who migrated there, about 50,000 were 
centered in and around St. Louis. They quickly grew loyal to their new national 
government and had little liking for the aristocratic slave-holding society of the South. 
Like most immigrant groups of the time, they had initially aligned with the Democrats, 
but shifted towards the Republican Party after the Kansas-Nebraska Act. They wanted 
free soil to the west, not out of any moral concern for the blacks, but because they did not 
want to have prospective prosperity ruined by competition with free slave labor.46 
As a result of these immigrants’ views, anti-slavery politicians such as William H. 
Seward made statements such as “Missouri is Germanizing herself to make herself free.” 
In turn, many native-born Americans treated them with contempt and distrust. They 
called them the “Damned Dutch” and even suspected those who voted Democrat of being 
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“Black Republicans at heart.” They viewed the immigrants as “the means for carrying out 
the objects of the dastard enterprise,” that enterprise being Abolitionism. One Democratic 
judge wrote to Jackson (before he was governor) that “Yankee abolitionists & German 
radicals” were out to turn Missouri into a “second Illinois” and were already doing so in 
the city of St. Louis. The city’s district had gone over to the Republicans in the 1860 
election thanks to the efforts of the Wide Awakes. The Wide Awakes were Germans 
armed with sticks and lanterns. Their job was to protect Republican events. When anti-
Republican harassment threatened these events they would respond in force and drive out 
the perpetrators. The Minutemen recognized the political threat posed by the Germans 
and were eager to put them down. They blatantly flew the Confederate flag from their 
headquarters in the hope that this would provoke the German population. If the German 
militia struck first, then they could play off the prejudices of fence-sitters and rally them 
to the pro-Southern cause.47 While the Minutemen did not achieve this aim in the 
intended way, something like it would indeed occur. 
 All across the state towns formed militia units. These could be split into three 
types. There were pro-Union militias, many of them who did not care about slavery one 
way or the other, but did not want to see their republic fracture. Germans were a heavy 
presence in these militias. Their Wide Awakes and Union clubs had quickly undertaken 
military training. Blair armed them with muskets, but was careful to purchase them from 
Illinois and Unionists rather than from the St. Louis Arsenal. Doing so would have 
caused a stir. Then there were legitimately neutral militias who vowed to fight anybody 
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who would make them choose a side. Finally there were the pro-secessionist militias, 
most of the larger ones in the north and west, which would help make up the State Guard, 
as well as furnish most of its officers. Many of these men had received the onset of war 
“with joy,” eager to strike a blow for southern independence. One town passed a 
resolution that the militia would stand up for “Southern Rights” while another saw its 
women sew together a Confederate flag for the men. Thompson stated in his memoirs 
that though his men had a seemingly neutral white flag with the Missouri coat of arms, 
the “Southern blood that was known to flow in our veins, was a sure indication of our 
proclivities.” The Minutemen in St. Louis plainly stated that in “the event of a disruption 
of this Union, the honor and safety of Missouri impel her to espouse the cause of the 
Southern states, and, in such case, we should endeavor to unite all slave-holding States in 
one Confederacy.” In some cases towns were so divided in sentiment that two militias 
sprang up in the same place. All claimed self-defense, but it was evident that most were 
prepared to pitch in with the Union or the Confederacy.48 
Governor Jackson himself was preparing for a fight, under the auspices of armed 
neutrality while at the same time pushing for secession in private correspondence. In one 
April 19 letter to David Walker, a representative from the still unseceeded state of 
Arkansas, he wrote, “From the beginning my own convictions have been that the interest, 
duty, and honor of every slaveholding state demand their separation from the northern or 
non-slaveholding states.” Abolitionism was “the most damnable and hellish crusade that 
was ever waged against any people upon earth.” He urged Arkansas to secede as well due 
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to strategic considerations. To the south of the state, it blocked a geographic joining with 
the Confederacy. In Jackson’s mind Arkansas’ secession would enable Missouri to freely 
exit the Union.49 
 Jackson was disappointed that secession had not succeeded at the February 
convention, but he understood that Missourians’ Unionism was mostly conditional. If he 
could prompt some unpopular Federal action, than he could convince his constituents that 
the Union did not serve and in fact threatened their interests. He would also play on their 
elevation of state over nation. Under his direction the state legislature passed a bill giving 
him control over St. Louis’s police force. He hoped to use this to stack the police board 
with pro-secessionists, rendering the city’s Federal arsenal vulnerable.50 Around this time 
Jackson made David Frost, the commander of the militia, a brigadier-general of 
volunteers. At St Louis, Frost took control of the pro-secessionist Minutemen.  He did 
this under the guise of an 1858 law which raised a militia force in each district of 
Missouri.51 This was the next step in the creation of the Missouri State Guard. Jackson 
and his associates also supplied Frost with weapons, including several artillery pieces 
shipped in from the Confederacy. While publicly proclaiming that the militia was only 
taking the St. Louis arsenal’s contents to defend the state from anyone who would violate 
her neutrality, Jackson revealed different motivations in some of his private 
correspondence. “I do not think Missouri should secede today or tomorrow…I want a 
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little time to arm the state… Missouri should act in concert with Tennessee and 
Kentucky. They are all bound to go out, and should go together if possible.”52 
These actions did not go unnoticed by the Federal presence. Blair was dissatisfied 
with the commanders in St. Louis, finding them too cautious or perhaps even too 
sympathetic to rebellious elements. Indeed Major William Bell, in charge of the St. Louis 
Arsenal, was a Secessionist in collusion with Jackson and Frost. Blair particularly found 
the ranking commander, General William S. Harney, soft and inactive. Harney was a true 
Unionist, but was heavily embedded in pro-Southern culture thanks to his connections, 
including through marriage, to prominent pro-Southerners. Blair used his connections 
with this father Francis Blair, Sr. an influential ally of President Lincoln, to place Captain 
Nathaniel Lyon, an energetic and temperamental man of quick action and a sense of 
uncompromising morality, in charge of the St. Louis Arsenal.53 Lyon indeed acted fast, 
using a steamer to move much of the arsenal’s contents across the Mississippi River to 
Illinois. He further fortified the arsenal with the German Home Guards. 
On the other side of the state Governor Jackson ordered Captain George 
Moorman, a pro-Secessionist attorney, to take his militia, the Independence Grays, to the 
arsenal at Liberty and seize it. The mission was delegated to Henry L. Routt, an 
influential attorney in Liberty. Arriving at the arsenal with a force of mounted volunteers, 
Routt’s only opposition was Major Nathaniel Grant and a book of military regulations. 
Grant’s attempts to dissuade the men with the rules and articles of war came to naught. 
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He had to stand aside while the Secessionists grabbed a brigade’s worth of weaponry. 
Overall the Missourians seized 3 six-pound cannon, 12 cannon barrels, five caissons, 
1,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 1,180 muskets, 250 rifles, 119 carbines, 100 
pistols, 420 sabers, 40 swords, 450,000 cartridges, 2,550 pounds of powder, and various 
other pieces of military equipment. All were carried away in wagons save for the big gun, 
which was ridden by a Guardsman waving his hat in celebration. Not all of the powder 
and ammunition could be carried, so it was for the time hidden in haystacks until they 
could be transported.54 Jackson opened up a private correspondence with President Davis 
about this time. Davis approved of the seizure at Liberty, writing “we look anxiously and 
hopefully for the day when the star of Missouri shall be added to the constitution of the 
Confederate States of America.”55 
Equipment was also expected from the Confederacy. Representatives of Jackson’s 
government had already made contact with Confederate authorities in an effort to arm 
Missouri. They met Confederate officials in Montgomery, Alabama, to procure big guns 
for Frost’s militia. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, shipped large crates of “marble” up the 
Mississippi. As it turned out these crates contained four artillery pieces, three cannon and 
one mortar, along with ammunition, all seized from the Federal arsenal in Baton Rouge.56 
With his artillery, Frost set his men on the outskirts of St. Louis on May 6. They named 
their base Camp Jackson. 
 
54 James E. Payne, “The Taking of Liberty Arsenal,” Confederate Veteran 38 (January 1930), 15; 
W.H. Woodson, History of Clay County, Missouri, (Topeka, Kansas: Historical Publishing Co., 1920), 124; 
Michael Gillespie, “The Battle of Rock Creek,” Civil War Times Illustrated Vol. 30 No. 1 (March/April 
1991), 36. 
55 Snead, 168. 
56 Carolyn Bartels, The Civil War in Missouri Day by Day: 1861-1865, (Two Trails Publishing, 
1992), 4; McPherson, 291; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies Vol. III, (Washington D.C. 1894), 4-5. 
32 
 
   
Frost’s militia had some Confederate arms, but was in a tricky position. They had 
moved into position too late. Francis Blair, Jr. and Nathaniel Lyon had acted quickly and 
already secured the arsenal. In fact, much of its contents were now stored safely across 
the river in Illinois. Still, Camp Jackson remained and Lyon wanted to do something 
about this potential threat, which everyone knew contained many “secessionists of the 
boldest and most radical stripe.” General Harney, still overall commander in Missouri, 
restrained him. He ordered Lyon to stay put and focus only on defending the arsenal. 
Harney also commanded a stop to the arming of pro-Unionists in St. Louis. Blair 
intervened on Lyon’s behalf and gave him the go-ahead. On May 10 Lyon marched the 
Home Guards out of St. Louis and approached Camp Jackson.57 
Frost asked Lyon what he was up to, only to learn that he and his men were to be 
arrested for unlawful assembly. A letter from Lyon accused him and his men of plotting 
to seize Federal property, of communications with the “so-called Southern Confederacy,” 
and of accepting Confederate weapons and supplies, much of it stolen U.S. government 
property. Frost protested, assuring Lyon that his men had sworn an oath “to sustain the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States and of this State [Missouri] against all 
violence…” His men had all taken the same oath and had only flown US and Missouri 
flags. However, he admitted that in spite of Lyon’s “unconstitutional actions”, his men 
were unprepared for any battle and he thus had no choice but to “comply with your 
demand.” Once Frost’s men were disarmed and marched out as prisoners, Lyon found 
evidence that contradicted Frost’s protests. Several of the avenues in Camp Jackson were 
named after prominent Confederates, including President Jefferson Davis and General 
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P.G.T. Beauregard, the latter the South’s preeminent war hero. He also found and 
identified the artillery pieces from the Baton Rouge Arsenal. Here was firm evidence of 
collusion with the Confederacy.58 
The seizure of Frost’s militia proved unpopular with much of St. Louis’ citizenry. 
Many were upset that the “German rabble, composed of soldiers of the lower element of 
the city, recruited from the saloons and dives” were marching prominent men from St. 
Louis to prison. As the Home Guards escorted the prisoners through the streets, 
onlookers hurled curses and insults at them. A favorite was “Damn the Dutch!” Words 
turned to violence when shots were heard. This spark to violence remains unclear. Initial 
reports were heavily biased. Pro-Secessionists claimed that the undisciplined Home 
Guards cracked under the barrage of insults and fired vengefully into the crowd. Lyon’s 
report as well as other Union sources claimed the crowd had fired on the soldiers first, 
most specifically one drunkard who stumbled in front of the procession and used his 
pistol. Whatever the cause, the violence was lopsided in the Home Guards’ favor. 28 
civilians were killed and dozens more wounded. Worse, there were women and children 
present in the throng and some of these were among the victims. The most infuriating 
image that came out of the event was one child who was shot out of his mother’s arms.59 
As tensions rose following the Camp Jackson Affair, the Federal authorities 
offered parole to the prisoners. Many refused, feeling that their arrest had been 
completely unlawful and in violation of Missouri’s state power. One officer, Emmett 
MacDonald, “would not sign the Parole of honor,” stating that he had “already sworn to 
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defend the Flag and Constitution of my Country and I was not to be intimidated by a lot 
of Dutch.” He ended up in an Illinois court arguing against the illegality of the entire 
Camp Jackson Affair. His objection that state militia could not be disarmed by the 
Federal government actually received some serious consideration, but the trial never 
concluded as he and the others were released. Despite his protestations of loyalty to 
Constitution and country, MacDonald would join most of the Camp Jackson men in the 
State Guard to fight these ideals. Most of those who accepted the terms of parole would 
violate them, arguing correctly that their imprisonment was not exactly lawful. Curiously 
Colonel Frost not only honored the terms, but when he was released he did not join the 
State Guard, waiting until Missouri made serious strides towards forming official 
Confederate units.60 
As tragic as it was, the Camp Jackson Affair was a boon to the pro-secessionist 
cause. An aggressive Federal commander, with the backing of the Federal government, 
had imprisoned the state’s local defense force. He further had recruited the foreign-born 
men who fired upon men, women, and children. The Camp Jackson Affair “thrilled the 
State from centre to circumference, and aroused every sentiment of opposition.” Many 
saw the incident as “invasion, outrage, war – indicating a fixed determination to trample 
on all the rights, laws, securities, and guaranties of the State.” Thousands who had 
preferred to stay in the Union while sitting out the war were irate that the Federal 
government had disarmed and imprisoned their own people. Even a few Unionists 
questioned their allegiance and some would join the State Guard for a time before their 
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anger cooled and they reverted to their previous stance.61 A fairly recent immigrant from 
Illinois was sufficiently stirred to join the militia against the Federal forces. In the 
northwestern town of Lexington, Confederate flags sprang up, the American flag “set 
afloat to the winds from all public buildings of the town.”62 Jackson’s military bill, which 
had been stalled for weeks, was speedily passed on May 11, the day after the massacre. 
Sterling Price was named commanding general of the Missouri State Guard. Given his 
Conditional Unionism, Price represented his state’s profession of armed neutrality. This 
appointment was not necessarily well received among pro-Southern elements in the 
MSG, creating “considerable doubt about our position.”63 
Thousands of Missourians now rushed to join the State Guard. The question was 
could Jackson, Price, and other pro-Confederates effectively channel the outrage into 
long-lasting Union fervor? Could they convince the majority of Missourians to embrace 
secessionism and even admittance into the Confederacy? The Missouri State Guard was 
further recruited and organized. Ironically, in trying to buy time for the recruitment and 
arming of thousands of Missourians, as well as balance Missourians’ unique political 
stances with the Secessionist inclination of themselves and their close associates, Jackson 
and Price made it difficult for Confederates to provide further support. 
On the Union side, General Harney sought to calm emotions and avert a civil war 
within the Civil War. On May 12 he issued a proclamation that promised to preserve 
peace. He called on local authorities to aid him and for the people “to abstain from the 
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excitements of public meetings and heated discussions.” He further announced his 
intention to use disciplined regular army troops instead of the Home Guards. In a letter to 
current Secretary of War Simon Cameron he suggested bringing in a regiment of Irish 
troops to counteract the presence of the reviled German soldiers.64 A few days later he 
issued another proclamation in response to the passage of Governor Jackson’s military 
bill. He saw the bill as another incendiary incident. He implored Missourians to disregard 
the bill and think instead of how their state’s destiny was much more tied to the Union 
than the rebellious states. He pointed out that the militia camp had a street named after 
Bereaugard and was partially supplied by arms taken from a federal arsenal in Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana. This shows that Harney was aware of the Confederate connections of 
the Jackson administration, yet unlike Lyon he sought to avert a secessionist Missouri 
through moderate, peaceful methods rather than aggressive action.65 
 Harney communicated with Sterling Price, asking him to disband the State Guard. 
Price responded that this would violate the state’s laws, but did temporarily disband his 
concentration of Guardsmen at Jefferson City. Men were technically sent home, but to 
train and organize within their divisions.66 The two came up with a truce, the Price-
Harney Agreement. The Federal army would control the area around St. Louis while the 
State Guard would manage the rest of the state. These forces would be peacekeepers, 
with the Federal Army protecting the rights of Secessionists and the State Guard ensuring 
that Unionists were not harmed. While the truce was in effect the military bill was to be 
revised. In post-war writings, veterans of the State Guard and Jackson’s government saw 
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this as a promising deal that was violated by Lyon. But what actually occurred under the 
State’s Guard’s jurisdiction shows that the Secessionists did not honestly carry out their 
end of the deal. 
 Jackson and Price saw the Price-Harney Agreement as a way to forestall Federal 
advances while they tried to cobble together an army in the countryside. Secessionists 
seized 15,000 pounds of lead at Lebanon to make more bullets. In St. Joseph Jeff 
Thompson led a pro-secessionist throng in taking down an American flag and tearing it to 
pieces. They quickly hoisted the Confederate banner in its place. There were also many 
incidents of harassed Unionists. German immigrant Nicholas Haerle headed a pro-Union 
meeting in Lexington’s courthouse. Not long into the meeting 50 secessionists barged in 
and rushed the stage. They seized the American flag and when Haerle attempted to stop 
them they beat the Unionist badly, shooting him in the leg. While Hearle was recovering 
at home the mob returned and told him, in the name of Jefferson Davis, to leave or suffer 
the consequences. Hearle had to flee for his life. Harney further asked Price about a 
troubling concentration of Guardsmen near the Arkansas border. This suggested that the 
State Guard was in contact with Confederate forces. Between this and the attacks on 
Unionist civilians he might have to raise more Home Guard units.67 
Price quickly denied any involvement by the Missouri state government or State 
Guard in these events, and professed ignorance of any interventionist actions by the 
Confederacy. If the rumors proved true, he claimed he would see to the immediate exit of 
the Confederates from the state. As for the attacks on citizens, Price insisted they were 
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the actions of rash individuals. He warned that to raise more Home Guard units would be 
“injudicious, if not ruinous, to the peace of the State.”68 Governor Jackson and his cabinet 
publicly supported the Price-Harney Agreement, but in private correspondence with 
President Davis complained that it was another method of subverting local state power, as 
it still left eastern Missouri under the rule of the Federal government. Lieutenant-
Governor Reynolds admitted that the governor himself had no proper authority to contact 
a foreign power for aid, as Missouri was still “nominally” Union, but considering the 
unusual and unprecedented state of affairs felt that it was his own “high moral duty” to 
approach the Confederacy and prepared to travel to Richmond to foster further relations69 
While Price and his associates took advantage of the truce and pulled the wool 
over Harney’s eyes, other pro-Confederate Missourians found the Price-Harney 
Agreement detrimental to their efforts. General Thompson and other avid secessionists 
lambasted the “temporizing and vacillating” attitude of their leaders. Thompson felt that 
“we were sold” by the agreement, especially when he was ordered to temporarily disband 
his militia. He himself ignored the agreement and left the state in search of Confederates 
willing to provide arms and other equipment.70 Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Reynolds 
sought official Confederate support. While he was able to get some, it was impossible to 
get full acknowledgment as a member of the Confederacy until Missouri passed a 
secession ordnance. Confederate officials in Arkansas and other nearby states appeared 
hesitant to supply arms, promises of military intervention, or other assistance in light of 
the Price-Harney Agreement. They could not discern whether it was a genuine neutrality 
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act or was a “reprehensible” trick to buy time for a military buildup as well as to 
negotiate entry into the Confederate cause. There was even a theory that Jackson and 
Price were steering the state back to unionism. A Missouri commission was assembled to 
go to Richmond, Virginia, and meet personally with President Jefferson Davis to remove 
such doubts and gain firmer support.71 
While the commission traveled east, major developments ended the Price-Harney 
Agreement and finally plunged Missouri into full war. The Union leadership tired of 
Harney’s peace-seeking efforts. Citing incidents of harassment and armament across the 
state, Blair and Lyon reported that the truce did not promote Missouri’s neutrality, but 
instead provided cover for a festering rebellion. This led to Harney’s dismissal at the start 
of June, and Lyon took his place. After learning of his dismissal, Harney continued to 
argue that there was no great secessionist threat in Missouri, that the stories were 
exaggerations and rumors. “My confidence in the honor and integrity of General Price, in 
the purity of his motives, and in his loyalty to the Government, remains unimpaired.” He 
cited Price’s presidency at the State Convention that voted against secession. Price’s 
actions since then only “served to confirm the high opinion of him I have for many years 
entertained.” Harney was evidently a victim of Price’s attractive personality.72 While 
many within the Confederacy could not figure out the stance of Jackson’s government 
and the Missouri State Guard, the Union was much quicker to label them as rebellious. 
The problem was that by publicly proclaiming armed neutrality, Missouri did not make 
any solid commitment to the Confederate cause. Yet even if it did not come out on the 
Confederate side, its actions still displayed a rebellious attitude towards the Federal 
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government. An uncooperative state, even one not in the Confederacy, endangered and 
hampered the Union war effort in the West, especially one with valuable river access and 
rail networks. Also, there were many Missourians who wanted to serve with the Union, 
and the Federal government did not want to have their wishes to serve their country 
precluded by local government. 
Lyon’s ascendance to command threatened the Price-Harney agreement. Price 
even saw his appointment as a violation of the agreement and grew bolder in his 
recruitment and armament of the State Guard. However, not everyone gave up on the 
truce and a meeting was arranged. Governor Jackson, Price, and Thomas Snead met up 
with Lyon and Blair at the Planters’ House near St. Louis. Jackson and Price’s strategy 
was to converse more with Blair, who they believed could be reasoned into prolonging 
the agreement. However, Lyon hijacked the conversation. Though his manner was more 
impassioned, he proved to be well-informed of Missouri politics and held his own in 
arguing and debating with Price and Jackson. The meeting dragged on for several hours 
as the participants argued in circles. Price and Jackson insisted the Federal government 
had no right to raise troops in Missouri, while the Union side claimed that the Missouri 
State Guard was subverting Federal authority. Lyon finally came to a dramatic 
conclusion that did not bode well for peace. 
“Rather than concede to the State of Missouri the right to demand that my 
Government shall not enlist troops within her limits, or bring troops into the State 
whenever it pleases, or move its troops at its own will into, out of, or through the State; 
rather than concede to the State of Missouri for one single instant the right to dictate to 
my Government in any matter however unimportant. I would see you, and you, and you, 
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(he pointed to the three Missourians as he said these words) and every man, woman, and 
child in the State, dead and buried. This means war. In an hour one of my officers will 
call for you and conduct you out of my lines.” 
With that war had finally arrived.73 
Jackson did take advantage of this to declare Missouri’s war against the Federal 
government and stoke his Secessionist agenda, while still not outright announcing any 
alliance with the Confederacy. He started with a list of “unprovoked and unparalleled 
outrages” on the part of the Federal government. “The solemn enactments of your 
Legislature have been nullified, your volunteer soldiers have been taken prisoners, your 
commerce with your sister States has been suspended, your trade with your own fellow-
citizens has been and is subjected to the harassing control of an armed soldiery, peaceful 
citizens have been imprisoned without warrant of law,” and, raising the specter of Camp 
Jackson, “unoffending and defenseless men, women, and children have been ruthlessly 
shot down and murdered…” Jackson lamented that: 
All our efforts toward conciliation have failed. We can hope nothing from 
the justice or moderation of the agents of the Federal Government in this 
State. They are energetically hastening the execution of their bloody and 
revolutionary schemes for the inauguration of civil war in your midst; for 
the military occupation of your State by armed bands of lawless invaders; 
for the overthrow of you State government; and for the subversion of those 
liberties which that Government has always sought to protect; and they 
intend to exert their whole power to subjugate you, if possible, to the 
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military despotism which has usurped the powers of the Federal 
Government…You are under no obligation whatever to obey the 
unconstitutional edicts of the military despotism which was enthroned 
itself in Washington, not to submit to the infamous and degrading sway of 
its wicked minions in this State…Rise, then, and drive out ignominiously 
the invaders who have dared to desecrate the soil which your labors have 
made fruitful…74 
Despite this militaristic call to arms, Jackson still declared near the end of his 
proclamation that “Missouri is still one of the United States,” a concession to Conditional 
Unionists with some ramifications. This put Missouri outside the Confederacy, yet in 
obvious opposition to the Federal government. This put it in danger from the Union army 
while not adequately inviting protection from the Confederacy.75 A comparison can be 
drawn to Kentucky’s own attempt at neutrality. Kentucky’s governor Beriah Magoffin 
was also pro-Southern in his sympathies. Unlike Claiborne Jackson, however, Magoffin 
respected the majority of the Kentuckians’ views, which was armed neutrality, and had 
no intention of thwarting the majority of the state through schemes. While both the Union 
and Confederacy plotted to swing Kentucky into their camp, Magoffin never gave them 
sufficient pretext. Kentuckians who wanted to fight for the Confederacy had to exit the 
state and enlist in the national Confederate army. While Kentucky would still become a 
battleground, both in the conventional and guerilla sense, it at least chose a side, the 
Union, before it entered the war. The cause of this was a Confederate movement into the 
southwestern corner of the state, a movement which violated its neutrality. Kentucky’s 
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move towards the Union after Confederate intervention likely set off warning bells for 
the Confederacy. A Union shift in Missouri could occur if similar actions were 
committed there. Kentucky also did not expose its militia army to danger until it was 
ready to choose a side.76 By contrast the Missouri State Guard in 1861 was exposed. It 
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CHAPTER IV 
Price’s Army 
The Missouri government naturally gave command of the State Guard to the popular and 
histories Sterling Price. In addition to his experience in the Mexican War, he was an 
inspiring and prominent figure who could easily rally thousands to the cause. It was also 
believed that he would be more level-headed than the other officers who were taking 
command of the volunteers.77 Most post-war accounts by State Guardsmen were 
enamored with him for his bravery and general kindness (which sometimes translated to 
soft discipline). In the memories of the State Guard he was like George Washington. One 
former Guardsman provided the following glowing description of him from the Battle of 
Lexington: 
During the heaviest part of the combat, General Price galloped up, covered 
with dust, his fine face glowing with the excitement of exercise, and his 
eye kindling with the fire of battle. Perfectly self-possessed, he seemed not 
to heed the storm of grape and canister, and taking his position in the rear 
of the battery, directed the handling of the guns. Many of the officers 
urged him to retire or dismount, but with prefect coolness he kept his 
position. While here, I observed a grape-shot strike his field glass, 
breaking it in pieces. Without the slightest apparent emotion, he continued 
giving his orders. Remaining about twenty minutes, he retired, leaving a 
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lasting impression upon his men, who have ever loved him as their chief, 
and admired as their ‘beau ideal’ of honor, and chivalry.78 
 Yet Price had his contemporary critics. Among them was Lieutenant-Governor 
Reynolds. Reynolds recalled how in the Mexican War, Price disobeyed orders to hold 
back and instead attacked and defeated a Mexican force. This victory ended in what 
could be considered a massacre of Mexicans. Reynolds “was struck” by how proudly 
Price recalled this act of indiscipline. He theorized that this successful violation of 
military orders revealed a “tendency…to action independently of his official superiors, 
almost to the extent of insubordination.”79 Reynolds believed he detected in Price another 
pattern of “confident predictions of success, bold advances, bewilderment when real 
danger of failure appeared, and precipitate disorderly retreat from it.” Price would boldly 
seek battle, but balk if events proved more difficult than anticipated. If Reynolds is to be 
believed, Governor Jackson came to recognize this pattern and regret his appointment of 
Price as “the greatest mistake of his life.”80 But these are arguments made with hindsight, 
when Price’s strategic and tactical failings, and more importantly his poor relationship 
with Confederate leaders, were known. At the time Price was the best option to rally and 
unite thousands of Missourians in an ostensibly Missourian cause. 
 The idea of the Missouri State Guard was not unique. Several other states had 
their own state guards, some formed prior to the war. Arkansas had its own state troops 
which would fight alongside Missourians at Wilson’s Creek. The other neutral border 
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state, Kentucky, formed a State Guard a year earlier in response to John Brown’s raid. 
Since it was formed to prevent any major slave uprising, the Kentucky State Guard was 
mostly made up of pro-Confederates. Because of this Unionists viewed it with the same 
level of intense suspicion which they directed towards the Missouri State Guard.81 The 
MSG stood out because when it did fight, it would technically do so as its own separate 
faction instead of mustering into Confederate service. 
The Missouri State Guard was to be divided into nine divisions. These were not 
traditionally-sized divisions and in fact were very uneven in their numbers. Each division 
was made up of men from one of the nine assigned military state districts. As a result, 
divisions representing more fervently secessionist areas from the west and south of the 
state had a tendency to be much larger, while those in the north and east had difficulty 
coalescing amidst the presence of Federal army units or lack of southern sentiment. Also, 
many of the listed units within the divisions were greatly under-sized according to 
military norms. Some of the “regiments” were little larger than a company. This meant 
that there were proportionately more officers in the ranks. In fact, it was so hard to keep 
track of the various units that they were referred to by their commanding officers’ 
names.82 
The head of each division was a prominent Missourian with some military or 
militia experience. As politicians they were all good at inspiring men to sign up and 
notably most were pro-Southern and defenders of slavery in their chosen careers. Only a 
couple of them had professional soldiering experience, but most did have involvement in 
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past military conflicts against the American Indians or in the Mexican War. There were 
actually about a dozen West Point And Virginia Military Institute graduates among the 
generals and other officers who provided valuable knowledge and leadership. In short, 
though there were few professional officers in the highest ranks, there was much military 
experience spread around. The issue was the difficult conditions for training the men, as 
the State Guard would constantly find itself responding to a fluctuating political situation 
in the early months of 1861 and then constant Federal incursions.83 The generals of the 
State Guard, Price included, sported massive staffs. This was criticized by some as a 
ridiculous proliferation of officers, calculated to enable generals to put their relatives and 
friends in high-ranking positions. Defenders have stated that without the war department 
apparatus of the regular armies, the State Guard needed these oversized staffs to 
compensate.84 
 The First Division represented the southeastern portion of the state, bordering 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Nathaniel W. Watkins was given command of the 
division, but chose only to fill its ranks with his political influence before resigning. 
Having been born in 1796, he reasoned he was too old to actually lead his division on 
campaign and left his position to be filled by an election. The winner was Jeff Thompson, 
who in the pre-war militia had risen to the rank of captain and division inspector. As a 
prominent citizen and former mayor of the town of St. Joseph, he was pushing for 
Missouri’s secession before almost anyone else. He had taken down the American flag in 
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St. Joseph and replaced it with a Confederate one.85 Ironically St. Joseph, Thompson’s 
residence, sat in the northwestern and thus opposite corner of the state from the First 
Division’s district. Believing Missouri to have been “sold” to the Union by the Price-
Harney Agreement, Thompson was en route to southern territory in hopes of serving in 
the regular Confederate Army when full war was declared in Missouri. On the way back 
he literally rode into the camp of the First Division and delivered a fiery pro-secession 
speech that got him elected to command. One veteran recalled that “with the exception of 
Gen. Price, there is, perhaps, no man around whom the Missourians would more 
enthusiastically rally…”86 Thompson would end up waging a separate campaign from 
Price, fighting a guerilla-style war in his corner of the state. Despite resorting to less 
conventional means of warfare, he would have a somewhat more harmonious relationship 
with neighboring Confederate forces across the Mississippi River. 
 The Second Division, in Northeastern Missouri, was handed to Thomas A. Harris, 
a consul for a railroad. Harris was a military enthusiast who went off to fight at the age of 
12 in the admittedly bloodless Mormon and Honey Wars (the latter was a border dispute 
between Missouri and Iowa), and likewise was unable to fight in the Mexican War 
because it ended right as his regiment was ready to leave Missouri. Harris did go to West 
Point, but for unknown reasons did not graduate. In 1861 he initially found his division 
himself cut off from the rest of the State Guard, given his geographic location. Despite 
the occupation of his assigned district by Federal troops, he managed to raise 2,000 men. 
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Northeastern Missourians, as described earlier, had a bitter feud with Illinoisan 
abolitionists. Like Thompson Harris would wage more of a hit-and-run war until he was 
able to link up with the main body of the State Guard.87 
 The Third Division, situated in the central northern region, fell to John Clark, Sr., 
a fiery secessionist who owned 160 slaves. From Kentucky he had moved to Missouri to 
practice law, taking a break to fight in the Black Hawk War (he also nearly got into a 
duel with Claiborne Jackson when the future governor exposed a private letter of his and 
criticized its contents and spelling). Starting in 1857 he represented Missouri in Congress, 
and was still there while he was raising troops to fight the United States government. This 
effectively made him a traitor-in-office and Congress expelled him.88 
 William Y. Slack led the Fourth Division, in the northwest. Like many other 
Missourians Slack was born in Kentucky. He practiced law, but had military experience 
under Price in the Mexican War.89 As a member of the state legislature he mainly 
represented slaveholding society despite having no slaves himself. He was “an able 
debater at the law and on the stump” and successfully campaigned for Buchanan in the 
1856 election. He was one of the few true disciplinarians in the Guard, but was beloved 
by his men because he had risen from shared humble roots.90 He would be held in high 
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regard by both Price and Governor Jackson, the latter once telling him “You and Gen. 
McBride are my salvation.”91 
 The Fifth Division, the northwesternmost division, fell to Alexander Steen, who 
unlike most of the divisional commander had actually been born in Missouri. Steen was 
the third choice for this position. The first choice, Prominent Mexican War veteran and 
politician Alexander William Doniphan refused to fight for secession and the second 
choice, Jesse Morin, felt likewise. On paper Steen was the most qualified Divisional 
commander in the State Guard. His father Enoch Steen was a Union Army officer (who 
would stay loyal to the stars and stripes in this war). Steen himself had performed well in 
the Mexican War, receiving commendations for his repeated bravery. He returned to the 
army in the 1850s to fight Indians until wounded in 1857. He was named a lieutenant 
colonel by Claiborne Jackson and was supposed to be at Camp Jackson, but happened to 
be off on other business when Lyon took it. His credentials were impressive enough that 
he was made a captain in the Confederate army. Despite his position in the regular army, 
he decided to stick with the MSG.92 
The commander of the Sixth Division was Mosby Monroe Parsons, a Mexican 
War veteran who then served as Missouri’s attorney general from 1853 to 1857. After 
that he was elected to the state senate and was an avid supporter of joining the 
Confederacy. He was so ardent in his cause that he lambasted Governor Jackson for 
supporting Douglas over Breckinridge and for agreeing to the Price-Harney Agreement.93 
 
91 Unknown to Mrs. Slack, December 26, 1863 from Slack, William Yarnel (1816-1862), Papers, 
1847-1880, MHS; See the paragraph on McBride and the Seventh Division for more information. 
92 Preston, 154; Allardice, 215-216. 
93 Werner, 228-229; Burchett, 76. 
51 
 
   
Since Thompson, the head of the original First Division, was waging a separate 
campaign, Price took to calling Parsons’ men the First Division in his reports.94 The Sixth 
Division came out of the center of the state. 
 James H. McBride commanded the Seventh Division in the center south. McBride 
had served as a lawyer (fellow law practitioners made up his staff and soldiers addressed 
him as “judge” rather than general), president of the Springfield Bank, and representative 
in the State House. He had an intimate relationship with his officers and men, holding 
them together by his personality rather than discipline. A staff officer recalled him as a 
“clear-headed, silent, courageous man.” However, his popularity with his men did not 
earn much approval from his superiors. Price found McBride too lax in discipline, a 
damning statement considering that ill discipline was a recurring problem throughout the 
entire army.95 Snead had a more optimistic assessment in his post-war contribution to 
Battles & Leaders of the Civil War, recalling that “while there was no attempt at military 
discipline, and no pretense of it, the most perfect order was maintained by McBride's 
mere force of character, by his great good sense, and by the kindness with which he 
exercised his patriarchal authority.”96 
James Spencer Rains, an avid politician, headed the Eight Division. The eighth 
military district was situated along the volatile border with Kansas and thus had a large 
pro-Southern recruiting pool. He started his career as a Whig, but switched to the “Know-
Nothing” American party when the former Whigs turned secessionist. Despite his initial 
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opposition to secession, he gladly accepted a position in the MSG. His only good 
qualification was his ability to raise thousands of troops and he indeed headed the largest 
division in the State Guard. He was said to be too kind and let his subordinates and men 
run all over discipline. It was unfortunate for the State Guard that he did not follow his 
anti-Secessionist beliefs (ironically Rains would still retain command of his district in 
1864, albeit nominally). Known for his over-drinking, he was unpopular with a good 
many other officers as well as politicians, so much so that a Tenth Division was almost 
formed to reduce his command. Rains’ performance would be a major factor in 
Confederate General Ben McCulloch’s unwillingness to assist the Missourians.97 He was 
somewhat countered by a few competent officers under him, Robert Weightman being a 
notable example. Weightman had a somewhat violent past, having been expelled form 
West Point for knifing a fellow student in the face. Years later he got into a serious 
incident after he disputed an accomplished horse ride in his paper. The horseman 
confronted him with a pistol and Weightman responded by knocking aside his weapon 
and killing him with his dagger. Despite his willingness to engage in frontier violence, he 
proved an able colonel and leader of men, meriting praise and laments from Confederate 
battle reports after his death at Wilson’s Creek.98 
The Ninth Division was given to Meriwether Clark Sr., a descendant of famed 
explorer William Clark and a West Point graduate with Mexican War experience. This 
division practically never came into existence, as it lay right in the same district as St. 
Louis. It was impossible to get units together with in the midst of a thick Federal 
presence. Furthermore, the St. Louis area held the largest concentration of the state’s 
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Unionists. The few units that did materialize and were able to reach Price’s main army 
were often placed under the leadership of other divisional commanders.99 
 For many recruits the ability to actually make it to a sizeable MSG force was an 
adventure in itself. Those in Federal-occupied territories could not just march to Price’s 
army in regiments. In addition to Federal patrols there were still many pro-Union 
civilians ready to snitch on recruits. The Guardsmen had to travel piecemeal in small 
groups or even as individuals. One group of 600 men found this out the hard way. They 
undertook an impressive 19 hour march. Their grueling trek yielded no reward, as the 
tired men were surprised by Federal cavalry and forced to surrender. A civilian they had 
encountered the day before had turned out to be pro-Unionist and had ratted them out.100 
Another recruit, Robert Caldwell Dunlap, was captured with half of his company by 
Federal cavalry. To secure his release he had to take an oath not to fight against the 
Union. As soon as he got home, he decided he could violate his oath since in his view 
President Lincoln had violated the Constitution.101 
One team of river pilots ducked out of ferrying Federal soldiers, slipping away 
while the commanding Union officer was distracted by two women. They instead signed 
up in the State Guard as mounted soldiers. One of them, Absalom Grimes, recalled that 
their horses had to be donated by pro-Southern citizens, and that “no two soldiers wore 
the same equipment. It would be useless for me to try to describe the appearance of that 
brigade when mounted. Nothing was uniform except that we all rode astride.” Their 
“sabers” were actually refashioned metal tools. This group was notable for including Sam 
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Clemens, the future great American author Mark Twain. If Grimes is to be believed 
Clemens had a string of misfortune on the trip south, including having to ride a four foot 
mule. 
The journey proved to be as dangerous as it was humorous. Absalom Grimes 
claims that while he and his fellow recruits were camping out at a barn Federal soldiers 
arrived. Grimes fired off his double-barrel shotgun and then bolted onto his horse to join 
the rest in fleeing. Clemens was left behind on his undersized mule and when he caught 
up was almost mistaken for the enemy and shot. Clemens then injured his ankle while 
escaping from a barn fire. On top of this he was also suffering from a boil. Clemens 
considered himself too unfit to continue on, thus exiting the war and saving himself for 
future literary achievements.102 
Many of the recruits were also tasked with bringing valuable supplies along with 
them, including ammunition and powder taken from the Liberty Arsenal and hidden in 
caches across northwest Missouri. One, Ai Edgar Asbury, “was entrusted with three large 
wagonloads of powder” to be delivered to the State Guard. The powder was stored in 
“kegs, half barrels and barrels, with some boxed in tin cans”. The wagons had to go over 
very rough roads, and their cases began to crack, leaking powder. This kept the drivers 
“watching and frightened all the way” because one wrong move could engulf the supply 
team in an explosion. They also had to navigate the large presence of suspicious 
Unionists. Two of Asbury’s fellow drivers grew so worried that their mission would be 
 




   
discovered that they lost their courage and went home, leaving Asbury to manage all 
three wagons by himself.103 
Asbury made it with his powder, which was fortunate for the State Guard because 
it was in a constant shortage of essential supplies from weapons to food. However much 
the Confederacy struggled to maintain its armies in the early years of the war, the State 
Guard had it worse. It of course could no longer receive Federal assistance and since it 
was not part of the Confederacy it could receive scant financial support from that quarter 
as well. In fact, to pay for the formation and equipage of the State Guard, Jackson’s 
government took $500,000 from Missouri’s banks, and by extension its citizens. The 
expectation was that once Missouri was a Confederate state, its government would repay 
the people with public bonds. The banks appear to have mostly approved this, expecting 
that the furor generated by Federal actions would indeed result in a Confederate Missouri. 
Pro-Confederate towns and counties borrowed money from the banks to fund their local 
State Guard units. They and the bankers expected a quick Confederate victory and the 
return of their money through the promised bonds. This financial scheme proved to have 
dire consequences for the state. When Missouri’s secession did not occur, the money was 
not paid back to thousands of civilians and the Federal government was not going to give 
relief to those who funded its enemies. As a result Missourians later found themselves in 
desperate economic circumstances and more likely to turn to desperate measures such as 
guerilla warfare and robbery.104 
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The government’s seizure of half a million dollars did somewhat alleviate the 
State Guard’s supply problems. It could be used to purchase goods from seceded states 
James Harding was the Guard’s quarter-master general, and he found his task unenviable. 
Harding had received this position back in February and had set about modernizing an 
arsenal of flintlocks and outdated cannon. He got ahold of some bullet molds from St. 
Louis and started to produce ammunition. He successfully converted flintlocks into rifled 
guns, but was unable to make them effective beyond short ranges. More successful was 
the rifling of three large guns, but these were lost when Lyon seized Camp Jackson.105 
Harding found himself traveling the bordering Southern states in search of 
equipment he could buy. He went all around the Western Confederacy to procure 
supplies. He found that regular Confederate units were having their own logistical issues. 
In Arkansas he was able to gain $10,000 in bonds from its government, but little else. He 
had better luck at Fort Pillow in Tennessee, where General Leonidas Polk gave him a 
considerable amount of supplies. However, delays would ensure that these supplies did 
not make it to the State Guard until winter.106 
While Harding was away Price put his nephew, Major Thomas Price, and his 
chief aide Thomas Snead in charge of ammunition and ordnance, a job Snead admitted he 
was ill-suited for. He could not identify the various types of artillery and knew nothing 
about ammunition. Fortunately for this particular man he was able to gather a few lower-
class people who knew how to devise ammunition on their own. One of these, a 
mechanic named Andrew M. McGregor, was valuable for devising ammunition molds. 
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The practical experience of these men worked wonders and they daily produced “heaps 
of bullets, and buck-and-ball cartridges – enough for the immediate wants of the State 
Guard.” Ammunition shortages were further alleviated after some military successes. 
Later on, captured round shot from the Battle of Carthage was used to cast molds, giving 
the artillery pieces actual big shot to spout instead of collections of rocks and small metal 
objects. Men in the rank-and-file were encouraged to fashion their own cartridges and 
quickly became exerts at “home-made ammunition.” Many of the bullets were made with 
lead from the Granby Mines in Southwest Missouri. Later on, visiting Confederate 
ordinance officers would identify this location as indispensable to the war effort in the 
area and garrison it.107 
Artillery was greatly lacking, but the State Guard was able to scrounge together 
pieces from various arsenals and militia units. Lexington, the first center for State Guard 
organization, provided “Old Sacramento,” a 12-pounder brass cannon captured years 
earlier in the Mexican War. The main function of this dated gun had been to contribute to 
the fireworks on July 4th. “Old Sac” was a celebrity, and supposedly Colonel Hiram 
Bledsoe of the artillery would embrace and kiss its barrel after a good performance.108 In 
the various battles the large guns often had to be loaded with improvised shot, such as 
collections of rocks. Like those creating ammunition for the hand weapons, some of the 
more industrious Guardsmen fashioned their own moulds for shot and used them 
whenever they had a break from marching.109 
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There was a severe shortage of rifles. Some companies were fortunate enough to 
have been in on the sacking of Liberty arsenal, while various militia outfits would have 
already possessed Enfield rifles or other modern weaponry. The majority of Guardsmen 
had to bring along their personal firearms. These consisted chiefly of squirrel and hunting 
rifles. The recruits were practiced shots with them, but the rifles had limited range. In an 
encounter with Federal troops, they could expect to be hit by volleys of fire well before 
they could return the favor. One veteran recalled that nearly all his comrades “were 
armed with shotguns and rifles; it is not, however, to be inferred that all were armed, for 
some had no guns at all.” Up to the Battle of Wilson’s Creek there were hundreds of men 
in Price’s command who marched on the campaign trail without any weapons. At best 
some, like the experienced hunters amongst them, may have carried long knives for close 
combat.110 
The officers attempted to train troops using General William J. Hardee’s highly 
praised manual of tactics. The men proved to be comically ill-suited for Hardee’s tactics, 
not through any personal deficiency, but because at the time most were armed with a 
plethora of hunting rather than standard military rifles. Harding commented, “A force 
using bayonet and formation tactics without actual bayonets and ranged rifles is not a 
very imposing or formidable looking movement.” Some Guardsmen, fancying 
themselves to be expert shots, argued that it would be wiser to fight from the cover of 
trees and fences and pick off Lyon’s men.111 Occasionally there was a man with a 
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bayonet. One tall and imposing volunteer attracted attention for being the only man in his 
company to have both a musket and a bayonet. However, he had no scabbard for his 
bladed extension and insisted on keeping it affixed to the barrel of the musket at all times, 
even when it was unwise. For example, while using his ramrod to reload his weapon in 
the heat of battle he slashed open his hand.112 
The shortage of proper military weapons was accompanied by a shortage of 
proper uniforms. The State Guard had the appearance of an armed civilian mob, which 
was not far from the truth. Snead recalled, “In all their motley array there was hardly a 
uniform to be seen, and then, and throughout all the brilliant campaign on which they 
were about to enter there was nothing to distinguish their officers, even a general, from 
the men in the ranks, save a bit of red flannel, or a piece of cotton cloth, fasted to the 
shoulder, or to the arm, of the former.” (A Confederate soldier supposedly once mistook 
General Price, who was wearing a civilian jacket, for a local farmer and guide).113 There 
were uniformed units, storied militia units such as the self-described Washington Blues 
and Independence Grays. As with many early Civil War units on both sides, the different 
Guard units created a varied assortment of colors that could cause confusion on the 
battlefield. There were men in blue, men in gray, some with brown pants sporting red-
stripes, and others dressed in the French Zouave style.114 What the Guardsmen did not 
lack were proper flags. The units did not sport the traditional American or the 
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Confederate flag, but Missouri’s state flag, a blue field with golden coat-of-arms on both 
sides. The cavalry were to wield nine-foot long guidons with M.S.G. in large gold letters. 
There was variety here as well, however, with many units adopting unique flags, all with 
the Missouri coat of arms, but twists such as the First Division’s black field with red 
crosses.115 
Food and shelter were other major concerns. In his centennial history Bruce 
Catton humorously referred to the State Guard’s commissary as “the nearest 
cornfield.”116 That was no exaggeration. Like other Confederate armies throughout the 
war, the soldiers found themselves having to constantly pluck their sustenance from the 
miles of cornfields. At times it was the only proven edible source of food. One way to 
spice up their diet was to make lye hominy out of the corn.117 When there was no corn 
around the guardsmen might be able to rely on lean beef. As for their horses, of which 
there were many, they had to content themselves with prairie grass. Finally, there were 
few tents and no real way of paying the troops.118 
With all these issues of supply and poor disciplinary measures, the State 
Guardsmen often took it upon themselves to loot. While all armies in the Civil War were 
guilty of looting to some extent, the State Guard’s actions alienated parts of the Missouri 
citizenry and, worse, potential Confederate allies at a crucial time. The soft leadership of 
officers like General Rains meant indiscipline on the battlefield as well as off it. The 
officers in other units could be expected to at least make serious attempts to prevent or 
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punish looting, but this was a rare quality in the Missouri State Guard of 1861 and early 
1862. One Missourian officer recalled two years later, in a letter to President Davis no 
less: 
In the beginning of the war I thought and hoped everything could be 
carried on with that decency and regularity that characterized the old army 
in the field. I soon learned that where untrained officers had to discipline 
untried men, all of whom were their equals, many their superiors, no such 
thing was possible…I resigned rather than command a regiment in a mob, 
and Price’s Missouri State Guard became nothing more.119 
Confederate generals questioned the reliability of allies who might panic under 
heavy artillery fire or conversely rush off to action without orders. These were indeed 
factors that frustrated General Ben McCulloch and Colonel James McIntosh in their 
summer 1861 campaign. 
Without pay and with few supplies, the question is what motivated the rank-and-
file of the State Guard, and to what extent did these men devote themselves to military 
service? In his memoir published several years after the war, veteran Ephraim Anderson 
had a chapter that gave the prototypical Confederate narrative, that the men fought for 
states’ rights and personal freedom rather than slavery. In fact in this chapter and 
throughout most of his book, he did not mention slavery at all. In his own recollections 
Snead dramatically stated that in the State Guard: 
there was hardly a man who could not read and write, and who was not 
more intelligent than the great mass of American citizens; not one who 
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had not voluntarily abandoned his home with all its tender ties, and thrown 
away all his possessions, and left father and mother, or wife and children, 
within the enemy’s lines, that he might himself stand by the South in her 
hour of great peril, and help her to defend her fields and her firesides. And 
among them all there was not a man who had come forth to fight for 
slavery.120 
This justification, labeled the Lost Cause narrative, has been roundly criticized in 
the last few decades of Civil War historiography as a myth. But the case is not as clear 
with the Missouri State Guard. It was true that many pro-secessionists and slavery 
advocates were within the ranks, especially in command positions. Thompson wrote to an 
associate years after the war: 
I tell you plainly that I never fought the United States because I hated the 
United States. I never fought the North because I hated the North. I did not 
desire to be one iota freer than I was under the flag of the Union; but there 
was an abstract political principle of States rights and four thousand 
millions of dollars worth of African slaves that I thought could only be 
saved out of the Union…I was a fair, square, and consistent enemy of 
Abolitionism and those who fought their battles…121 
Even non-slaveholders felt a stake in the institution. The largely non-slaveholding 
citizens of southeast Missouri, for example, were firmly pro-Confederate because black 
slavery was a measuring stick for white freedom. Of at least 35,000 men to pass through 
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the ranks of the Guard, about 20,000 would stick to national Confederate service for the 
rest of the war or take up arms as guerillas and partisans. Yet many of the men were 
indeed motivated by state over national loyalty. The Camp Jackson Affair had seen 
Federal troops and German outsiders gun down men, women, and children, and the 
Federal, not Confederate, Army was the one that had invaded the state. Sometimes peer 
pressure could induce men to pitch in. One man remembered years later that the young 
son of a family recently arrived from Ohio devoted his service (and indeed lost his life) to 
the Confederacy, despite having no familial, geographic, or ideological ties with it.122 Yet 
many also came to believe that it was in Missouri’s best interests to stick to the Union, or 
grew disenchanted with the Confederate alliance.  They did not feel the threat to slavery 
that their southern neighbors did. It was not unheard of for men to desert the State Guard 
or even join a pro-Union militia. One, John McKown from St. Louis, joined the State 
Guard because he felt that the Federal Government had acted out of the bounds of the 
Constitution in Missouri, but months later he mustered out and quickly signed up in the 
Union Army, revealing lack of interest in the overall Confederate cause. It should be 
noted that his cousin Williams had been among the first to sign up with the Union and 
this caused much dissension within the greater McKown family.123 This weak allegiance 
to the Confederacy applied to the Guardsmen’s families as well. One veteran recalled a 
youth who joined the State Guard and died at the Battle of Lexington, yet his family 
became staunchly pro-Unionist later in the war. He further noted that one young lady 
who waved a Rebel flag and expressed hatred for the Federals married a Union veteran 
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and devout Republican after the war.124 For a considerable number of Guardsmen 
allegiance to Missouri could be followed at the expense of any devotion or alliance to the 
Confederate cause. The Guard also shed members for other causes. In the 1861 
campaigns there were many men who would join up for a battle for a few days and then 
leave to work on their farms. As harvest time approached in 1861, thousands in Price’s 
Army left, with or without permission, to tend to their livelihoods.125 Others simply 
decided that soldiering was not for them. Ironically one of these deserters was William 
Quantrill, who re-entered the war as an infamous anti-Federal bushwhacker when he was 
caught up in the partisan violence of the countryside.126 
These factors go a long way in explaining some of the tensions that would wrack 
the Missouri-Confederate alliance. Several times in 1861 Price threatened to act without 
regard to McCulloch’s authority or harassed him to attempt a reconquest of the whole 
state instead of a more careful military campaign. McCulloch likely felt that the 
Missourians were too dead-set on setting Trans-Mississippi Confederate policy. He 
certainly was not enthused with the constant desertions, short enlistment terms (little 
more than six months),127 lax security, and other disciplinary issues riddling his allies. As 
long-term partners, the State Guard was not a reliable force except as a buffer between 
Arkansas and the Union Army. 
 
124 O’Flaherty, 53; Schrader, 21-22, MHS. 
125 McGhee, 45-46; Cutrer, “Price and McCulloch are Fighting Each Other Harder than They are 
Fighting the Enemy: Divided Command and the Loss of Missouri,” in Confederate Generals in the Trans-
Mississippi, Vol. 2, (University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 8; In several 1861 battles, civilians rushed in 
from the countryside to pitch in and grab some loot before heading back home. Though their transitory 
service caused issues, they did provide more punch in the battles and reduced the strain on logistics when 
they left. 
126 Duane Schultz, Quantrill’s War: The Life and Times of William Clarke Quantrill, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996), 69. 
127 Peterson, 24. 
65 
 
   
The historian Albert Castel is perhaps correct in stating that Price’s main mission 
of rescuing Missouri from the Union was “the tragic yet natural miscalculation of his 
entire career.”128 Secession was simply not that popular a cause among his men except as 
a way to free Missouri. Their ties with the Confederacy could only be maintained as long 
as they were convinced that the Federal government was out to suppress and oppress 
Missourians. Also, in such a divided state, unsure Missourians were likely to back a 
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CHAPTER V 
The Carthaginian War 
In military terms the State Guard now found itself in a dicey position. It was still not 
ready for a full war and its forces were scattered across the state. Price quickly ordered 
the State Guard’s main armory at Jefferson City moved south to Boonville, considered 
more defensible thanks to a sympathetic populace. Clark’s Third Division was to gather 
there. If driven out it would merge with Parsons’ Sixth Division further south. As soon as 
Price reached Boonville he headed north to Lexington. There had been skirmishing near 
there and he felt that this was where the action would be. But as it turned out Lyon was 
bringing the bulk of his force to bear on Boonville, moving much faster than anticipated. 
He intended to capture or drive out Jackson and his government. Governor Jackson found 
himself in charge of military operations and sent a force under John S. Marmaduke north 
to delay Lyon. While Marmaduke fought Lyon, Parsons could make his way up to bolster 
the defenses.129 
Parsons’ men used whatever horses and wagons were available to reach the 
battlefield. They did not get past Boonville, however. Upon arriving there they were 
displeased to find a scarcity of weapons, and not all of it military grade. Ephraim 
Anderson described the men’s predicament. “Our company had about eight guns, and 
these were the common rifle and double-barreled shotgun… Whether to go on or, or turn 
back, was now the question. Arms, but of a rather indifferent description, could be 
obtained at home, and without any, our commands would not be very efficient.” 
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Ultimately, with battle imminent, the company captains decided it would be better to wait 
and hope that Jackson’s government would deliver the promised arms.130 
Lyon and Marmaduke met on June 17. The battle seemed to start well for the 
State Guard. This was due to Lyon’s overestimation of enemy strength. He responded 
slowly to the opening shots by deploying his artillery. Once Lyon had set everything up, 
the State Guard learned how outmatched it really was. The Union artillery had 
considerable effect on the green Guardsmen. Sharpshooters within the Guard’s ranks had 
boasted that they would pick off Federal officers and discombobulate the enemy, Now, 
with shells bursting around them, they found themselves unable to focus and line up their 
shots. The Guardsmen who had enthusiastically rushed to their state’s defense “began to 
realize we had taken no child’s play on our hands.” Marmaduke withdrew to a dense 
wood and some buildings to form a stronger defense. Lyon responded by bringing up his 
whole force into line of battle. Marmaduke was then ordered to fall back to meet with 
Parsons. However the undertrained MSG found it difficult to withdraw under fire and 
instead found itself in a rout. Kelly’s Company, the best-trained unit in the State Guard at 
the moment, had been left behind to man Boonville’s defenses. A mounted group of 80 
men arrived to support them but, upon seeing the superior Federal force, they had a 
democratic vote and elected to ride away without a fight. With no support, Kelly was 
forced to withdraw.131 
The 80 mounted horsemen were part of Parsons’ division, which was sent to stem 
the tide of retreat. But with little arms themselves, they could not do much good. 
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Furthermore the men in the Sixth Division came across Marmaduke’s routed men, all 
telling terrifying stories of a great, bloody defeat. Parsons’ men joined the mass of fleeing 
Guardsmen.132 Many historians have argued that for its miniscule numbers in 
participants, losses, and time, the Battle of Boonville was decisive, throwing off the State 
Guard before it could effectively organize and placing most of the state’s important 
locations under Federal control. The one-sided defeat certainly had an effect ton 
Missourians’ mind-sets. One semi-literate soldier admitted that they all “kam near getting 
sceard to death” and “hat to run like turkis.” He and some of the others, disenchanted by 
the panicked defeat, switched sides days later. Following the battle, Lyon issued a 
proclamation offering amnesty to any Guardsman who switched sides or simply left the 
army. Hundreds took him up on this offer and hundreds of potential recruits shied away 
from replacing the MSG’s losses. Others abandoned their wagons and ran into the woods. 
Over the following weeks those that did not give up tried to make their way to Price and 
his army. This proved to be difficult as the Union now controlled the Missouri River and 
all its crossings. One advantage was that the men were in civilian attire and, if they 
traveled in small bands, could slip through the guards and sneak across the river.133 
Snead recalled that this tiny battle was a “stunning blow” to Missouri’s southern 
sympathizers. The ripple effects from this encounter “did incalculable and unending 
injury to the Confederates.” The quick defeat and the rout of Jackson’s government made 
outright secession impossible. Furthermore, the MSG at or coming toward Boonville 
dispersed, leaving a large chunk of Missouri open to Lyon’s men. The battle was a 
serious logistical as well as political blow. The territory lost included the wealthiest, most 
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populous, and pro-MSG counties, putting a strain on the MSG’s already thin resources.134 
Quarter-Master General Harding, already low on means of transportation, also had little 
time to get the State Guard’s supplies out of town. He was able to evacuate the 
ammunition and powder in a large water cistern. Everything else had to be destroyed. The 
victorious Lyon reported that “Two pieces of artillery were taken (iron 6-pounders). 
Considerable camp equipage and about 500 stand of arms of all sorts were taken. About 
60 prisoners taken were released upon oath to obey the laws of the General Government 
and not oppose it during the present civil troubles.”135 In terms of killed and wounded, 
both sides only suffered under 20. 
Things were not going well on the diplomatic front either. When Lieutenant-
Governor Reynolds and the Missouri commission reached the Confederate capital at 
Richmond, they found that doubts about their state’s status plagued the highest levels of 
Confederate government. President Davis told Reynolds of the contradictory behavior 
displayed by Missouri’s leadership. Particularly he said the Confederacy was confused by 
the alternating support and opposition to the entry of Confederate troops. He asked, “If I 
agree to send Confederate troops into Missouri at your request, can you give me any 
guarantee that Mr. Lincoln may not propose and Governor Jackson assent to the 
agreement rejected by General Lyon, and compel these troops to retire before their joint 
forces?” Reynolds himself did not know and could give no guarantee.136 Not helping 
matters was the failures of the State Guard. Victory was needed. Fortunately victory was 
around the corner. 
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The armies in Missouri found themselves in a race. Price’s force was rushing 
south from Lexington to escape entrapment by two Federal forces and then to link up 
with the rest of the Missouri State Guard, under the command of Governor Jackson 
himself. Price himself rode alone and ahead of his men, making his way for Arkansas. 
There he hoped to facilitate a Confederate intervention under General Ben McCulloch.137 
One of the pursuing Federal forces was Lyon’s, fresh off its victory at Boonville. The 
other was led by General Franz Sigel, a German immigrant who had gained his position 
through military experience in the Revolution of 1848 and more importantly his massive 
popularity among other German immigrants, a large pool for recruitment. He would go 
down in history as one of the most incompetent long-running Union generals and his 
actions in the summer of 1861 would presage that reputation. His gray-clad German-
Missourian troops pursued Jackson’s force, occupying Springfield along the way. Sigel’s 
occupation of the prominent Missouri town was heavy-handed. Citizens who may or may 
not have been treasonous were arrested, exacerbating local anti-German sentiment. 
However, many of the citizens remained staunch Unionists as evidenced by a later mass 
exodus following a Confederate victory over a month later.138 Around this time General 
John C. Fremont, the first Republican presidential candidate and a frontier hero, was put 
in overall command of the Union’s western theatre. He would manage the Unionization 
of Missouri from St. Louis while Lyon led the main force in the field.139 
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While pursued by Sigel, the State Guard’s fortunes started to change. A group of 
German Home Guards was reported to be in their way of retreat at Cole Camp, Benton 
County. Upon arriving there on June 19, they learned that a battalion of 350 State 
Guardsmen had already surprised the camp at night, driving out or capturing the Germans 
(who were undisciplined and fairly drunk). This small victory cleared the way for a 
successful retreat and also added several hundred Guardsmen to the ranks of the main 
force. Jackson’s army then came across two artillerists, Captain Henry Guibor and 
Lieutenant William Barlow. They had been captured at Camp Jackson and were keen to 
disregard the rules of parole. These were trained artillerists and put together a fairly 
effective battery. Rains and Slack’s divisions, marching from Lexington, linked up with 
Jackson. Parsons had seniority, but Rains had more men (3,000) and more knowledge of 
the area, so Jackson placed him in command. Jackson also had tension with Parsons, 
remembering that he had strongly opposed secession. This caused considerable confusion 
in the chain of command, with battle reports going to both Jackson and Rains.140 
By the start of July the fight was back in the Missouri State Guard. Hearing that 
Sigel had encamped at the town of Carthage, the State Guard was imbued with “new life” 
and marched quickly to confront him.141 Now Sigel felt threatened and marched west to 
buy time for Lyon to come to his aid. Sigel was understandably worried given the 
disparity in numbers. He had 1,100 men and the State Guard 6,000. He may have been 
less worried if he knew that a third of the opposing force lacked weapons of any kind, 
and of those who possessed them many held short-ranged hunting rifles. If he fought the 
 
140 Kenneth E. Burchett, The Battle of Carthage, Missouri: A History of the First Trans-
Mississippi Conflict of the Civil War, (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Incorporated Publishers), 10, 76-
77, 84; Snead, 215-216; Hinze, 74; Snead, 217-219; Brooksher, 100-101. 
141 Carthage (Mo.). Civil War battle memoir. MHS. 
72 
 
   
battle correctly, Sigel could utilize his technological edge for a victory. The forces met on 
July 5, west of Carthage. It was a clash of Missourians against Missourians, a microcosm 
of Americans against Americans. 
The Missouri State Guard took position “on a high ridge of prairie, gently sloping 
southward, with undulations to a creek about one mile and a quarter distant. In front of 
our right was a large field of corn extending to the timber on the creek.” Because of the 
inexperience of most of the MSG officers and the lack of time to train the men, the 
infantry could not really form proper lines of battle, only a jagged approximation. 
Unarmed men either stood behind the lines or stood with the others to bolster the army’s 
appearance. Rains sent the mounted men, many of them also unarmed, on the flanks. 
Seeing this large force arrayed against him, Sigel halted his men and unlimbered his big 
guns. His infantry took cover behind a low hill and in the timber.142 
By the standards of the great Civil War battles, the artillery duel was light on 
casualties, but was still a tremendous experience for the green soldiers. The Guardsmen 
were ordered to lie down, letting most of the shells fly over them. The men were not so 
much nervous as frustrated at having to sit still and not fight the enemy. The rebel guns 
did not hit many targets, but effectively kept the equally green Federals on edge, sending 
them scurrying for cover in the timber. The stalemate was broken by the mounted men. 
Both Parsons and Rains sent theirs towards the Federal flanks. Many of the horsemen 
were unarmed and could only hope to intimidate or distract the enemy. They succeeded 
in this, convincing Sigel’s artillery to divert fire towards them. The decisive moment 
came when men under future famed cavalry raider Jo Shelby tore down a rail fence and 
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got into Sigel’s flank, just as the Union battery there ran out of ammunition. Threatened 
by the masses of horsemen crawling towards his rear, the German-born general ordered a 
withdrawal.143 
 What followed was a running battle. Sigel’s force had to cross many creeks to get 
back to Carthage and skirmishes erupted along the crossings. Governor Jackson had a 
tremendous opportunity to trap the much smaller Federal force, but his army was too 
inexperienced to pull off such a move. Neither he nor Rains had the skill to quickly 
coordinate a pursuit. Everybody surged forward at once in what adjutant-general Snead 
admitted to be a “rabble.” The divisional and brigade commanders tried to find ways to 
cross the fords under enemy fire or to find paths that would take them around the enemy. 
Promising routes turned out to be detours or required halts to dismantle obstacles such as 
rail fences. Parsons even donated his private carriage in order to get the men across one 
of the creeks faster. Mounted units split off in an attempt to run ahead of the enemy. 
Sometimes the horsemen did make it in front of a unit of retreating Unionists, but did not 
have the strength of arms to effectively stand in their way. Others were distracted by the 
prospect of looting ditched Federal supplies.144 
 The battle reached the town of Carthage itself. There was no solace for Sigel’s 
column. The disorganized elements of the State Guard continued to harry it. One group of 
Rebels entered the town from the west and broke ranks at the sight of Federal artillery, 
looking for buildings, fences, and other structures from which to snipe. This was another 
tactical mistake on the part of the Guardsmen, who were now too scattered and unable to 
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seize the artillery for themselves. The Federals successfully escaped the town and headed 
back for Springfield. The Guardsmen’s entrance into Carthage was received with much 
jubilation. One woman walked outside and hurrahed for Confederate President Jefferson 
Davis even as the bullets were still flying about.145 The MSG continued the chase, aided 
by civilian gifts of food and water. 
 Sigel’s army escaped with a loss of 44 men. The State Guard lost about 200, 
likely as a result of continually charging into artillery and musket fire in their pursuit and 
from confronting superior weapons. Still, the battle was a major victory. The State Guard 
had averted disaster and scored a major morale-booster at the same time. Even better they 
had defeated an army composed largely of the despised German “Dutch.” The Battle of 
Carthage was up to that point the greatest battle of the Civil War, though it would be 
rapidly eclipsed by First Bull Run and dozens of others. The Guardsmen had fought in a 
disorganized and shoddy manner, but they had also proven themselves brave and 
resourceful, and their success bolstered their enthusiasm. 
 During the battle other pleasing developments occurred at the southern border. 
Price’s trip to Arkansas was successful. The commander there was General Ben 
McCulloch. Like Price McCulloch had not come out of West Point or any other military 
academy. However, their issues with West Point were slightly different. As discussed 
earlier, Price had been an insubordinate officer in the Mexican War. His insubordination 
had met with success and thus he felt that West Point generals were not all that great. 
McCulloch’s issue with West Point was not so much with the men it produced than the 
idea of the academy. As a fervent Jacksonian Democrat, McCulloch saw West Point as 
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the center of a military caste that blocked leadership opportunities for experienced 
frontier warriors such as himself. McCulloch was indeed a seasoned soldier. He had 
aided in the successful Texas Revolution of 1836. As a Texas Ranger he had provided 
valuable service in the Mexican War and frequently fought Indians on the West Texas 
frontier. Seeing that McCulloch was a popular and prominent figure in his home state of 
Texas, the Confederate government gave him a sizeable command based in the Trans-
Mississippi. McCulloch’s assigned goal was to defend his home state and Arkansas 
(where he was based), as well as Confederate allies in Indian Territory (Indian groups 
such as Cherokees and Creeks were, like Missourians, wracked by internal divisions and 
would also likewise suffer a brutal civil war within a civil war). Before Price came to 
gain his aid he had already considered a major offensive into Missouri from Arkansas, 
believing this would fulfill the objective of defending Indian Territory by bringing 
Missouri to the Confederate side as a buffer state. Henry Rector, the Governor of 
Arkansas, had enthusiastically supported the plan and offered 8,000 state troops towards 
McCulloch’s force. However the Confederate government nixed the plan. Under Davis’ 
direction it wanted to fight a defensive war and considered Missouri a Union state. Since 
Jackson had not been able to convince the majority of the need for secession, there was 
no justification to invade it. Though never afraid of a fight and often desirous of offensive 
action himself, McCulloch was reasonable and cautious in how he executed his duties. 
The Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, further discouraged him from going beyond his 
mission parameters, which was to defend Arkansas and Texas and to coax undecided 
inhabitants of Indian Territory to the Confederate cause.146 
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 Now, however, Lyon’s army was barreling down Missouri. If the State Guard was 
destroyed, then Arkansas could be next and Indian allies to the west would feel less 
inclined to support the Confederacy. In fact thousands of Arkansans under General 
Nathaniel Pearce came north with McCulloch, reasoning that the “the best defense” for 
their state “was to fight her enemies as far away from her soil as possible.” McCulloch 
and Price rushed north with 3,000 men, with more Confederate soldiers marching behind 
them. They wanted to rescue Governor Jackson’s army before it was crushed and were 
pleasantly surprised to see that he had won without their assistance.147 Now the 
Confederates had finally entered the state. The State Guard greeted the arrivals with 
careless enthusiasm. Some fired off their guns in excitement and sparked a keg of 
gunpowder, sending themselves flying through the air. William Watson, a soldier in the 
3rd Louisiana, did not specify if there were any deaths from the accident, but noted it as 
his first indication that the State Guard had more “zeal than discipline.”148 
Combined with the State Guard, the temporary Army of the West posed a 
numerically powerful force and had a chance to deal Lyon a major defeat. For a brief 
moment Price and McCulloch, as well as the Missouri State Guard and the Confederacy 
in general, were on the same page. Upon seeing McCulloch, the Guardsmen cheered. 
Snead recalled: 
We were all young men then, and full of hope, and looked with delighted 
eyes on the first Confederate soldiers that we had ever seen, the men all 
dressed in sober gray, and their officers resplendent with gilded buttons, 
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and golden braid and stars of gold. To look like these gallant soldiers; to 
be of them; to fight beside them for their homes and for our own, was the 
one desire of all the Missourians, who, on that summer day, stood on one 
of their own verdant prairies, gazing southward.149 
But shortly Price and the MSG would pick at and reveal tensions that would 
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CHAPTER VI 
Victory and Disunion 
The feud, or perhaps more accurately the seeds of the feud between Price and McCulloch 
began shortly after their union in southern Missouri. The exact origins of the tensions and 
when they truly began are hard to discern. Much of the reasoning was given in hindsight 
during partisan bickering in the papers. After McCulloch and Price linked up with 
Jackson, the Army of the West retired to the southwest corner of the state to train and 
organize. McCulloch also wanted the MSG to go to an area where it could be better 
supplied, noting that many in its ranks had a “disposition to leave” due to “scarcity of 
supplies.” Price, however, was insistent that they move soon and start taking back 
Missouri. McCulloch assented and planned a move towards the town of Springfield. Not 
only did Springfield hold supplies, but Lyon, the man to be defeated, was concentrating 
his forces there.150 
 Lyon himself was having issues. His aggressive pursuit of the State Guard had left 
his army on a thin supply line and in hostile territory. He was also not just confronting a 
massive if under-armed militia army, but a Confederate counter-invasion as well. He 
wrote Fremont for further aid, but the Pathfinder was dilatory and disorganized in his 
response. Lyon, feeling desperate, withdrew for Springfield. If there was a time to strike 
him, it was now. 
 An oft-cited reason for the split is over the quality of the State Guard. McCulloch 
was accused of “prejudice” towards what he perceived as a rabble of undisciplined and 
poorly equipped soldiers. One accuser said he was unqualified for his major assignment 
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and let the West Pointer James McIntosh, his right-hand man, distort his opinions of the 
State Guard. However, the MSG not only contained some well-organized militia units, 
but at the time many Confederate units in other states were still finding their footing. It 
had some unique issues, but was not too different from other early war units. Also, as a 
rough-and-tumble Westerner himself, McCulloch would have had no prejudice towards 
frontiersmen well versed in hunting, Indian-fighting, or other forms of violence and hard 
living. The roots of the Price-McCulloch divide likely originated in matters of command. 
McCulloch never criticized the Missourian rank-and-file in his reports, only writing that 
they needed competent leadership to mold them into first-rate soldiers. It was at this level 
of the army that the two generals began to experience tensions. 
Price’s rank of major-general was clearly higher than McCulloch’s of brigadier-
general. On the other hand McCulloch was a Confederate general, and he viewed the 
MSG as a raggedy militia outfit. Arkansas General Nicholas Bartlett Pearce added to this 
confusion. Pearce actually did not head a Confederate outfit, but a division of Arkansas 
State troops, an outfit similar to if better equipped than Price’s. Pearce was uncertain as 
to who he was to answer to, as he was part of General William Hardee’s department 
rather than McCulloch’s. He called a meeting to settle the matter. It was soon established 
that McCulloch, having been assigned command of much of the Confederacy’s Trans-
Mississippi Department, was indeed in charge, a decision that Price himself suggested 
without McCulloch’s prodding. Despite this understanding, Price and the Missouri State 
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Guard immediately set about to challenge the Texan’s authority in what they saw as 
Missouri’s interests.151 
 Aside from continually pestering McCulloch to move fast and hard against the 
enemy, Price’s first troublesome action concerned the thousands of unarmed men under 
his command. McCulloch did not want to have a mob of such under-equipped men in his 
rear for two reasons. First they would be a drain on resources that could be used for the 
fighting men, of which he already had plenty. Price’s Army was already a logistical drag, 
with volunteers coming and going as they pleased and no proper system for distributing 
supplies. Secondly, if they made contact with the enemy they, having no means of 
defending themselves, would likely panic and throw the entire army into confusion. He 
ordered Price to leave them behind and the Missourian appeared to consent. 50 miles of 
marching later, the unarmed men still clung to the army. It is unclear how much 
involvement Price had in this disobedience. McCulloch reported that these men mostly 
came from Clark’s Third Division, and that Clark himself had knowingly disobeyed his 
orders. However, there were further orders from Price’s command on July 30, calling for 
the unarmed men to follow, but one day to the rear. He must have had some knowledge at 
least. It is likely that these orders were made after the fact, a result of the MSG’s failures 
in discipline. One veteran from the unarmed group reminisced that he and his fellows 
stole Confederate tents and followed the army, determined not to miss a battle.152 
 The Rebel and Federal armies made contact on August 2.  As at Boonville, the 
following event was little more than a skirmish, but had dire consequences for the 
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Rebels’ alliance. Lyon realized he could not just keep retreating. His foes would catch up 
to him and hundreds of Unionist civilians in Springfield would be abandoned. He decided 
the best defense was an offense and he marched his army out of Springfield in the 
direction of the enemy. His scouts reported that Rains’ Division was at Dug Springs. To 
confirm this, he sent forward a small force under Captain Frederick Steele. Rains, leading 
an advance guard of 400 mounted men, reported Steele’s approach and called for 
reinforcements. McCulloch sent Colonel James McIntosh with 150 of his mounted 
Arkansas riflemen to investigate (a staff officer of Rains later criticized McCulloch for 
sending a scouting rather than a fighting force). Meeting Rains, McIntosh relayed 
McCulloch’s cautious orders not to provoke a major battle, as most of the Rebel Army 
was still coming up. McIntosh ordered Rains to stay put and the two sides traded sporadic 
and ineffectual artillery fire. 
The terrain was marked by heavy brush and vegetation and McIntosh and Rains 
could not gauge the strength of the Federal force. Steele himself was uncertain what he 
was up against and deployed artillery on his flanks. The mutual probing eventually 
ignited a heated skirmish. It got too heated for Rains’ horsemen and they were soon in a 
“regular stampede.” One Arkansan veteran from McIntosh’s command implied that 
Rains’ mistake was keeping his men mounted. He recalled that in the face of artillery 
shells, “his horses were very disorderly and could scarcely be kept in ranks.” McIntosh 
blamed the men. He derisively reported “the command of General Rains, as I expected, 
came down upon us in full flight and in the greatest confusion.” He himself tried to stem 
the rout, but soon saw that it was a vain hope and ordered a general retreat. In their flight 
the Missourians went far, leaving 200 tethered backup horses to be captured by the 
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Federals. Rains blamed McIntosh for not sending promised reinforcements. McIntosh 
countered that he did not command much men at the moment and they would be wasted 
fighting alongside the apparently panicky Guardsmen. McCulloch sided with McIntosh. 
He rode up to meet the retreating men, “exhausting his whole vocabulary of 
vituperation…in denunciation of the Missourians.” As far as he was concerned Rains had 
aggressively provoked a fight without proper reconnaissance and then shamefully bolted, 
causing mass confusion among the advance units. He now felt that the State Guard, about 
half his army, was unreliable. If its generals could not control their men, then what would 
happen in a full-on battle? For their part the State Guard felt that they were being unfairly 
maligned based on one incident. One officer pointed out later that the Federals reported a 
few men killed and wounded, evidence that at least some of Rains’ men stood their 
ground and fought. To their chagrin the skirmish at Dug Springs was alternatively titled 
the “Rains Scare.”153 
 McCulloch and Price were now butting heads constantly. Lyon, learning how far 
outnumbered he was, retreated back towards Springfield. Price continually insisted that 
McCulloch go on the attack, but the Texan was hesitant to do so. He was afraid of a 
repeat of Dug Springs on a greater scale and wanted a firmer grasp of what he was up 
against. Pearce, the commander of the Arkansas regiments, agreed, finding the 
Missourians’ incessant call for action “clamorous and unjust.”154 According to Thomas 
Snead, Price finally convinced McCulloch to move in a dramatic moment on August 4. 
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Price told McCulloch that he was older than him, senior in rank, had experience from the 
Mexican War, and was in charge of a force twice as great as his. But he would willingly 
put all his men under McCulloch’s command if they could just launch an attack on Lyon. 
“If you refuse to accept this offer, I will move with the Missourians alone, against Lyon. 
For it is better that they and I should all perish than Missouri be abandoned without a 
struggle. You must either fight beside us, or look on at a safe distance… I must have your 
answer before dark, for I intend to attack Lyon tomorrow.”155 This is one of the great 
myths of the 1861 Missouri campaign, accepted at face value for decades by both 
veterans and historians alike. One veteran summed up the myth in his claim that Price 
displayed “a magnanimity of which history presents but few examples in military 
leaders” by letting the more pessimistic McCulloch take command.156 It was a picture of 
a superior man subordinating himself to an inferior for the good of the cause. First of all, 
it is impossible for Snead to remember such a long and epic speech by Price word by 
word. Secondly it would have been odd for McCulloch, a seasoned Texas Ranger and 
veteran himself, to accept such a condescending speech in awed silence. Thirdly this 
scene furthers the idea that McCulloch and other Confederate generals ultimately lost 
Missouri by failing to heed the strategies and advice of Price. Any regrets or failures 
linked to the following battle could be laid at McCulloch’s feet rather than Price’s, as he 
had command. The most unusual aspect of the tale concerns the change in command 
arrangements. According to Nathaniel Pearce, it had already been agreed that the State 
Guard would be placed under McCulloch. However, Price very well may have threatened 
to attack on his own. He had disobeyed orders to stay put in the Mexican War. He was 
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the commander of a military force under Missouri, not the Confederacy, and thus saw 
himself as only answerable to the chain of command in a voluntary sense.157 
 Whatever occurred on August 4, McCulloch finally planned an attack out of his 
camp along Wilson’s Creek. He reiterated his plans for unarmed men to stay behind and 
Price seemed to consent to his orders. “No unarmed man will be permitted to march with 
or follow the army. No wagons will move with the command.”158 McCulloch’s sudden 
willingness to move is often attributed to pressure from Price. He claimed in a future 
report, however, that he had received a promising letter from General Leonidas Polk in 
Tennessee. Polk and General Gideon Pillow had been in contact in General Jeff 
Thompson and his MSG First Division. Pillow in particular was quite taken with General 
Thompson’s “earnestness and anxiety for service” and believed that with coordination the 
Confederacy could seize most of Missouri. Even an invasion of Illinois was considered. 
The plan was to send up to 12,000 Confederates into the state from the east. This force 
would be a link-up between Pillow’s men and another group from Arkansas under 
General William J. Hardee. This force would move in a northern direction, getting 
between Lyon and the prize of St. Louis. Though the State Guard might fail him again, 
McCulloch now expected better organized Confederates in Lyon’s rear.159 
 McCulloch’s enthusiasm was literally dampened by rain on August 9. The 
Guardsmen’s cartridges were not adequately protected against the elements, as most of 
the men had no cartridge boxes and used their pockets instead. With half his force unable 
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to function, McCulloch had to cancel the attack.160 As fate would have it the anxiety-
ridden Lyon had changed his mind again and was coming out of Springfield to strike the 
Rebel camp. Thanks to the civilian attire of the State Guard and the ease with which its 
members could come and go, it was not difficult to send Unionist Missourians into its 
camp as spies. He thus had an accurate view of the enemy’s positions. The battle plan, 
partly devised by Siegel, was audacious in how it disregarded military maxims. In the 
face of a force that outnumbered them two to one, they would divide the army. Sigel 
would take his men on a roundabout march and come from the south. Lyon would attack 
from the north, occupying his enemy’s attention. Lyon and Sigel pinned their hopes on 
surprise, as well as the inferior weaponry of the State Guard, to even the odds.161 
 Surprise was achieved for both thrusts. As luck would have it Rains, encamped in 
the north above Oak Hill, had withdrawn his pickets without either providing 
replacements or notifying McCulloch. As a result Lyon’s wing caught him almost 
unawares (one veteran claims that Rains was sending out fresh pickets, but a Unionist 
civilian had informed Lyon of the break in picket duty, giving him a window of 
opportunity). If not for foraging wagon teams that spotted the Federals, Rains would have 
been caught even more by surprise. Lyon’s force drove the Eighth Division from its camp 
and endangered the entire rebel force. At the time McCulloch, McIntosh, and other 
officers were having breakfast. A messenger arrived and reported the surprise attack, 
claiming that 20,000 Federals were on the way. McCulloch’s initial reaction was that 
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Rains was panicking again, but artillery fire to the north disabused him of that notion.162 
McCulloch acted swiftly. Finding Siegel’s surprise rear attack more concerning, he led 
elements of the MSG and the 3rd Louisiana Regiment south. Price was ordered to meet 
Lyon from the North, and did so with 3,100 of the State Guard. Many of the men were in 
the process of getting breakfast. Some went into battle with a rifle in one hand and a 
piece of bread in another, while one was literally covered in blood as he had been 
slaughtering a sheep for meat.163 
 Price effectively found himself in temporary command as he formed his divisions 
into a long line. This proved a little difficult at fist as “hundreds of panic-stricken men, 
some wounded, many on foot and many others in all sorts of wheeled vehicles,” rushed to 
the rear from the opposite direction. These were the unarmed men who added to the 
Rebels’ early confusion. General Pearce recalled that one of his battalions was “literally 
run over by this rabble.”164 The central geographic feature of the MSG’s part in the battle 
was Ox Hill, which the Federals had quickly overrun and occupied.165 It would soon be 
renamed in the combatants’ memory as Bloody Hill, as both sides fought for its control in 
an hours-long slugfest. It was the first great battle west of the Mississippi and known as 
the Bull Run of the West. The reason for the fierce, casualty-high fighting can be partly 
attributed to the undisciplined and amateur nature of units on both sides, but also their 
western character. McCulloch’s assessment of the State Guard based on the Rains Scare 
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proved to be a great extrapolation. For the most part these were hardened frontiersmen, 
not likely to give up the fight so soon even in their first legitimate battle. At the same 
time they were reckless and made amateur errors. For example, the officers of McBride’s 
Seventh Division did not understand the importance of skirmishers in feeling out the 
enemy. As a consequence the men, armed with hunting rifles, ran en masse into 
outranging Federal musketry. “Disheartened,” they had to take cover behind a crest on 
the hill until one Captain Tribble boldly led them on an advance. They neared the enemy 
with considerable loss, but were finally able to respond with their own rifles.166 
On the matter of rifle ranges, the State Guard did benefit from thick brush lining 
the top of the hill. If careful or lucky, they could use the brush as cover for getting into 
range. They were sometimes able to draw the Federals into close-quarters ambushes, 
many experienced squirrel-hunters scoring headshots with their hunting rifles. Some of 
the men also contended with massed fire by taking irregular skirmish formations, so as 
not to lose too many men in one shell burst or volley (these improvised spaced out 
formations were actually adopted by some generals in the last year of the war).167 The 
State Guard’s use of artillery was very poor. Because of the lack of big guns, the Guard 
had never created the position of Chief of Artillery. There was no one directing all the 
guns to focus on specific targets or counter-battery fire. Thus the Union guns battered 
away the Rebels without serious resistance.168 The cavalry was also mishandled. Rains 
ordered Jo Shelby to repeat his successful flanking maneuver from the Battle of Carthage. 
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The cavalry would strike the Federal flank and rush up Ox Hill, in rear of their battery. 
Given the much greater intensity of the battle and the more difficult terrain, it went very 
poorly this time. James Totten, the commander of the battery, turned a couple of his guns 
and, supported by infantry, quickly beat off the attack. The cavalry wisely spent the rest 
of the battle on foot.169 A final issue during the battle was the lack of an effective hospital 
corps. With no stretcher teams, men in the firing line took it upon themselves to carry 
wounded men to cover, thinning ranks in action. They then “returned to their places in 
the battle line and continued their bloody work.”170 
 The battle also had several unusual episodes, attributable to both the hardscrabble 
and amateurish nature of the dueling armies. One chaplain amidst the State Guard told his 
men to aim for the stomachs of the enemy. This would give them a slower death, 
allowing more time for the unsaved to find redemption in Christ (Federals suffering 
agonizing deaths from such wounds were likely not appreciative). General Parsons had 
not been able to eat breakfast due to the dawn attack, and resolved to get his morning 
meal in. He thus faced his horse away from the battle so he could eat with some 
semblance of peace.171 Colonel Benjamin Rives, the commander of the 4th Cavalry in 
Slack’s division, rushed to the fray absent of any of his men so that he could lend a hand 
with his own rifle.172 At least dozens, if not hundreds of the unarmed men that 
exasperated McCulloch, “marched boldly to the front to be shot at” until they were able 
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to obtain “guns from the dead, wounded, and prisoners.”173 Artillery officer Hiram 
Bledsoe had to use sacks of buck shot to load Old Sacramento, the Mexican War relic.174 
Another artillerist fired a cannonball just to get rid of a pesky sharpshooter in a tree. It 
split the tree in two and “literally blew him to pieces.”175 The entire battle had a strange 
flow to it. The two lines would advance, fire at each other, and then withdraw for a bit. 
This resulted in periods of eerie silence amidst otherwise frantic fighting.176 
Price displayed his one great quality as a general, his capacity to inspire his men. 
He rode back and forth along his entire front, purposefully going to where the fighting 
was the hottest and urging his men to stand firm or to reinforce a wavering section of the 
line. This naturally put him in danger. Several bullets damaged his clothes. One hit him in 
the side, prompting him to joke to an officer “That isn’t fair; if I were as slim as Lyon 
that fellow would have missed me entirely.” Despite the pain, he kept so calm that his 
men were unaware of his wound until the battle was over.177 
 Despite their initial surprise, the State Guard-Confederate army soon swung the 
battle in their favor. Sigel beat a retreat, enabling McCulloch to go north with the rest of 
his army, “in the nick of time” recalled one survivor who noted that the MSG’s lines 
were thinning out. Lyon now had to face the entirety of McCulloch’s army with a much 
reduced force. Still, the battle went on for a while with great intensity. Lyon, like Price, 
was in the thick of the fighting and himself wounded twice. He grew despairing, realizing 
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that Siegel had failed in his part of the battle. In a heated moment when Missourians and 
Arkansans broke through the Union’s front line, he decided to personally lead a 
counterattack. His bravery cost him as he was shot though the heart. Sturgis took 
command and, seeing that victory was impossible, ordered a retreat, a daunting prospect 
given how close the lines were to each other. Nevertheless the Federals successfully 
extricated themselves thanks to an orderly fighting withdrawal and exhaustion on the 
Rebel side.178 
 The Confederates and Guardsmen had scored a great victory. The Federal Army 
was finally in retreat. The price was high, however. Snead calculated the losses and the 
number of men involved. He estimated that 732 of Price’s men were killed, wounded, or 
missing, out of 1,317 overall casualties for the Rebel side (later figures put it at 724 with 
173 killed and 551 wounded). One soldier in Rains’ division claimed “we could hardly 
walk for fear of treading on” the dead and wounded. The tally among the officers was 
staggering. Most suffered a wound of some kind. Division commanders Slack and Clark 
were wounded in the leg, the former suffering a laceration. Colonel Benjamin Rives, 
commander of the Fourth Division’s cavalry, took Slack’s place while Clark’s was taken 
by Colonel Congreve Jackson, an infantry officer, and then Price’s eldest son Edwin 
Price. Clark and Slack would both be offered positions in Confederate Congress during 
their recoveries. Clark would accept and become one of Price’s main political allies as a 
senator. Slack, on the other hand, surprised many by replying “he would not have it under 
any circumstances… He was where he wanted to be.” Many of the best infantry and 
artillery officers under them were mortally wounded, with many reports and post-war 
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recollections making special mention of Colonel Richard Weightman’s death. 
Weightman had been the only officer in the State Guard that consistently earned the 
praise of McCulloch, and had fallen after sustaining three wounds. Overall the combined 
Army of the West suffered 277 dead and 945 wounded for a total of 1,222 casualties. The 
Federals suffered 258 killed, 873 wounded, and 186 missing for a total of 1,317.179 
 McCulloch’s opinion of the State Guard after this battle was mixed. “Our men 
were at great disadvantage, on account of the inferior weapons, but they fought generally 
with great bravery…Want of arms and discipline made my number comparatively small.” 
On the other hand he saw that the rank-and-file were fierce and brave soldiers. His after-
action reports even commended the divisional commanders for their gallantry, except of 
course for Rains.180 One point of contention was the superiority in Federal intelligence. 
They had surprised the Army of the West and exploited its weak spots. William Watson 
of Louisiana wrote that this was due to the inability of the State Guard to keep out 
civilians. A group of ladies profusely expressing support for the cause had walked into 
camp and was given a thorough tour by Price. It was suspected they had been spies, and a 
naïve Price had given them all the information they wanted.181 
A disturbance erupted over a battery of captured guns. The 3rd Louisiana had 
overrun a Federal battery and then had to leave them as they further pursued the enemy. 
Guardsmen, always looking for a way to make up for their deficiency in supplies, 
swooped in and took the guns, harnesses, and horses for themselves. Price further 
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infuriated the Louisianans by crediting the guns’ capture to his own men in his report, 
perhaps confusedly mixing them in with two guns captured by mounted Missourians and 
Texans. McCulloch insisted to Price that the guns had been stolen and the general agreed 
to return them to their rightful captors. While there is no evidence that Price had been 
aware of the thievery, he returned the guns without their horses and harnesses.182 
 The Federal Army soon abandoned Springfield, allowing the Missouri State 
Guard to enter. McCulloch issued a proclamation to the divided town that cast him in the 
role of liberator, yet he called for Missourians to act, aware that the state was far from 
being in Confederate hands. He knew that without enough support from the state’s 
civilian population, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for any future military 
operations in the area to achieve their political end goals. His proclamation was 
calculated to engender pro-Confederate feeling while appealing to Missourians’ desire to 
be independent in their decision-making. This showed that, contrary to some accusations 
that he was blind to Missourians’ sensitivities, he was aware that the state was not a 
guaranteed hotbed of pro-Confederate sentiment. Of course, he still hoped that he could 
rally thousands of its civilians to the Secessionist cause. 
…I have come among you simply with the view of making war upon our 
Northern foes, to drive them back, and give the oppressed of your State an 
opportunity of again standing up as freemen and uttering their true 
sentiments…Your beautiful State has been nearly subjugated, but those 
true sons of Missouri who have continued in arms, together with my force, 
came back upon the enemy, and we have gained over them a great and 
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signal victory…If the true men of Missouri will rise up and rally around 
their standard, the State will be redeemed… Missouri must be allowed to 
choose her own destiny…I have driven the enemy from among you. The 
time has now arrived for the people of the State to act; you cannot longer 
procrastinate. Missouri must now take her position, be it North or 
South.183 
Once in Springfield, McCulloch and Price broke over strategy. McCulloch 
believed the army should halt at Springfield, finding it the best position given the 
circumstances. He felt that after the loss in men and the expenditure of ammunition, the 
combined army was not yet up to the challenge of retaking Missouri. Pearce’s Arkansans 
were heading home. Other men were too sick to continue or were needed to honor a 
protective treaty with allies in Indian Territory. This left McCulloch with only 2,500 men 
outside of the State Guard. Much of the State Guard still consisted of undersupplied and 
unreliable men. In the days following the battle, many of the new recruits left, some 
satisfied with having taken a part in a single battle and others shaken by its aftermath. 
One doctor with a heavily critical diary believed many of the men left because they were 
“disgusted on account of the incompetence of the General Officers,” mainly their failure 
to pursue the enemy immediately.184 
Many veterans believed McCulloch had passed up an opportunity to destroy the 
rest of Lyon’s army. Many historians have echoed this viewpoint, believing that 
McCulloch could have used the vast number of horsemen in his army to mount a pursuit 
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and shatter the retreating enemy. One writer claimed this failure “virtually eliminated any 
chance…to reverse the flow of military and political fortune in Missouri.”185 This is 
hindsight, and McCulloch had many reasons not to go after the enemy. The commanding 
general noted that his army was dangerously low on ammunition, rations, and other 
supplies, further making an offensive movement difficult. The only way to compensate 
seemed to be looting, an act which disgusted the Texan. The presence of thousands of 
unarmed men had resulted in a looting spree that spread anti-Confederate sentiment 
among the civilian population. These looters also stole from their comrades-in-arms, 
picking up captured enemy rifles or even weapons dropped by Arkansans and 
Louisianans. One later accusation was that they stole tents as well, depriving many 
Louisianans of shade from the late summer heat. McCulloch did not have the influence to 
restrain the Missourians from these actions. Price to his credit tried to act, finally 
installing a provost-marshal. He further issued an order stating that all men leaving the 
State Guard had to turn in their weapons. It is not known how carefully this rule was 
observed. After all, many of these weapons were personal firearms.186 Price did manage 
to prevent a heinous act by General Rains. Finding a Federal hospital with much of the 
wounded enemy, Rains had the medical supplies seized and transported towards his 
camp, leaving the Union surgeon to treat his charges without the necessary equipment. 
Price was furious at this horrid treatment of wounded Federals and ordered the supplies 
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returned.187 Despite a major victory and Price’s attempts to stem looting, the alliance was 
in danger of falling apart. 
McCulloch claimed in a December report, intended to counter charges of neglect 
and prejudice towards Missouri, that he had provided Price with a smart strategy. He 
believed that while assuming the defensive, the Missourians could convene a secession 
convention and officially join the Confederacy. By putting the State Guard under 
Confederate jurisdiction, this would enable more coordination and co-operation while 
also rallying all pro-Secessionists to the cause. Staying put would also bring them in 
marching distance of support from Texas and Arkansas. Price was disappointed in his 
ally’s stance. He wanted to move now, with an eye towards advancing to the Missouri 
River in the north. He believed that to sit still or make a retrograde movement towards 
the Arkansas border would deny the State Guard all the fruits of its recent victory.188 
Price was perhaps encouraged by a message from Governor Jackson. Jackson had 
been unable to procure further arms from the Confederacy, but did receive an 
appropriation of $1,000,000. He optimistically stated to Price that soon all available arms 
and Confederate soldiers that could be spared outside Virginia would converge on 
Missouri to rescue it from the Union.189 This was indeed an unrealistic expectation. In 
fact, the secondary incursion into Missouri from Confederate forces in Tennessee and 
Arkansas, which had encouraged McCulloch, had fallen apart before it began thanks to 
disagreements and animosity between Hardee and Pillow, as well as the indecisiveness of 
 
187 Dr. E McD. Coffey, “Two Stories About Gen. Price,” September 19, 1885, in Confederate 
Tales of the War in the Trans-Mississippi Part One: 1861, (Camp Pope Bookshop, 2010), 132-133. 
188 OR III, 747-749. 
189 Series LIII, 722. 
96 
 
   
Polk. Hardee and Pillow had different ideas on how to proceed into Missouri. Polk, who 
should have settled the matter quickly, instead balked upon learning of a concentration of 
Federal forces in eastern Missouri. Hardee gave up on the feasibility of a Missouri 
campaign. He believed the country in southeast Missouri could not support any sizeable 
army. He further stated that he had no such army in the first place. General Thompson, 
who had helped bring together this planned operation, had to have been very 
disappointed. He had been clearing the way with successful surprise attacks and bragged 
that he had stopped all Federal supply traffic for ten days. He was later forgiving of the 
cancellation in his memoirs, noting that “the peculiarities of the country” would have 
made an invasion from the southeast difficult. But he did lament that “the personal 
jealousy which has so often injured our cause” might have played a part in aborting the 
campaign.190 
McCulloch ultimately decided it would be pointless to keep his army so far into 
Missouri. This resulted in much disappointment and resentment among the Missourians, 
one doctor bitterly noting in his diary, “Sigel ran like a coward at Wilson Creek and 
McCulloch was too coward to catch him.”191 McCulloch could not do much where he 
was. Other assistance was not forthcoming and he had other duties to attend to in other 
states and territories. Since Price was not willing to stay put, he could not put up an 
effective defensive posture either. As they departed southward, some of the Louisianans 
took revenge for the theft of the captured guns, seizing a wagon train bearing clothes for 
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the State Guard.192 Though his Confederate support waned for the moment, Price was 
determined to build upon his triumph at Wilson’s Creek. Late in August he set north for 
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CHAPTER VII 
High Tide of the Missouri State Guard 
Price’s Northern Missouri Campaign had two major objectives. One was to take the bank 
at Lexington, which held money that could fund the State Guard’s war efforts. Another 
more urgent matter was the rescue of Harris’ Second Division. Being in the 
northeasternmost part of the state, Harris’ division had been separated from the rest of the 
State Guard by Lyon’s movements and had to lie low as it received recruits. Harris did 
try to contribute to the July and August campaigning by ordering small, but noticeable 
military movements. These induced Fremont to divert reinforcements from Lyon, though 
given Fremont’s slowness these Federals may have never made it to Springfield in the 
first place. Harris’ recruiting and raiding efforts went quite well thanks to Federal 
mismanagement. The commanding Federal officers had been heavy-handed and intrusive 
in managing northern Missouri. This resulted in a pro-State Guard population.193 
 As he moved north, Price had to leave contingents of the State Guard behind to 
protect his supply lines. 400 men stayed in Springfield. Another small force under 
Colonel John Weidemeyer was left to guard the supply line at Osceola. One might think 
that Price’s force would have been greatly reduced by the time he reached Lexington, but 
there were in fact many enthusiastic volunteers that hopped onto his army, as well as 
scattered elements of the State Guard who had been unable or unwilling to leave their 
home counties to join the campaign in the south. The western border counties of Missouri 
were the most reliably Secessionist, as its inhabitants had a long, violent history with free 
soilers in Kansas. By the time Price reached Lexington he would have an army of 18,000. 
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“With an army increasing hourly in numbers and enthusiasm,” Price overwhelmed any 
Federal garrison that got in the way. These garrisons abandoned their positions, some 
making their way to Lexington. The Guardsmen were also encouraged by a friendly 
civilian population. Everywhere they went they were greeted with pitchers of waters and 
many treats. One Guardsman recalled, “Often fruit and water were dispensed with fair 
hands; bright eyes greeted us joyously, and rosy lips murmured forth hopes for our 
success and triumph.” Price joyfully reported that “citizens vied with each other in 
feeding my almost famished soldiers.”194 
 The only serious fight on the way to Lexington occurred at Dry Wood Creek. The 
opponents were Jim Lane and his Kansas Brigade, situated across the border at Fort 
Scott. Lane hoped to slow down or turn back the State Guard with an ambush, a difficult 
plan considering he had less than 1,000 against an army over 10,000. The Kansans hid in 
the dense trees around Dry Wood Creek. Their ambush was successful, catching the 
Missourians by total surprise. Lane’s big guns even scared some of the still non-battle-
tested Guardsmen, prompting many of them to volunteer for horse guarding duty. But 
Price had simply to move the mass of his army forward and Lane’s men withdrew. 
Fighting continued in prairie grass, much of it 7 to 8 feet in height.  This dry grass proved 
to be a danger. In several spots the fighting started fires and kept the men tending to the 
combustible artillery caissons on their toes. Heavily outnumbered, the Kansans saw no 
hope for victory and retreated to the safety of Fort Scott. The Missourians lost 2 killed 
and 23 wounded, the Federals 111 killed and wounded. It was a major victory that raised 
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morale, moreso because the enemy included the hated Jayhawkers. Ephraim Anderson 
noted, “many of those who had been plundered and outraged by them were in our 
ranks.”195 
 The Missouri State Guard reached Lexington on September 11 to find it manned 
by 3,500 men under Colonel James Mulligan. Mulligan, a Chicagoan, led a collection of 
units that had entered the town in response to Price’s northward march. These included 
his own 23rd Illinois, German Home Guards, the Union 13th Missouri, a battalion of army 
reservists, and one artillery battery. Expecting Price, they had already dug trenches and 
felled trees and fences to make barricades.196 One Union colonel described the layout of 
the defenses, centered on a Masonic College: 
The college is on a bluff about 200 feet above low-water mark, and from 
15 to 30 feet higher than North or Main street. Third street runs along the 
top of the bluff. Close to and surrounding the college building was a 
rectangular for of sods and earth about 12 feet thick and 12 feet high; with 
bastions at the angles and embrasures for guns. At a distance of 200 to 800 
feet was an irregular line of earthworks protected by numerous traverses, 
occasional redoubts, a good ditch, trous-de-loup, wires, etc., etc. Still 
farther on the west and north were rifle-pits. The works would have 
required 10,000 or 15,000 men to occupy them fully. All the ground them 
the fortifications to the river was then covered with scattering timber. The 
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spring just north and outside of fortifications, was in a deep wooded 
ravine...197 
This was to be the true test for the State Guard. Though it had numerical 
superiority in manpower and artillery, it would have to fight an entrenched enemy 
without any Confederate support. Federal reinforcements could potentially come in from 
around the state. Price’s whole army was not up yet and he had to wait for the rest to 
arrive before pushing on the town. As his men came up, a running series of skirmishes 
erupted. At first Price made for a bridge, but the Federals burned it down, forcing him to 
turn west and use Independence Road, the main avenue of approach. Hidden Federals in 
the adjoining cornfield surprised the advance MSG cavalry with a volley, sending 
panicked horses running back into the infantry. Artillerists from the Sixth and Eight 
Divisions hurried up their guns and their shells drove the Federals out of the fields. The 
fight continued along the road, passing through cornfields, an orchard, a cemetery, and 
finally the streets. General McBride, commanding the Sixth Division, wrote the Federals 
“fled like rats” into their earthworks. Skirmishes broke out along the entrenchments, with 
one band of Rebels managing to get onto a breastwork and plant their flag. However, the 
MSG could not break through and the artillery sparred for the rest of the day. To the 
pleasure of Guardsmen lying in the orchard for cover, fruit was torn from the trees and 
plopped down alongside them, allowing them to snack without endangering themselves. 
When the dust cleared, the combatants were shocked to learn, despite the long and 
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furious fighting, that casualties had been extremely light. Each side had only suffered 25 
killed and wounded.198 
Despite his subordinates’ insistence on a breakout assault the next day, Mulligan 
opted to wait for Fremont to send relief. In hindsight he may have slapped himself for 
passing up an opportunity. Price’s force was again very low on ammunition (the artillery 
had eventually resorted to collections of rocks for ammunition) and not yet at full 
strength. Price waited. “It is unnecessary to kill off the boys here. Patience will give us 
what we want.” When he had his full force and the rest of his ammunition, then he would 
take the town.199 
The next few days were marked by skirmishing and potshots.  One resident 
recollected decades later that small bands of impatient Guardsmen would slip into the 
town only to engage in pointless skirmishes. Men on both sides were kept awake by slow 
but frequent cannon fire. Many of the besiegers protected themselves by “hugging the 
ground” by a plank fence. The fence absorbed the shocks of the blasts, an indictment of 
how weak the improvised shells were becoming.200 Day by day more Guardsmen arrived, 
supplemented by temporary recruits from the surrounding area. The defenders wondered 
when their relief was going to come. Fremont had indeed ordered several forces to make 
for Lexington, but these columns were scattered and uncoordinated. One by one these 
rescue efforts petered out or were blocked by other MSG forces. On September 17, 600 
Federal soldiers tried to block Parsons’ 3,500 man division, which had missed out on the 
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previous campaign, from reaching Price’s army. At the Battle of Blue Mills Landing, 
Parsons’ army braved canister fire to overwhelm and drive off the Federals. Parsons’ 
Seventh Division then blocked a relief column under Sturgis by seizing all the boats 
along his march route. Four regiments of Indiana men departed from Jefferson City in 
steamers. After disembarking they mistook each other for the enemy and lost a dozen 
men killed and wounded. Their officers were so embarrassed that they slunk back to the 
capital. Jim Lane, with his recently defeated Kansans, was also ordered by Fremont to 
come to Mulligan’s relief, but he had his own plans involving the town of Osceola.201 
By September 18 Price was satisfied with his strength. He had a rough 5 to 1 
advantage in men and 3 to 1 in artillery (with the Federals themselves having to 
improvise ammunition much like the State Guard). The ammunition shortage was 
alleviated by the possession of Lexington’s blacksmith shop and a warehouse on the 
riverbank. The forge in the blacksmith shop was used to mold projectiles for the artillery. 
Thus the Rebels could continually hurl shot and shells at the Federals with little fire in 
return, though as at Wilson’s Creek they failed to coordinate all their might on specific 
targets. One youthful artillery officer, Churchill Clark, used fiery shot on the Masonic 
College in the hopes of burning it down. The shells were too slow to do their work and 
were tossed out before they could set the building ablaze.202 
Price sent Mulligan a demand for a peaceful surrender, but was rejected. The 
Federal commander was more receptive to a message urging civilians to leave the area. 
Many went into the countryside or into secure indoor locations, but just as many were 
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eager to witness a battle and did not the generals’ advice. The Guardsmen from all 
directions advanced “as one dark moving mass, their guns beaming in the sun, their 
banners waving, and their drums beating-everywhere. The defenders recalled that “as far 
as we could see, were men, men, men, approaching grandly.”203 The most furious and 
controversial part of the ensuing fight centered around the Anderson House, located on 
the west side of the Federal lines. The Guardsmen found this house to be a good spot 
from which to snipe at the Union soldiers. Mulligan ruefully claimed in his reminiscences 
that the house was a hospital and off-limits, but this was an unrealistic expectation. Even 
the editors of his entry in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War pointed out that he had 
“no military right to expect” that such a strategic spot should be ignored and that he could 
be equally culpable for having the hospital put in such a spot in the first place. The 
sharpshooting certainly raised the ire of the nearby Federals, who assaulted the house. 
The charge sent its occupants scurrying, save for several wounded men and sharpshooters 
trapped on the top floor. The Federals bayoneted most of the surrendering men. One 
surviving Guardsman named W.H. Mansur would have been executed by firing squad if a 
less temperamental Federal had not rushed him out of the house to safety.204 
Many of the defenses held on the 18th, but the Guardsmen did seize strategic 
points that worsened the Federals’ situation, most importantly the cisterns that gave the 
Federals fresh water. On the 19th they did not make any assaults, but fired at the Federal 
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earthworks from trees and upper floors. The artillery on both sides dueled, running so low 
on ammunition that they reused each other’s recently cast and sub-par balls.205 
A truce was declared early in the evening and once again Price asked for 
Mulligan’s surrender. Though his men were running low on water and weakening with 
thirst, Mulligan refused, holding out hope that relief would finally come. Meanwhile, the 
men of Harris’ Second Division were fashioning a new weapon in the riverside 
warehouse. They were taking hemp bales and fashioning large moveable breastworks out 
of them. The plan was to advance towards the Federals’ lines with these protective 
devices. The Guardsmen would get close enough to use their shorter-ranged weapons and 
inflict greater pressure on the defenders. There has been disagreement over who came up 
with this idea. Naturally Harris got much of the credit as it was his division, while others 
credited Captain Thomas Hinkle, one of Price’s staff officers. With or without Hinkle’s 
direction, Harris ordered 132 hemp-bales prepared for the 20th. The soldiers tied the bales 
together with large coils of rope and dunked them in the Missouri River to make them 
fireproof. The next morning wagons carried them out to the men for the assault.206 
Harris’ men moved forward under the cover of their makeshift shields and across 
terrain dotted by convenient six-foot tall pawpaw bushes. The hemp bales proved to be a 
work of genius. Bullets could not penetrate them. Even the artillery could not do the job. 
Out of shells, the Federals could only hurl weaker balls which glanced off the hemp. One 
veteran approvingly remembered, “Each bale was put in charge of three men and rolled 
up the hill: by keeping it in front, the men were protected from the enemy's fire, while our 
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riflemen directed their aim at every head that was raised above the breastworks.” 
Mulligan recalled, “Round-shot and bullets were poured against them, but they would 
only rock a little and then settle back. Heated shot were fired with the hope of setting 
them on fire, but they had been soaked and would not burn.” Those Guardsmen with 
shorter-ranged hunting rifles and shotguns were now close enough to deal some real 
damage. Despite this, Mulligan was still determined to fight it out. It took a long 
argument with his subordinates to finally convince him that further resistance was 
useless. Over 3,000 Federals surrendered and became prisoners of the State Guard.207 
The MSG suffered about 150 killed and wounded. Aside from the full surrender, 
the Federals suffered almost 40 killed and 117 wounded. While the hard casualties among 
the soldiers were still light compared to great Civil War battles, the Siege of Lexington 
had a dramatic effect on the citizenry and their possessions. One farmer lamented that 
many of his friends and neighbors’ homes had been burned in the crossfire. Much of the 
farmland had also been burned up, resulting in the loss of entire crops. He further 
described the sight of “Horses Mules Men & Hogs lying in all directions some dead 
whilst others maimed & mangled.”208 
The Missouri State Guard was ecstatic. They had marched far north and taken out 
an entire Federal force, as well as beating back several others across the state. They now 
had the supplies and money of Lexington at their disposal. In his report Price gushed with 
pride over the successes of his men. “This victory has demonstrated the fitness of our 
citizen soldiers for the tedious operations of a siege as well as for a dashing charge. They 
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lay for fifty-two hours in the open air without tents or covering, regardless of the sun and 
rain and in the very presence of a watchful and desperate foe, manfully repelling every 
assault and patiently awaiting any orders to storm the fortifications. No general ever 
commanded a braver or a better army. It is composed of the best blood and the bravest 
men of Missouri.” In addition to the prisoners, the State Guard acquired “5 pieces of 
artillery and 2 mortars, over 3,000 stands of infantry arms, a large number of sabers, 
about 750 horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams, and ammunition, 
more than $100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In 
addition to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State and the public 
records, which had been stolen from their proper custodian, and about $900,000 in 
money, of which the bank at this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be 
returned to it.”209 As usual there were disciplinary problems. Many of the captured goods 
were placed in the courthouse to prevent their theft. However, the guards themselves 
looted the place, forcing an angry Price to replace them with an entirely new set of men. 
As Ordnance officer J.F. Snyder, charged with guarding the house, lamented, “our army 
was such a free democracy that my feeble efforts to check that petty rapine, and enforce 
discipline, were but partially successful.”210 
The MSG stayed still, enjoying the fruits of victory and planning their next move. 
Governor Jackson himself arrived to witness his State Guard’s triumph. One veteran 
recalled the wave of euphoria. “Doubts and fears were left to the past, and the dawn 
seemed to appear and brighten the horizon, dissipating the mists and clouds that had 
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shadowed and darkened our earlier fortunes.”211 However, McCulloch’s warnings about a 
rushed northern invasion without proper logistics proved prophetic. Despite a string of 
victories and the resultant captured goods, the State Guard found itself ill-equipped to 
press the offensive. The captured Federal ammunition could only do so much to make up 
for the State Guard’s depletion. Hundreds of their horses were infected with a disease that 
crippled them. Their riders had to guide them on foot. Price had rallied enough to create 
his largest army, but had no means of maintaining and keeping it together.212 
Finding it hard enough to feed and supply his own army, Price was not willing to 
keep the thousands of prisoners around. Before leaving on parole, the Federal soldiers 
had to take an oath. They could not take up arms against Missouri or the Confederacy 
until they had been officially exchanged. A few actually escaped the oath by disguising 
themselves as Guardsmen, an easy feat thanks to the Rebels’ lack of proper uniforms. 
The majority, after having to take the oath, were forced to listen to an angry speech by 
Governor Claiborne Jackson. Jackson harangued them for sticking their noses in 
Missouri’s business and violating its sovereignty. To offset this, Price praised their 
gallant defense in a brief speech before having them marched out of Lexington.213 
Price had hoped that by marching into central Missouri and scoring victories he 
would enable thousands of Missourians to publicly flock to the secessionist cause. “It was 
a delusive hope,” as both potential soldiers and supporting civilians were more interested 
in protecting personal life and property than risking themselves for “any mere abstract 
principle.” Also, hundreds of Guardsmen took on furloughs to help with the harvest at 
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home, or simply to escape danger. Thousands of men did approach to join the Guard 
during its time at Lexington, but a good number of these dispersed for two reasons. First 
many prioritized their farms, which were approaching harvest time, and secondly many 
of the recent volunteers heard of concerning Federal movements.214 
There were two such Federal movements in late September that threatened Price’s 
Army. To the south, Jayhawker General Jim Lane re-entered Missouri and led a raid on 
the town of Osceola, one of Price’s chief supply bases. Wiedemeyer’s contingent of 
Guardsmen there fired a couple of volley before the assailants drove them off. Lane’s 
Kansans then embarked on a drunken spree of looting and violence, burning almost every 
building down and executing nine civilians. It was a harbinger of the kind of war 
Missouri would descend into the following year. This event was a logistical blow to the 
State Guard, but it did lead to increased anti-Union sentiment, a potential source for new 
State Guard recruits. The pro-Confederate Missourians were incensed, with Governor 
Jackson threatening to have Kansas burned “from one end to the other.” A few weeks 
later, 300 Guardsmen crossed into Kansas for a retaliatory raid. This is the only known 
foray into “foreign” territory by the State Guard. They struck the town of Humboldt on 
October 14, taking its citizenry and Union militia completely off guard. They looted the 
town and burned much of it down.215 
The other movement under Fremont was at the moment much more concerning. 
The Lincoln administration had been deluging Fremont with criticisms of his dallying 
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and ineffective management of his disparate forces. Fremont also heard rumors (which 
were true) that the War Department was considering his removal after he issued a 
controversial proclamation on August 30. Responding to the rise of the State Guard and 
the defeat at Wilson’s Creek, he had decided to place the state under martial law and 
emancipate the slaves. While Fremont was a former Republican Presidential candidate 
and free-soiler, it is unclear how much this played a role in this decision. More likely it 
was done for pragmatic reasons in the vein of other Union generals confiscating 
Secessionist property. However, other generals had done this in actual Confederate 
territory. Fremont announced the emancipation in a state that could still swing into the 
Union camp. Fremont’s martial law and emancipation proclamation raised the ire of even 
Missourian Unionists. After all, non-German unionists in the state generally supported 
slavery and had stayed faithful under the belief that the Federal government would not 
actually dare to abolish slavery. The martial law was also carried out with heavy-
handedness. The Lincoln administration was understandably worried how this would 
influence Missourians’ support or hostility to the war. The nightmare scenarios that 
slaveholders in the border states associated with emancipation could lead them to 
embrace Confederate protection. Lincoln tried to diplomatically steer Fremont towards 
retracting his policies, then had to order him outright to do so. Fremont’s emancipation 
proclamation at best freed two slaves if one of his biographies is to be believed, and 
despite some positive reactions to it in the North, it put him on very shaky ground with 
Washington. Feeling pressure from above, Fremont went all-out in assembling a massive 
20,000 man army. He first marched for Price, but his army moved so slow that the State 
Guard commander caught wind of his approach with plenty of time to spare. Knowing 
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that his men were under-equipped to fight such a large force, he ordered his men south. 
The order was obeyed, but with some grumbling. The men thought they were unbeatable, 
and one commented “we thought how silly” General Price was “retreating southward 
with such a formidable array of men at his command.”216 
 To add insult, the withdrawal happened under ominous weather, with constant 
rain and gloomy clouds. The rain made the roads muddy and soaked the soldiers, an 
uncomfortable experience given the temperature was falling as well. It was a struggle to 
find a spot dry enough to mount a tent, and men had to sleep on the chilled ground. At 
one point the Guardsmen came upon a flooded marsh. The men had to walk through two 
feet of water so cold that ice was forming on top. They then found the Osage River 
greatly flooded. All the Rebels had for crossing was one flatboat, which was used by 
Harris’ division. The rest of the men had to chop down the surrounding timber, using the 
logs as bases for planks. These hastily constructed rafts had an “irregular and uneven 
surface”, but they got the job done. Heavy ropes were tied to trees on either side of the 
river and used to pull the rafts back and forth. In this manner Price’s army made it over 
the Osage, albeit slow enough that those who reached the other side took to fishing to 
pass the time. Some were even able to stay in the homes of sympathetic citizens, enjoying 
warm meals and dances with the ladies. The Guardsmen reached the town of Neosho, 
well ahead of Fremont, but it had been whittled down to 7,000 men. Most of the losses 
were desertions.217 Their privations did not end either. The men found themselves low or 
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out of everything. There was no available forage save some corn. A few men “tried 
wildcat.”218 
 McCulloch withdrew his Confederate force south into Arkansas and urged Price 
to follow suit. He explained that a withdrawal into Arkansas’ Boston Mountains would 
provide a “very advantageous” defensive line with easier access to food and other 
supplies. A battle could be fought on the Rebels’ own terms. Price, however, was 
reluctant to take the Texan’s advice. Though Price was being tactically unsound, he did 
have the understandable fear that leaving Missouri, even temporarily for a more favorable 
battleground, would send a message to the state that he had abandoned it.219 
 Meanwhile, Thompson continued his guerilla war to the east. His raids were 
generally successful, but his reports to the commanding Confederate General in the West, 
Albert Sidney Johnston, were laced with frustration. He continually implied that further 
co-operation from regular Confederate forces would do great wonders in eastern 
Missouri. For example, when he announced a successful demolition of a bridge, he hinted 
at the benefits of more material Confederate aid. Johnston simply congratulated him and 
made no guarantees. A few days later on October 18, he announced his intention to take a 
supply rich Federal outpost. He wrote, “Had I with me a few Confederate regiments I 
could take Ironton by Sunday, and capture 12,000,000 rations and an immense quantity 
of forage…” If he only had one brigade sent in he would succeed for sure. The aid did 
not arrive.220 
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 As his First Division suffered setbacks at the end of October, Thompson similarly 
implored Polk and Hardee to send men, but Polk did not and Hardee reiterated that it was 
unfeasible to spend resources on east Missouri.221 The issue was that Confederate forces 
at the moment were spread thin, due to the idea that the best way to gain legitimacy as a 
nation was to hold onto as much territory as possible. Thus Johnston continually 
professed and encouraged support for the Missouri State Guard without intending to 
spend his resources on it. He appeared to see them as a diversionary force, alleviating 
Federal pressure on his side of the Mississippi.222 The unfortunate truth was that the State 
Guard was only one voice clamoring for the attention of the Confederate government. In 
addition to holding onto the vital waterways in the West, the Confederacy was answering 
Texas’ pleas for more protection on the Gulf Coast and on the western frontier. 
Arkansans wanted more of its fighting men on its own soil rather than abroad. Around 
this time Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin ordered two Texas regiments 
to join McCulloch and strengthen the Reel position in Missouri. This shows that the 
Confederate government did have a major interest in Missouri. The regiments, however, 
were diverted by the commanding general in Texas to bolster the coastal defenses. 
Missouri was not being ignored. It was simply a victim of an unwieldy grand strategy.223 
 Late in October Fremont neared Springfield. The advance guard was led by Major 
Charles Zagonyi, a Hungarian and the head of Fremont’s colorful personal bodyguard. 
Zagonyi and the bodyguard had been mocked as window dressing for the ostentatious 
Fremont and felt they had a lot to prove. On October 21 he sped ahead with over 300 
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horsemen against what he thought was about 400 Guardsmen, but was surprised to run 
into over 1,000. Astoundingly, his cavalry charges were successful. His men were so 
gaudily dressed and audacious that when they burst into town the Guardsmen mistook 
them for a fancy mounted militia unit and cheered them on. The bodyguard turned and 
fired their revolvers into the spectators. Zagonyi was able to push the surprised 
Guardsmen out of town. His losses were high, however, with many men dead, wounded, 
or scattered. One of the lost horses ended up in the hands of McBride’s division. McBride 
literally had to stop two of his staff officers from dueling each other over the prize.224 
This small action raised the alarm of the State Guard. One Guardsman wrote to his wife 
that, with Fremont’s large army close by and fresh “recruits coming in every day,” he 
expected “a heavy battle.” He overestimated the State Guard at 30-40,000 men and was 
confident that they would “thrash [the Federal Army] again.”225 But no heavy battle 
came. A messenger reached Fremont and informed him that he was relieved of command. 
His provisional successor, General David Hunter, then made an odd decision. Gathering 
the officers, he declared “Gentlemen, we will not fight tomorrow” and pulled his 40,000 
man army back north, conceding southern Missouri to the State Guard. If one his letters 
to the War Department is to be believed, he had mistakenly believed that the Missourians 
had fled into Arkansas. This still doesn’t explain why he made no effort to cement control 
over southern Missouri.226 
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 This retrograde move, which enabled Price to keep a strong foothold in the state, 
likely contributed to the proceeding political proceedings. On October 21 a second 
secession convention met at Neosho. In the Confederacy’s view the MSG’s string of 
victories over Federal forces was justification enough for Missouri’s legitimacy as a 
member state. As for the reasons for secession, the delegates accused the Federal 
government of “reveling in unbridled power” and in using a “brutal soldiery” to displace 
the legal state troops. The convention sought to move towards three goals: 
1. Of an ordinance dissolving all political connection between the State of Missouri 
and the United State of America. 
2. Of an act of provisional union with the Confederate States of America. 
3. The appointment of three commissioners to the Provisional Congress of the 
Confederate States of America.227 
Naturally, with all the delegates being pro-Southerners secession was approved and 
the Confederate constitution ratified. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, That all 
political ties of every character now existing between the Government of 
the United States of America and the people and government of the State 
of Missouri are hereby dissolved, and the State of Missouri resuming the 
sovereignty granted by compact to the said United States upon the 
 




   
admission of said State into the Federal Union, does again takes its place 
as a free and independent republic amongst the nations of the earth.228 
 There were obvious issues with the legitimacy of this move. No Unionists were 
present for it, meaning that not all Missourians were represented. In fact only 19 senators 
and 68 representatives were let in on the convention and many did not even attend in 
person. They were now part of a new state government with little actual authority over 
much of Missouri. Back in July, Jackson’s blatant support for the Confederacy and armed 
conflict with the Union Army led his governorship to be disregarded. Hamilton R. 
Gamble, a former attorney and judge, took his place as provisional governor, and the 
state legislature declared Jackson a traitor. The Unionist government held sway over most 
of central, eastern, and northern Missouri. Jackson saw this new government as a Federal 
puppet. He rationalized in a letter to President Davis that since the Federal army had 
overrun so much of Missouri, he had no recourse but to move ahead without a vote of the 
people, now represented by Gamble’s government.229 
The announcement of Missouri’s entrance into the Confederacy filled the State Guard 
with newfound hope. Surely the South would send more men and supplies to protect what 
was now one of its states. McCulloch’s force was also nearby and had moved north a 
little, another promising sign. Surely now Missouri could be taken out of the grasp of the 
Union. An article in the Missouri Army Argus, the State Guard’s newspaper, prophesied, 
“The hand of Providence can be discerned in many events affecting our safety and our 
interest. The destiny of Missouri is now and forever the destiny of the Confederate States, 
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and our future, contemplated in the light of history and by the aid of just induction, is a 
bright and glorious future.”230 However, it turned out that there were still obstacles in this 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Losing Missouri 
The MSG’s win-loss ratio was thus far impressive, but there were circumstances that 
enabled these triumphs. The Union Army in Missouri had been uncoordinated and 
misled. Lyon had effectively taken most of Missouri in just a couple months, but his 
campaign withered and died with him as Fremont failed to support him. Price’s 
movement towards the Missouri River had benefitted from sloppy and dilatory 
movements on the part of the Federals. The State Guard was spared in November when 
Fremont was replaced by Hunter, who called off a 20,000 man invasion. On November 9 
the academic William Halleck was installed as the new commander of Federal forces in 
the West. Halleck was far from the striking and inspiring figures of Lyon and Fremont, 
but he had plenty of intelligence and was carefully making plans for a three-pronged 
Union invasion of the western Confederacy. 
 As Halleck set up his plans, the government in Richmond approved Missouri’s 
admittance to the Confederacy. Claiborne Jackson’s government and the MSG had to 
operate within new conditions. Article I promised military aid to drive the Union out of 
the state. Article II put all Missouri military forces under control of Jefferson Davis. It 
would no longer be purely a state defense force. Article III furthermore put almost all 
public property under national Confederate control. One of the conditions was that the 
Missouri State Guard had to be reorganized into Confederate service. Davis pointed out 
that the Confederacy could not effectively aid the MSG in the past because of its 
“anomalous condition.” Even now it was still a state rather than Confederate force. Davis 
recalled that even after the recognition of Confederate statehood, Missourians still 
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deluged him with “unreasonable complaints” that no aid was furnished, even though they 
themselves had not organized themselves in a manner that would welcome such aid.231 
The MSG finally had a sizeable break from campaigning. The objective that 
winter was to complete its training, aided by Confederate resources. While there was a 
respite from the Union Army, it was difficult adjusting to camp conditions. As the heart 
of winter set in, foraging expeditions targeted civilian property, tearing down rail fences 
for firewood as they had no axes to take down trees (some veterans insisted that it was 
Unionist fences that were targeted). The State Guard was hit by another wave of 
desertions, and rather than blame the hard conditions, the faithful targeted the inactivity 
of early 1862. “Active military operations would have immediately aroused all the fire 
and energy of the troops,” claimed Bevier, but instead the men found themselves bored 
while living in sub-par conditions.232 
Thanks to desertions and expiring terms of service, the State Guard was in 
desperate need of more men. Those who had chosen to stay and enter Confederate service 
believed that their future freedom was at stake, their arguments echoing the motivations 
of others within the Confederate rank-and-file. One man considering re-enlistment 
admitted to his wife that he was giving up a chance to “live at home in peace.” He 
believed that if the State Guard and the Confederacy in general was defeated, then “our 
condition will be worse than the Negroes.”233 On November 25 Price distributed a 
Confederate call for one-year volunteers. The men were to enlist as state troops and be 
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paid by the Missouri state until a transfer to Confederate service was completed. The 
MSG was to be reorganized into Confederate brigades, with the men electing most of 
their officers. These elections were invaluable. The State Guard was greatly over-
officered, and the consolidation of the small regiments into full-sized regular army ones 
meant that about half of the officers would lose their positions. After months of 
campaigning, the men knew which of their amateur military officers were proven leaders 
and which needed to be shunted back into political or legal careers. Thus the Missouri 
units ended up with effective leadership and command structures. These reorganized 
units would primarily be infantry, as the Confederacy would not expect mounted units 
without all the proper equipment of the cavalry.234 This reorganization produced some 
divisiveness. Many men preferred to remain in the State Guard, believing their state to 
have primacy over the Confederacy. In turn, the Confederate Missourians began to see 
them, much like McCulloch and McIntosh had, as an undisciplined militia force that 
would drag them down.235 
 Desiring much more men, Price added a second proclamation on November 26, 
exhorting Missourians to flock to the cause. He noted that out of a military age 
population of 200,000, only 5,000 now served in the State Guard’s ranks. Not wanting to 
alienate his potential recruits by impugning their bravery, he acknowledged that there 
was a lack of organization and equipment that may have held off volunteering. Now that 
the Guard was finally getting proper aid, and now that the farmers had finished the fall 
harvest and winter preparations, there was nothing to stop Missourians from leaving their 
homes and helping cast off Federal rule. By staying at home to protect their lives and 
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property, they in fact had endangered it by letting the Union forces and Jayhawkers run 
rampant throughout the state. “I must have 50,000 men. Now is the criss of your fate; 
now the golden opportunity to save the State; now is the day of your political 
salvation…” He asked for volunteers to bring along valuable supplies such as tents, 
weapons, blankets, etc. Remembering the hundreds of holiday soldiers who would melt 
away after a battle, Price implored recruits to “Come to the Army of Missouri, not for a 
week or month, but to free your country.”236 For this purpose he set up a separate camp 
near his own where recruits would be processed prior to joining one of the units.237 
 The new call for recruits produced less than hoped for results. Recruiters did get 
thousands of men to sign up. However, many of these were in the north, which was once 
again nearly cut off by Federal forces. To both protect and hasten their travels to his 
army, Price dispatched cavalry to escort them and screen their movements. These 
cavalrymen would go on forays to find or create recruits. They then had to guide the 
recruits to the main army while dodging both Federal units and Jayhawkers, the latter 
noted by one diarist to have riddled one hopeful Guardsman with 14 bullet holes. Also, 
pro-Southern, or more accurately in some cases anti-Federal men decided they would 
rather join guerilla outfits, among these one under former Guardsman William Quantrill. 
These men were opposed to the Union Army, but would expend much of their energy 
fighting similarly irregular pro-Union Jayhawkers along the Kansas border.238 Conditions 
in camp, despite incoming Confederate assistance, remained very rough for a time. Since 
food and supplies were low, Guardsmen had to leave Springfield and fan out into 
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neighboring towns to find a better place to stay. By February, however, more supplies 
and organization saw the men were “faring sumptuously.”239 
 While his force was still reorganizing, Price and some of his political friends were 
causing trouble with the other Confederates. The Missouri Commission in Richmond was 
hurling accusations at McCulloch, charging him with abandoning Missouri and passing 
up an opportunity for victory. Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin seriously considered 
these charges, writing to McCulloch, “I cannot understand why you withdrew your troops 
instead of pursuing the enemy when his leaders were quarreling and his army separated 
into parts under different commanders. Send an explanation.” McCulloch did more than 
that, choosing to visit Richmond personally to state his case.240 
 This left McIntosh in charge. McCulloch’s right-hand man now found himself 
dealing with Price’s incessant demands for action. Seeing the irregular violence unfolding 
to the north, Price wanted to move at the “earliest practicable day” and restore control up 
to the Missouri River. With McIntosh’s men, he could push to the river and create a safe 
route for which northern Missourians could reach his army.241 About a week later he 
received McIntosh’s reply. McIntosh found an offensive towards the Missouri 
impractical. He felt that his men did not have enough warm clothing or rations to 
campaign “in the depth of winter over the bleak prairies of Missouri.” Furthermore, he 
had already had to detach men to assist allies in Indian Territory and was staying on call 
to assist in the defense of Memphis on the Mississippi. To a general in Richmond, 
McIntosh wrote that he considered Price’s plan for a massive winter campaign “almost 
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madness.”242 Price was so furious with his refusal that he sent a message to Davis 
himself, begging him to flat-out order McIntosh to come to his aid. Davis assured him 
that “we here have not forgotten you; but, on the contrary, have been most anxious to 
give to Missouri all the aid in our power.” He told him that the Confederacy had no 
troops to spare save those in Arkansas, and they were similarly in need of 
reorganization.243 
 Frustrated by another refusal for a cooperative campaign, Price vented his 
frustrations towards General Polk, believing that McCulloch’s inaction “engendered” 
dissatisfaction “in the minds of the people of Missouri” and led them to “doubt whether 
the Confederate Government really sympathizes with them and desires to aid them.” The 
editor of the Missouri Army Argus, repeated these criticisms, expanding them to include 
the central Confederate government in Richmond. The editor’s article spread throughout 
the South (its arguments echoed in similar bitter editorials by other Missouri papers) and 
a furious McCulloch responded with his own article. This article did little to soothe 
relations, as he accused the State Guard of being little more than a rabble of ill-
disciplined militia. McCulloch’s story seems to line up better with the facts. His specific 
attack on Rains’ leadership of the Eight Division matches his omission of the same 
general when commending MSG generals for their bravery in August. Also, his 
accusations of reckless offensive schemes by Price matches up with the Missourian’s 
lucky drive against Lexington and his demands to McIntosh for a dead-in-winter 
offensive. In his defense, Price as a politician may have cannily realized that a rescue of 
Missouri from Jayhawking would foster pro-Southern sentiment, but he displayed some 
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strategic myopia. McIntosh already had to remove some of his force to assist in Indian 
Territory and Johnston’s western line along Kentucky’s southern border to the vital 
Mississippi River was seriously threatened at several points.244 
The Missourians also caused consternation over the command structure of the 
Trans-Mississippi. They wanted a unified command to ensure more cooperation. 
Lieutenant-Governor Reynolds claimed that the Missouri commission made a very 
unreasonable request. It asked that General Price be given command of all forces not just 
in his home state, but Arkansas as well. Not only could Davis not grant this yet since 
Price was still technically a state rather than Confederate general, but this would anger 
any officers and soldiers loyal to McCulloch. For similar reasons it was unfeasible to 
place McCulloch in overall command. Governor Jackson recommended Davis’ friend 
Braxton Bragg (whose egregious flaws as a commander were not yet known at that 
point), but Davis settled on the younger West Pointer Henry Heth. This was immediately 
challenged. The Missourians did not want someone “young and undistinguished.” The 
Missouri delegates in Richmond were horrified at the prospect, arguing that “utter 
ruin…would follow us in the future if some stranger to our troops and people should be 
placed in [Prices’s] stead.” They were so adamant that Price should retain control that 
Heth agreed to refuse the appointment shortly after having already accepted it.245 
Davis did not cave in and choose Price. Instead he found another West Pointer 
that better satisfied Governor Jackson and other leading Missourians. James Earl Van 
Dorn, an experienced cavalry Indian fighter, was the approved choice. Van Dorn was a 
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rising star. Hailing from Mississippi, he soon was leading Texans in capturing or driving 
out Federal troops in their state. He was called to Virginia to lead the Confederate cavalry 
along the Potomac, but did not stay long as he accepted command of Price and 
McCulloch’s forces. He was a highly energetic and reckless man, and this behavior 
extended beyond military life to his interactions with the ladies. Van Dorn left for the 
west on January 19. He arrived at Pocahontas, Arkansas on January 29. 
 As Van Dorn came west, the State Guard was undergoing its transformation. Two 
brigades, the 1st and 2nd Missouri, had been formed. Colonel Henry Little, Price’s 
valuable adjutant-general, was now field commander of the 1st Missouri. A career army 
officer before the war, he put his qualifications to good use, fine-tuning the men’s 
drilling. Slack, who had been proven to be one of the better divisional commanders, was 
rewarded with the 2nd, though his rank fell from brigadier-general to colonel. The rest of 
the force was still the State Guard, though in much smaller numbers. Colonel James P. 
Saunders, the current commander of the Fifth Division, reported that his “force consisted 
of the remainder of regiments reduced to skeletons by expiration of time and transfer to 
Confederate service.” The Fifth Division in fact had less than 1,000 men. Another officer 
listed one regiment as having only 75 men. These were men had either refused 
Confederate service or were awaiting a transfer to a Confederate brigade, the third of 
which was being organized under Colonel Colton Greene. Of the division commanders 
who had served in the summer of 1861, only Thompson, John B. Clark, and Rains 
remained in command of the First, Third, and Eight Divisions respectively. On February 
7 Daniel Frost, who had surrendered his men in the Camp Jackson Affair, made his return 
to Missouri. After his parole, he chose to go to the Confederacy and become a general 
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there. Upon learning that Missouri was now part of the emerging nation, he agreed to go 
west. At Memphis he collected a group of new recruits and fellow paroled Guardsmen, 
along with six gifted cannon from the Confederacy. He made a hard trek through the 
Boston Mountains and arrived with frostbitten, but fresh men and guns. Until 
reorganization was completed he was handed command of both the Seventh and Ninth 
Divisions.246 
 Right after Frost’s arrival the State Guard found itself in crisis. Halleck had 
launched a three-pronged invasion of the western Confederacy. The first prong under 
General Ulysses S. Grant would go for Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee River 
while the second under General John Pope would go directly for the Mississippi River. 
The westernmost of these prongs, General Samuel Curtis’ newly christened Army of the 
Southwest, was to seize the rest of Missouri, defeating disparate groups of guerillas and 
Guardsmen in detail. Once Curtis had solidified control over the countryside and 
gathered his force, he was to hit Price and drive him out of the state. Compared to 
Fremont’s army the year before, Curtis’ was considerably smaller, consisting of about 
14,000 men. However it was much more competently organized and led and moved much 
faster. Despite his proclamation the previous November and constant recruiting efforts, 
Price had fallen far short of the 50,000 men he had hoped for. What he did have was not 
concentrated at his base at Springfield. The Federal forces in the state in fact were already 
turning the tide against the State Guard. One by one Halleck’s Federals, in order to secure 
the various railheads in Missouri, defeated and drove away contingents of Guardsmen 
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from important locations. At the Battle of Mount Zion Church a regiment under Caleb 
Dorsey was scattered in less than an hour. Many of those who fled took individual or 
small group journeys to join the main force under Price. Much worse was the Battle of 
Roan’s Tan Yard. John Poindexter outnumbered a Union cavalry force 800 to 450, but 
was effectively defeated due to the enemy’s superior weaponry.247 These small actions 
formed the prelude to Curtis’ larger final thrust. 
 The Missouri Confederates and Guardsmen were not ready to fight this force. 
Curtis came upon them fast near Springfield, prompting Price to order a hasty retreat. In 
his later report Price claimed that he knew the enemy was coming after him, but, hoping 
for reinforcements from Arkansas, “held my position to the very last moment.” This is 
contradicted by other sources, who recalled that their withdrawal south was immediate. 
Many Guardsmen had to leave their suppers cooking over the fire. Somehow Quarter-
master general Harding had not received the order to retreat and was caught off guard. 
Working as fast as he could with his wagons, many of them civilian property that was 
“requisitioned,” he was able to haul away nearly all supplies in his immediate vicinity 
save for “one keg of mule shoes, one box of trousers and a few tents.” Having run out of 
wagons, he had a mounted unit put on the trousers and drape the tents over the pommels 
of their saddles, meaning he only lost the keg of mule shoes. However the MSG overall 
still lost 60 wagonloads of supplies in their necessary haste.248 
The First Missouri Cavalry mounted a charge that slowed the Union Army. What 
followed was a torturous fighting retreat south, “one of the severe tramps of the war.” 
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The retreat was cold, often rainy, and conducted over difficult terrain. If there was any 
time for sleep, many of the men found themselves unable to do so because of the uneven 
rocky ground.249 The heroes of this retreat were young Churchill Clark and his battery. 
He displayed a level of skill that showed the growing maturity of the Missouri artillerists. 
He constantly unlimbered his artillery to slow down the Federal advance cavalry, often in 
the form of ambushes. These resulted in seven short skirmishes from February 12 to 
February 25. Usually the Federals were slowed by Clark’s battery, enabling the rest of 
Price’s force to gain some distance. Then Clark’s battery would limber up and catch up 
with the infantry. This formula was broken at one point when the Union cavalry overtook 
a small contingent of Missouri cavalry, then surrounded Clark’s battery. The artillerymen 
grabbed whatever rifles and pistols they had, as well as sponges and other tools, and 
fought the Federals until infantry came to the rescue.250 
Clark and men from the 1st Missouri also broke the formula by setting a trap at the 
town of Keytsville. Clark set up his battery to face down a lane, with the infantry hiding 
behind the brow of a hill. The cavalry came down the lane “at a brisk trot, sabers rattling, 
laughing gaily and merrily”. Clark screamed the order to fire and the four cannon blasted 
their contents. The horses panicked, throwing riders to the ground. The riders wheeled 
about and rode straight back into those behind them, causing a traffic jam. This gave 
Clark’s battery time to reload and fire again. The second cannon volley was much 
deadlier, hitting the jam-packed cavalry and killing and wounding men and horses alike. 
The enemy scattered. Happy to have this small victory, the Rebels went back to the 
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retreat. Approaching the Arkansas border, the State Guard hoped to see McCulloch’s 
force, but learned it had already retreated itself. Thus, with “heavy hearts,” they crossed 
into Arkansas, leaving their home state in Federal hands.251 
 The pursuit continued into Arkansas. The State Guard met up again with 
McCulloch’s force at the supply base at Fayetteville. The reception of the Missourians 
was mixed. William Watson believed that as at Wilson’s Creek, Price had been lax in 
intelligence-gathering and had been fooled by Unionists. This resulted in him being once 
again surprised by a Union army and now the entire Confederate presence in the area was 
in trouble. Watson also suggested a dark truth about Price’s vision of a Confederate 
Missouri. “…Many thought that the people of Missouri were not so much devoted to the 
Southern cause as Price had led himself to believe.”252 
Once again there was great disagreement. Price believed that, united once again, 
they could make a stand, but McCulloch argued that a retreat was necessary. Also, thanks 
to a lack of communication likely caused by an inoperable telegraph line, the Texan had 
not been aware of Price’s retreat and had no time to prepare. Thanks to McCulloch’s 
refusal, Price had no choice but to continue his retreat. In the end the Confederates had to 
burn all the supplies they left behind, accidentally setting parts of the town on fire as 
well. As it happened Curtis elected to stop short of the town, finding Sugar Creek to the 
north much more defensible. His army’s fast and hard marching, quite a feat in the 
“sterility and rockiness” of the Ozarks, had outpaced his supply lines.253 
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 Morale was mixed among the Guardsmen. “Some called for transfer (which was 
never granted), some wanted to go to infantry, some wanted to remain cavalry, some 
wished they had never enlisted…” Those wishing to become infantry got their wish, 
adding to the ranks of the still incomplete 2nd Missouri Brigade, while Guardsmen 
wishing to remain cavalry joined Gates’ regiment.254 
During this respite from pursuit, Price and McCulloch met their new commander. 
Van Dorn, meeting them on March 3, proved to be a wise choice for uniting the western 
forces, creating “a sort of harmony between the two generals.” As a West Pointer with 
years of experience fighting Indians, he appealed to McCulloch’s wish for a qualified 
leading officer. His strategy, though it has received criticism in military histories, 
appealed to the Missourians. He proposed to lead his army back into Missouri. He 
believed the Union Army of the Southwest had halted for reinforcements, and thus he 
needed to strike them now. First he would defeat Curtis, then “to St. Louis – huzzah!” He 
wanted to start immediately. The mood improved among the Missourians. “We wer all in 
good Sperits and perfectly ready to start home. It does seam that every soldier is cheered 
up and feels fooley assured of a grait victory.”255 
 Van Dorn has been criticized for planning and executing an ambitious campaign 
so quickly and in late winter. Though he provided an ammunition train and an extra day 
of rations for each division, he ordered all other supplies left behind.256 However, there 
were some factors in his favor. Curtis was far ahead of his base of supplies and exposed. 
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Van Dorn also had a sizeable numerical superiority over him. Curtis had 10,500 men. 
Van Dorn was able to bring together 16,500.257 Van Dorn’s force was split into two 
wings. The State Guard and Missouri brigades, the largest element on its own, made up 
one wing under Price. McCulloch was to lead the other wing. In addition to his own men, 
he had Albert Pike’s Indian Brigade, consisting of Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Creeks, 
and several units of Arkansans. The Arkansans’ interests aligned well with the 
Missourians. Seeing how the Federals would enter their state after pushing the State 
Guard out of theirs, Arkansas’ government had been vainly trying to convince the 
Confederate government to send all Arkansas units back to the state.258 Thus Van Dorn’s 
plan, which had the objective of pushing the war northward, was widely approved, 
though even Price was surprised by how fast he intended to execute it. 
 Curtis responded with a retreat towards a more favorable position. Van Dorn first 
tried to cut off and bag Sigel’s two German divisions at Bentonville. The entrapment was 
undone by bungling on both sides and Sigel escaped (one Missourian wryly noted years 
later that Sigel had a lucky habit of always escaping the State Guard; at Carthage, 
Wilson’s Creek, and now Bentonville). The Federals took position on the heights behind 
Little Sugar Creek. Not wanting to assault these heights, Van Dorn hatched another 
ambitious plan. He would put his men on a circuitous route that put them in the Federals’ 
rear, catching them by total surprise. His route was the Bentonville Detour. Unfortunately 
the Federals had already considered that this route might be used and had cut down 
timber to create obstructions. The night of March 6 was spent clearing these obstacles. 
The Confederates had to hack their way through with axes while traversing “rough and 
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mountainous” terrain.”  To save time Van Dorn sent McCulloch’s men on another road. 
Because of this McCulloch ran into the enemy near the village of Leetown on March 7, 
completely separated from the commanding general and Price’s wing. The following 
Battle of Pea Ridge was thus two battles within close proximity.259 
 The fight for McCulloch went well at first, but there were several failures to press 
the advantage. Tragedy also struck the force’s leadership, as both McCulloch and then 
McIntosh were killed. Left in the hands of the far less inspiring Albert Pike, the 
Confederate effort in this area petered out. Price’s fight was at Elkhorn Tavern, under the 
supervision of Van Dorn. Elkhorn Tavern was a large building situated on a hill and 
served as Curtis’ headquarters. Van Dorn uncharacteristically grew cautious, passing up 
an opportunity to quickly smash the Federals around the tavern. He instead spent valuable 
time having the Missourians form up in battle lines, the State Guard in the east and the 
official Confederate units in the west. This gave time for Union Colonel Eugene Carr to 
bring up the rest of his surprised division. Price sent forward a skirmishing force 
comprised of his personal escort. At 10 AM they came upon the Federals and “succeeded 
in bringing on a general engagement,” buying time for the arrival of the First and Second 
Missouri Brigades. They quickly seized several heights from which they gained a 
commanding view of the Federal encampment. From these their artillery did effective 
work. The batteries were able to unlimber under heavy fire and once ready created a 
“living wall of fire which Missouri may well be proud of.” The Federal batteries were 
driven back. Several infantry counter-attacks were likewise handily repulsed. As at 
Wilson’s Creek, Price was lightly wounded, this time with a “bullet hole in his wrist, a 
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very painful wound.” His arm in a sling, he continued to lead his men, attempting to get 
into Carr’s right flank. Curtis sent timely reinforcements to prevent this.260 
By attacking against the Federals’ rear, the Missourians found themselves in 
possession of many spoils of war. They captured several enemy guns that had been 
hurried to stem the tide of their assault. Frost’s Guardsmen were fortunate enough to 
make an assault on the encampment around Elkhorn Tavern. Most of the Missourians had 
not eaten in thirty-six hours. Driving the Federals off, they came upon “a large quantity 
of sutler’s and subsistence stores” to relieve their famishment. However, there were 
major losses as well. Colonel Slack was severely shot in the hip, near his Wilson’s Creek 
wound, and had to be taken off the field. He died on March 20, ironically on the same 
day the Confederate government granted his commission as brigadier-general. Price saw 
that his men had made several major gains and had repulsed every counter-attack. 
Sensing success, he ordered his whole line forward at once. This drove the Federals back 
further through their camps and across a field. The Second Missouri Brigade repulsed a 
final counterattack before nightfall ended the fighting. The Missourians had to sleep 
where they had battled, still holding their weapons. Though cold and tired, they were 
optimistic. Colonel Thomas Rosser, taking the wounded Slack’s place, reported the views 
of the men. “Having been successful in every instance, officers and men were sanguine 
that victory was ours, and that the following day would make successful our arms.” Battle 
reports and veterans make it sound like nightfall prevented them from pressing further 
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and achieving victory, but in fact the Federals, though constantly pushed back, had 
prevented any decisive breakthrough and inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers.261 
On the night of March 7, the men went to sleep right where they had stopped 
fighting, “on the wet ground without blankets,” still in shooting range of each other.262 It 
was the largest battle the State Guard had been in yet, though perhaps not as ferocious as 
Wilson’s Creek. It was also the first battle where they had to contend with the mass 
overnight moaning and crying of the wounded. One veteran recalled the grisly scenes he 
came upon during the night. “The wounded of both sides were still lying thickly around, 
in the woods down by the road and down by the spring. Broken down wagons and 
dismounted cannon, dead horses and small arms thickly strewn the ground, with the 
numerous killed of both sides, told of a terrible conflict.”263 Orderly sergeant Ford had to 
endure the sounds of the Union wounded in his front and found himself unable to do 
nothing. “I awoke the tired guards that were off duty and had them build a great big log 
fire out of the quantity of trees lying all around us. I then had all the wounded brought 
and placed around it, and had their canteens all filled with water to quench their thirst, 
which is terrible when one is wounded and bleeding profusely. The thankful expressions 
those men gave me was more than enough to pay me for my care of them.” General Price 
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sent one of his aides to request the fire be put out, lest it attract enemy fire, but upon 
learning the reason for it let it keep burning.264 
The next day the Union, having shifted men from its left to right flank to bolster 
it, went on the offensive. Since Van Dorn had cut off their escape route with his flanking 
march, many Federal officers believed they were attempting a breakout rather than an 
actual defeat of the Confederates. At seven in the morning the battle resumed “with great 
fury” as artillery fire riddled the Missourians’ ranks. Those Missourians resting in the 
woods found themselves engulfed in a “cyclone of falling timber and busting shells.” 
Sigel then led an attack that gradually pushed the Confederates back. In the following 
engagement Churchill Clark, the youthful battery commander who had been a star at the 
Siege of Lexington and the retreat from Missouri, was decapitated by round shot. Curtis 
did not realize how well-timed his attack had been. The Missourians’ wagon train, in a 
“strange and criminal mistake,” had been left far behind on the long march and the men 
were dangerously low on ammunition. One of the Missouri batteries was now literally 
firing “spare trace-chains and blacksmith tools.” Van Dorn ordered a general retreat. The 
Second Missouri obeyed, disengaging efficiently. However, the First Missouri did not 
respond in time and broke in a more disorganized fashion.265 What followed was another 
rough retreat southwards, with the extra burdens of dangerously low rations and hundreds 
of wounded men. One Missourian recalled that he and his comrades had to drag their 
wagons “by hand through swamps and sloughs” and worse abandon many of their 
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wounded comrades.266 They got back to where they had started, no closer to regaining 
their presence in Missouri. 
Van Dorn later claimed in his report that the collapse of his right wing as well as a 
lack of food and ammunition put him in a tight spot and necessitated his withdrawal 
order, but it appears that he actually had intended to continue the battle and it was the 
heavy Federal cannonade and assault that forced the decision. Regardless, Missourians 
were irate and for years afterwards insisted that if they had stood and fought the Federals 
would have collapsed. One reminiscing veteran even depicted Price with “tears in his 
eyes” as he begged for four, two, or even just one half-hour to halt the Federal attack.267 
Very well may Price have cried. The Battle of Pea Ridge proved to be the last of 
the early battles for Missouri, and was even fought in Arkansas rather than his home 
state. This was not so clear at the time. Van Dorn was already thinking out another 
northward movement into Missouri. His returning optimism may have been a misreading 
of General Curtis’ movements. Curtis had turned north instead of pursuing the 
Confederates south. Van Dorn believed the Federals had been so shaken that they had 
abandoned their drive into Arkansas. As it turned out, hundreds of Missouri Guardsmen 
had decided to ditch the Confederate army and go back home. There were so many 
deserters that Curtis mistook this for a continued Rebel movement towards Missouri. Van 
Dorn boldly claimed “I was not defeated, but only failed in my intentions. I am yet 
sanguine of success, and will not cease to repeat my blows whenever the opportunity is 
 
266 William N. Hoskin (1841-) Civil War Diary, 1862-1865, MHS. 




   
offered.”268 Price, recovering from a swelling of his arm wound, also regained his 
enthusiasm. He stated in his communications with the government in Richmond that 
“with such additions to my force as I am led to believe will shortly be made, although not 
officially advised of them, I do not question my ability to penetrate aggressively the heart 
of Missouri.”269 
Van Dorn’s assessment of the Missourians should be noted. Like McCulloch he 
listed “bad discipline” as a cause of concern, but in this case he was likely referring to 
McCulloch’s wing itself, which fell apart upon the death of its commanders. In fact he 
was impressed by Price’s men. “I have never seen better fighters than these Missouri 
troops and more gallant leaders than General Price and his officers. From the first to the 
last shot they continually pushed on and never yielded an inch they had won, and when at 
last they received the order to fall back they retired steadily and with cheers. General 
Price received a severe wound early in the action, but would neither retire from the field 
nor cease to expose himself to danger.” Henry Little, commander of the First Missouri, 
particularly impressed Van Dorn with his “coolness, skill, and devotion” (William Shea, 
Pea Ridge’s main historian, shares this assessment, considering Little to have been the 
only effective commander in the Confederate ranks).270 
Van Dorn and Price’s plans were put on hold when Albert Sidney Johnston 
requested his men in Tennessee. Johnston was desperate to reverse the Confederacy’s 
fortunes in the west and planned a knockout blow against the Union army at Pittsburg 
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Landing on the Tennessee River. Thus the Missourians who signed up with the 
Confederacy to rescue their state from the Federal grasp were now to fight in foreign 





















   
CHAPTER IX 
After the Guard 
 
Van Dorn’s Army of the West never made it to Pittsburg Landing. They were too late to 
make it to the battle there. The fight there, better known as the Battle of Shiloh, was a 
Union victory and the Confederates had to regroup at Corinth. However, Van Dorn’s 
army was still wanted east of the Mississippi. Much to their growing discontent, the 
Missourians in his force learned that their home state had fallen low on the Confederacy’s 
list of priorities. The would-be nation was in dire straits in April of 1862. It had lost its 
footholds in Kentucky and Missouri. The Union naval cordon along its coasts was 
tightening. Its defenses on the Tennessee River were falling one by one and a massive 
consolidated Federal Army had emerged in Tennessee, poised to strike even further 
south. In the east, General George B. McClellan’s equally massive Army of the Potomac 
had landed on the Virginia Peninsula and was within a few days’ march of the capital at 
Richmond. The loss of Missouri hastened the loss of Confederate control over the 
northern Mississippi, with effective resistance on the western side of the river eliminated.  
The war west of the Mississippi was to become a secondary theatre. While early battles 
such as Wilson’s Creek and Pea Ridge would have their place in thousands of history 
books, other episodes would be relegated to the fringes, if mentioned at all. As if to 
symbolize this change in circumstances, Governor Claiborne Jackson had to step down 
thanks to a battle with stomach cancer. The more openly pro-Confederate Reynolds 
ascended to his place. 
The men in Price’s army made their final decision. About 4,000 went east with 
Price. The rest, the remaining State Guard, stayed west under the command of Mosby 
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Parsons. Parsons was instructed to return to Missouri and reorganize the men “into 
companies, battalions, and regiments, according to law.”271 Indeed, the State Guard 
actually survived for the entire war, but in name only.272 Van Dorn’s Army of the West 
landed at Memphis, Tennessee, on April 15. It made its way to Corinth, the center of the 
Confederate military at the moment. There they saw the impressive earthworks set up by 
General Pierre G.T. Beauregard. Remembering his capture of Lexington, Price was 
dismissive of these fortifications, ironic considering he would lose much of his men 
assaulting these same earthworks later in the year. There was no great battle for Corinth, 
as it was abandoned in the face of an overwhelming force under Halleck. While the 
Confederate leadership in the west desperately tried to figure out how to reverse their 
fortunes, Price made a trip to Richmond, arriving in June.273 
The citizens of Richmond greeted Price with enthusiasm, but Missouri’s general 
quickly became a great nuisance, and perhaps a serious threat, to President Davis. Price 
wanted his men re-assigned back to Arkansas, from which they could make another 
attempt to reclaim Missouri. He had the support of Van Dorn who, prior to Price’s 
arrival, sent a letter to the president with the message, “the love of the people of Missouri 
is so strong for General Price, and his prestige as a commander so great there, wisdom 
would seem to dictate that he be put at the head of affairs in the West.”274 Davis was not 
convinced, likely remembering the command feuds that Price had been a part of. Also 
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Braxton Bragg, one of Davis’ firmest friends, had just been installed as the new 
commander in the central Confederacy. Bragg wanted to keep Price, or more accurately 
his hard-fighting men as the Union threatened to cut deep into the vitals of the South in 
Tennessee and Georgia. Davis, who was always biased towards loyal friends, naturally 
bent to his wishes. 
The following meeting between Price and Davis grew heated, though to what 
extent is uncertain. The two sources for this encounter are Snead and Reynolds. Snead 
described Davis as “contemptuous” in the discussion, growing more and more frustrated. 
Price threatened to resign and try to take Missouri without the Confederacy’s help. Davis 
said he would be greatly surprised if Price won any victories in such conditions. Angered 
by this attack upon his generalship, Old Pap slammed a “fist down upon the table with a 
violence which set the inkstands and everything upon it a-dancing.” Reynolds added that 
after they stormed out, Snead was so furious that he tore the Confederate insignia off his 
uniform. He and Price seriously considered returning to Missouri under the “bear flag,” 
in other words retaking command of the State Guard. Despite Price’s actions of 
disrespect, Davis did promise to send the Missouri brigades back, with the vague 
qualifier “as soon as it could safely be done.”275 
Rumors of disloyalty on the part of Price provided further tension. One of Price’s 
sons, Edwin Price, had served in the State Guard as a brigadier-general and commander 
of the Fifth Division. While leading recruits to the State Guard in February of 1862 he 
was intercepted and captured. Though paroled, he opted out of the MSG and then 
declared himself as a Unionist. This led to a conspiracy theory that Price and his son were 
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forming plans to create a separate Northwest Confederacy, aligning Missouri with 
northern Midwestern states. This would be accomplished with the aid of Democrat 
copperheads in such places as Illinois and Ohio. More tangible was the prospect of a 
separate western Confederacy. Congressmen from the Trans-Mississippi states of Texas, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Missouri felt abandoned by the central government and did 
openly consider forming a separate entity so more of their fighting men would not be 
siphoned off to the east. Thomas Reynolds claimed that other delegates from Missouri 
later told him of a scheme to forcibly remove Davis from the presidency and have Price 
installed as a ‘generalissimo.” These potential challenges to Davis’ authority, and the 
Confederate government in general, were not wanted at a time when a large Federal army 
was at Richmond’s doorstep.276 
No such takeover occurred. Price left before the battles for Richmond went 
underway. These battles ended in a Confederate victory and disenchanted elements 
within the government either warmed back up to Davis’ administration or did not dare 
make a move against it at this time. As for whether an anti-Davis faction really 
considered installing Price as the new leader of the Confederacy, the only firm source 
appears to be Reynolds himself. It is hard to prove to what extent this scheme was 
seriously considered and how close it came to execution. 
Price returned to his men, serving under Bragg and Van Dorn. His men performed 
bravely, but failed to achieve victory at the Battles of Iuka and Corinth. Price finally lost 
patience and went to Arkansas, leaving his battle-hardened Missourians. Their paths 
would grow far apart. The Missouri brigades were part of the surrendered garrison at 
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Vicksburg in July of 1863. After their parole they fought in the 1864 Atlanta Campaign. 
Jeff Thompson’s men also continued their war. Under intensifying Federal pressure in 
Missouri, they crossed over the Mississippi. They were supposed to finally link up with 
the rest of the former State Guard at Corinth, but ended up manning a “cotton-boat fleet” 
to defend the vital port city of Memphis. Thompson actually scored a naval victory, but 
could not prevent the ultimate fall of Memphis. He returned west to wage more irregular 
warfare in southern Missouri and Arkansas.277 
Price saw it his duty to retake Missouri and constantly badgered his various 
superior officers in the Trans-Mississippi to give him an opportunity. The Trans-
Mississippi Department was always too far short of men for any major offensive 
operation, much less the conquest of an entire state. In the meantime Price was never able 
to recapture the glory of 1861. He commanded Arkansans and Missourians, but a good 
number of the latter had not been part of the State Guard. His battle record saw much 
more defeats than victories, though the blame could be shared with other incompetent 
generals. The State Guard’s political leader, Claiborne Jackson, also suffered misfortune. 
He succumbed to his affliction on December 7, 1862, on Arkansas rather than Missouri 
soil.278 
Though Price and the Confederate Army remained confined to battlefields in 
Arkansas, Tennessee, and elsewhere, Missouri was not free from violence. Bands of 
guerillas, known as Bushwhackers, sprouted up across the state. Former Guardsmen 
 
277 “The First Naval Victory on the Mississippi River, by Gen. Jeff Thompson,” from H.W.R. 
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278 Phillips, 273. 
144 
 
   
made up much of these bands and one, William Quantrill, became their most famous 
leader. These men committed irregular and far more violent warfare, not above killing 
Unionist civilians and surrendering soldiers. Actually commissioned as a colonel, 
Quantrill was in correspondence with Price (only one of his reports to Price has 
survived). Price assumed that all the stories about Quantrill, including the infamous 
Sacking of Lawrence, Kansas, were fictions of Union propaganda, and if confronted with 
evidence to the contrary, made the excuse that the Federals had violated the rules of war 
first. The State Guard also continued to operate in a fashion, though given the 
circumstances of tightened Federal occupation it copied the tactics of the Bushwhackers. 
One colonel, Joseph Porter, had been sent to northern Missouri to recruit more men. He 
formed a cavalry regiment, the Northeast Missouri Cavalry, for the purpose of raiding 
Federal and Home Guard outposts. Porter’s regiment were to send most of the captured 
weapons and supplies south for use by the Confederacy. Porter’s actions aroused the 
anger of the Federals, who lumped him in with the guerillas. He was accused of 
condoning the murder of non-combatants and prisoners, which some of his men indeed 
penetrated. In the Palmyra Massacre ten prisoners taken from Porter’s regiment were 
executed as criminals.279 
In the summer of 1864 Price finally got his permission to return Missouri. His 
superior, General Kirby Smith, envisioned a larger version of several previous raids by 
famed cavalry commanders John Marmaduke and Jo Shelby, both former officers in the 
State Guard. The plan was for Price to drum up recruitment and seize or destroy the 
various stocks of Federal supplies throughout the state. Price had more ambitious goals. 
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He sought to reach and seize Jefferson City and St. Louis before the November elections. 
Missouri’s secessionist politicians would be brought along to the capital, where they 
would be voted in. This would thus bring the entire state into the Confederacy. Governor 
Reynolds even came along to ensure that Price did not cut him out of a potential 
Confederate Missouri.280 The entire campaign quickly fell off the rails, largely due to 
Price’s agenda. He brought along a massive wagon train of poorly-conditioned vehicles, 
along with a host of pro-Confederate civilians who had fled the state years earlier. Price 
had up to 20,000 men, many of them unarmed and undisciplined. While the Guardsmen 
had these qualities, this current batch of new recruits were more interested in looting or 
were conscripted Arkansans with no interest in risking their lives for the Confederacy, 
much less Price’s personal goal to redeem Missouri. 
Price got a late start thanks to a delay in ordnance delivery, meaning that 
diversionary thrusts in other parts of the Trans-Mississippi had already played out. This 
resulted in better prepared Federal opposition when his army entered the state in early 
September. Price’s force suffered heavy casualties in its first major engagement at Fort 
Davidson and he abandoned any hope of taking one of the major cities. He moved for the 
easier targets, but was defeated several times more, due to a combination of inflexible 
leadership and his long, slow baggage train. One by one he had to abandon his objectives 
and he returned to Arkansas having lost nearly half of his army. One other factor in his 
defeat was the attitude of Missourians. In 1861 the Camp Jackson Affair and Lyon’s 
aggressive heavy-handedness had united Missourians of all stripes. By 1864, however, 
the majority of Missourians had chosen Unionism or neutrality thanks to less 
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controversial Union commanders as well as the depredations on civilians and their 
property by Confederate guerillas and raiders (though Federal soldiers and Kansas 
Jayhawkers committed similar acts). In fact, Price’s army continually had to contend with 
native Missouri militia. Even if he did seize Jefferson City or one of his other great 
objectives, there was no chance the state would go into the Confederacy. Thus Price 
waged a campaign with impossible end goals and set himself up for failure.281 
Governor Reynolds was so furious with Price’s performance that he made it his 
mission to destroy his reputation. Price spent the rest of the war countering attacks in the 
press by Reynolds and delivering his own. When the war did come to an end in May 
1865, with Union victory, Price, Reynolds, Shelby, and other Missourians fled to Mexico. 
They were among the Trans-Mississippi Confederates who refused to live in the reforged 
Union. Once in Mexico some of them took political and military roles under the Austrian 
Emperor Maximilien (Maximilien was installed as ruler by the French, who took 
advantage of the Civil War to seize Mexican territory without United States interference). 
As for Price, he and several hundred other Confederates formed a colony in northern 
Mexico, with hired Mexican labor servicing their plantations. Emperor Maximilien was 
deposed and executed and the more democratic government that took his place wanted 
his American supporters gone. Price returned to Missouri and was greeted as a hero. The 
stress of the last few years had gotten to him, however, and after a bout with several 
illnesses he died on September 29, 1867.282 
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Snead, Thompson, and others chose to remain in the restructured Union and 
resume some semblance of their pre-war lives. Like other veterans, the former members 
of the State Guard held reunions. Unfortunately for them, Missouri had furnished many 
more men for the Union Army and pro-Union militia. Thus veteran and memorial 
organizations in the state did not lean their way and were likely to commemorate the 
defeats of their Confederate brethren as heroic victories. Thompson was the most visible 
of the former commanding officers. He was determined to help restore the South through 
modern methods. He mainly did this through his engineering talents. Notably he was 
involved in public works and the draining of some of the same swamps he had fought and 
hidden in.283 
Though wracked with guerilla violence, Missouri would ultimately become a 
valuable asset for the Union, providing over 100,000 men to its army.284 Apart from its 
military contribution, its’ political policies under Governor Gamble would shift towards  
Republican stance. The Emancipation Proclamation, which freed slaves in rebellious 
territories, did not extend to Missouri. However, the momentum of emancipation began 
to have its effect even on Missouri’s Democrats. With the 13th Amendment likely to pass 
on the Federal level, the State Legislature was keen to get ahead and almost unanimously 
abolished slavery on January 11, 1865. The overall argument for emancipation was not 
only that slavery was wicked and contrary to “republican principles,” but had been the 
prime cause of disunion. Missouri’s preference for Conditional Unionism had been shed 
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by this point, lost thanks to the aggressive actions of the Secessionists and the 
Unconditional Unionists in 1861.285 
It would be unjust to entirely blame the Confederacy’s lost opportunity to have 
Missouri on Price, Governor Jackson, and the State Guard. The Confederate commanders 
in neighboring states could have coordinated better to assist, even with their own 
logistical and strategic issues. On the Union side some of their commanders in 1862 did 
an effective job of launching offensives against southern Missouri. However, many 
mistakes were made by the pro-Confederate Missourians. The most justified issues were 
on the political end. Claiborne Jackson and others could not fully endorse allegiance to 
the Confederacy as there were too many conditional Unionists in the state and even in the 
state military. They had to use underhanded methods to trigger the conditions that would 
turn these Unionists against the Federal government. This meant, however, that the 
Confederate government, operating on certain political norms, would not send wholesale 
support in men and material. It was not until Lyon’s force threatened to penetrate through 
southern Missouri into Confederate territory that McCulloch led his army to help. 
The State Guard’s indiscipline was another major factor. This was somewhat 
excusable as aggressive Federal actions deprived it of any good amount of time for 
training and supply. The Missourians soon proved themselves brave fighters at Wilson’s 
Creek and those who stuck around long enough to enter Confederate service were 
considered some of the best soldiers. But their propensity for looting or taking leaves of 
absence without permission put their reliability into question. Indeed the State Guard’s 
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1865, (St. Louis: Missouri Democrat, 1865), 13-14; Harrison Anthony Trexler, Slavery in Missouri, 1804-
1805, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1914), 238-240. 
149 
 
   
numbers fluctuated constantly. Hundreds of men would come for a fight and then leave 
once it was done. Others would melt away during moments of great hardship, such as the 
cold retreat from Lexington in late 1861 and the winter retreat the following year. It was 
much easier to desert when they were not only in their home state, but were in a state 
occupied by Federal forces. There were also many who were all for Missouri and not for 
the Confederacy. Many declined to enter Confederate service in 1862 and made their way 
home instead. It would not be surprising if some of them served in the militia that 
opposed Price’s 1864 expedition. 
Price and his supporters were perhaps most responsible for derailing coordination 
with the Confederates. Many singled out McCulloch, McIntosh, and even President Davis 
for prejudice and apathy towards Missouri. These accusations would have more validity 
if not for Price’s track record post-Pea Ridge. Price was always butting heads with his 
superiors and associates. He got into a heated argument with President Davis in June of 
1862. He quarreled with the commanders of the Trans-Mississippi. He even became a 
bitter enemy of other Missourians, foremost among them Marmaduke and Reynolds. The 
only constant in these strained alliances was Price himself. He was described by many as 
vain and arrogant. He thought only of his own cause, the liberation of Missouri from the 
Federal government. Though he served the Confederacy for the rest of the war, he could 
not put the national Confederate cause ahead of his own, even though a victory for that 
cause could perhaps achieve his personal one. Price was likely only tolerated in his high 
position because of his one great quality. No matter his strategic and tactical flaws, he 
could always garner enthusiastic loyalty from his fellow Missourians. The Confederacy 
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likely never removed him from his position as a major general because to do so would 
alienate Missourians in their camp. 
 The leadership of Missouri’s pro-Confederate elements ultimately held more 
blame for the loss of Missouri. Price was difficult to work with and the politicians were 
not strong enough in their overtures. If the Missouri State Guard had taken a more 
cautious approach in the wake of Wilson’s Creek and did not strain relations with 
McCulloch, the Confederacy could have maintained a considerable foothold in south 
Missouri while Guardsmen in occupied northern Missouri waged a guerilla war (with 
supporting raids and supply runs from the south). Also, a modest approach to retaking 
Missouri might have guaranteed more willing and better coordinated aid from other 
Confederate forces along the Mississippi. The alliance between the State Guard and 
Confederate Army instead faced serious tensions, tensions which lost the state and better 
enabled and hastened the rapid Federal takeover of most of the Mississippi. The loss of 
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